Why We Are At War Part 8

'a refusal to prolong the term of the ultimatum would render nugatory the proposals made by the Austro-Hungarian Government to the Powers, and would be in contradiction to the very basis of international relations.'[141]

V

_Great Britain declines 'Solidarity' with Russia and France_.

There is however another question which involves the whole foreign policy of Great Britain. Could Sir Edward Grey have prevented the war by boldly declaring at once that England would support Russia and France, if necessary by armed force? It was a policy urged on him from several quarters, and it is possible that such action might have been successful. It is to Sir Edward Grey's credit that he quietly but firmly refused to take so hazardous and unprecedented a step. Let us examine these proposals briefly. As early as July 24th M. Sazonof 'hoped that His Majesty's Government would not fail to proclaim their solidarity with Russia and France.[142]' The French Amba.s.sador at St. Petersburg joined in the request, and M. Sazonof pointed out that

'we would sooner or later be dragged into war if it did break out; we should have rendered war more likely if we did not from the outset make common cause with his country and with France[143].'

On July 30th the President of the French Republic expressed his conviction that

'peace between the Powers is in the hands of Great Britain. If His Majesty's Government announced that England would come to the aid of France in the event of a conflict between France and Germany, as a result of the present differences between Austria and Servia, there would be no war, for Germany would at once modify her att.i.tude[144].'

Even more important was the opinion of the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs, whose country was a member of the Triple Alliance:--

'As Germany was really anxious for good relations with ourselves, if she believed that Great Britain would act with Russia and France, he thought it would have a great effect.'[145]

Such opinions must, and do, carry great weight, but Sir Edward Grey and the British Amba.s.sadors were equally firm in withstanding them. Sir George Buchanan at once told M. Sazonof that he

'saw no reason to expect any declaration of solidarity from His Majesty's Government that would entail an unconditional engagement on their part to support Russia and France by force of arms'.[146]

On July 27th he met the proposal more directly by pointing out that, so far from such a policy conducing to the maintenance of peace, it would merely offend the pride of the Germans and stiffen them in their present att.i.tude.[147] Two days later Sir Edward Grey pointed out to M. Cambon that

'even if the question became one between Austria and Russia, we should not feel called upon to take a hand in it. It would then be a question of the supremacy of Teuton or Slav--a struggle for supremacy in the Balkans; and our idea had always been to avoid being drawn into a war over a Balkan question'.[148]

That is one answer to the proposal, an answer based on history and on Britain's foreign policy in past years. Sir Edward Grey had another answer. It was to the effect that Germany could not, and ought to have known she could not, rely on our neutrality. For when the Russian Amba.s.sador told him that an impression prevailed in German and Austrian circles that in any event England would stand aside, he pointed out that

'this impression ought to be dispelled by the orders we have given to the First Fleet, which is concentrated, as it happens, at Portland, not to disperse for manoeuvre leave'.[149]

The situation continued to develop unfavourably for the cause of peace owing to the Austrian declaration of war on Servia, and the consequent mobilizations in Russia, Germany, and France. On July 31st Sir Edward Grey said:--

'I believe it to be quite untrue that our att.i.tude has been a decisive factor in situation. German Government do not expect our neutrality.'[150]

It is not quite clear that Sir Edward Grey's belief was justified.

England's att.i.tude may have been an important factor in the situation, but still in our opinion Sir Edward Grey was not only right in refusing to commit England to a new Continental policy, but could not, with due observance of const.i.tutional usages, have taken any other course. Again, it is doubtful whether the German Government did or did not rely on our neutrality. The German Chancellor and the German Secretary for Foreign Affairs later affected great surprise at our action. Germany, however, as we have shown above (p. 82), had been plainly warned by Sir Edward Grey on July 29th[151] that she could not rely on our remaining neutral under all circ.u.mstances.

Whether Sir Edward Grey was right or wrong in his estimate of Germany's prudence is a small matter; what is important is that his action was throughout perfectly straightforward and consistent. And unquestionably he had a very difficult part to play. The near East was like a blazing rick surrounded by farm buildings; Germany was, if not stirring up the conflagration, certainly not attempting to pour water on the flames, while Austria, possibly--and even probably[152] with Germany's knowledge, would allow no one to make the attempt.

It would have aided the Austrian cause more effectively in Europe and elsewhere, if the Government had communicated[153] 'the _dossier_ elucidating the Servian intrigues and the connexion between these intrigues and the murder of 28th June', which it said it held at the disposal of the British Government.[154] For even Count Mensdorff 'admitted that, on paper, the Servian reply might seem to be satisfactory'.[155]

To judge whether the Servian reply was satisfactory, it was, and is, necessary to examine the evidence on which the Austro-Hungarian Government based the accusations formulated in its note of July 23rd.

But even a.s.suming that the Austrian charges were true, as the German White Book says they are,[156] it is only a stronger reason for allowing the Powers to examine this evidence; and it does not explain the persistent refusal,[157] until July 31st,[158] to permit any negotiations on the basis of the Servian reply.

Such being the situation, it is very difficult to see what more Sir Edward Grey could have done to prevent the outbreak of war between Austria-Hungary and Servia, which did inevitably, as he foresaw from the first, drag in other nations. He urged Servia to moderation and even to submission; he tried to induce the four Powers to mediate jointly at St.

Petersburg and Vienna; he proposed a conference of the four Powers to prevent further complications; he did everything in his power to restrain Russia from immediate armed support of Servia; he declined to join Russia and France in eventual military action; and even up to the violation of the neutrality of Belgium he still strove to avert the horrors of war from Europe.

VI

_Italy's comments on the situation_.

We have already shown (Chap. II) how Italy became a member of the Triple Alliance, and how, in spite of its apparent frailty and of the somewhat divergent aims of its members, that alliance has endured for thirty-two years. It remains to consider what policy Italy adopted in the critical situation created by the presentation of the Austro-Hungarian note to Servia, and to appreciate the significance of that policy. It is supremely significant that Italy, though a member of the Triple Alliance, was not consulted about the terms of the Austrian note to Servia; that she worked persistently side by side with England in endeavouring to prevent an outbreak of war, and, when that failed, to induce the states actually at war, or on the brink of war, to suspend all military operations in order to give diplomatic intervention an opportunity; and it is equally significant that, when the great war broke out, Italy remained neutral, in spite of the pressure from her allies and the tempting bait of a share of the spoil, which, it is said, is even now being offered to her.[159] This is but a bald description of Italy's policy, but it can be substantiated in detail from official doc.u.ments. As early as July 25th the Italian Amba.s.sador in a conversation with Sir Edward Grey 'made no secret of the fact that Italy was desirous to see war avoided',[160] and he cordially approved the idea of mediation by the four Powers. Two days later Italy again approved the proposed conference of four to be held immediately in London. The Italian Foreign Minister promised to recommend most strongly to the German Government the idea of asking Russia, Austria, and Servia to suspend military operations pending the result of the conference, and went even further in undertaking to ask what procedure Germany thought most likely to be successful at Vienna.[161] He thought it very doubtful whether Germany would consent to ask Austria to suspend military operations, but made a further suggestion that

'Servia may be induced to accept note in its entirety on the advice of the four Powers invited to the conference, and this would enable her to say that she had yielded to Europe and not to Austria-Hungary alone'.[162]

Next day the Marquis di San Giuliano called attention to a point in Servia's reply to Austria which might form a starting-point for mediation.[163] On July 29th he tried to get over Germany's objection to the idea of a 'Conference' by suggesting adherence to the idea of an exchange of views in London.[164] Next day he added to this the practical suggestion that

'Germany might invite Austria to state exactly the terms which she would demand from Servia, and give a guarantee that she would neither deprive her of independence, nor annex territory.... We might, on the other hand, ascertain from Russia what she would accept, and, once we knew the standpoints of these two countries, discussions could be commenced at once.'[165]

Moreover the Italian Amba.s.sador at Vienna, in the hope of pacifying Russia, made the useful suggestion that Austria should

'convert into a binding engagement to Europe the declaration which has been made at St. Petersburg to the effect that she desires neither to destroy the independence of Servia, nor to acquire Servian territory'.[166]

All efforts to preserve peace proved futile; Germany delivered her ultimatum to France and to Russia. Then arose the question, what was Italy to do? The answer to this was given by the Italian Foreign Minister:--

'The war undertaken by Austria, and the consequences which might result, had, in the words of the German Amba.s.sador himself, an aggressive object. Both were therefore in conflict with the purely defensive character of the Triple Alliance; in such circ.u.mstances Italy would remain neutral.'[167]

The German White Book says 'Russia began the war on us'[168] and 'France opened hostilities'[169]; if these statements were true, Italy would have been obliged, if she were to remain faithful to her engagements, to take part in the war side by side with her colleagues of the Triple Alliance. Impartial readers can draw their own conclusions.

NOTE

_Austro-Hungarian note to Servia, and Servia's reply_.

On July 23rd the Austro-Hungarian Government presented an ultimatum to Servia, demanding unconditional acceptance within 48 hours, an ultimatum which the _Temps_ next day described as 'unprecedented in its arrogance and in the extravagance of its demands'. Of it Sir Edward Grey said:--

'I had never before seen one State address to another independent State a doc.u.ment of so formidable a character. Demand No. 5 would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's independent sovereignty, if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Servia.'[170]

It may be true, as the Austrian Amba.s.sador explained,[171] that the Austro-Hungarian Government did not intend this step to be regarded as an ultimatum, but as a _demarche_ with a time-limit.

In this extraordinary doc.u.ment[172] the Austro-Hungarian Government demanded:--

A. That Servia should publish on the front page of its 'Official Gazette', and in the 'Official Bulletin' of the Army, and should communicate to the Army as the order of the day a declaration

(1) condemning Serb propaganda against Austria-Hungary;

(2) regretting that Servian officers and functionaries partic.i.p.ated in the propaganda;

(3) promising to proceed with the utmost rigour against persons who may be guilty of such machinations.

B. That Servia should undertake

(1) to suppress any publication inciting to hatred and contempt of Austria-Hungary;

(2) to dissolve the society styled Narodna Odbrana and similar societies and to confiscate their means of propaganda;

(3) to eliminate from public instruction in Servia all teachers and all methods of instruction responsible for fomenting opinion against Austria-Hungary;