Why We Are At War Part 9

(4) to remove from the military service and from the administration all officers and functionaries guilty of such propaganda, whose names and deeds the Austro-Hungarian Government reserved to itself the right of communicating;

(5) to accept the collaboration in Servia of representatives of Austria-Hungary in the suppression of the subversive anti-Austrian movement;

(6) to take judicial proceedings against accessories to the Serajevo plot, with the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian delegates;

(7) to proceed immediately to the arrest of Major Voija Tankositch and of Milan Ciganovitch, a Servian State employe, who have been compromised by the results of the inquiry at Serajevo;

(8) to stop co-operation of Servian authorities in illicit traffic in arms and explosives, and to dismiss and punish those officials who helped the perpetrators of the Serajevo crime;

(9) to explain the unjustifiable utterances of high Servian officials, at home and abroad, after the Serajevo crime.

On July 25th the Servian reply[173] was presented to the Austro-Hungarian Government. Even to a reader with Austrian sympathies this reply seems to go a long way towards meeting the demands. The Servian Government agreed

A. that Servia should, as demanded, publish a declaration

(1) condemning all propaganda which may be directed against Austria-Hungary;

(2) regretting that, according to the communication from the Imperial and Royal Government, Servian officers and officials partic.i.p.ated in the propaganda;

(3) promising to proceed with the utmost rigour against all persons who are guilty of such acts.

B. That Servia would undertake

(1) to introduce a provision into the press law providing for the most severe punishment of incitement to hatred and contempt of Austria-Hungary and to introduce an amendment to the Const.i.tution providing for the confiscation of such publications;

(2) to dissolve the Narodna Odbrana and similar societies;

(3) to remove at once from their public educational establishments all that serves or could serve to foment propaganda, whenever the Austro-Hungarian Government furnish them with facts and proofs of this propaganda;

(4) to remove from military service all such persons as the judicial inquiry may have proved to be guilty of acts directed against the territorial integrity of Austria-Hungary;

(5) though they do not clearly grasp the meaning or the scope of the demand, to accept the collaboration of Austro-Hungarian officials so far as is consistent with the principle of international law, with criminal procedure and with good neighbourly relations;

(6) to take judicial proceedings against accessories to the Serajevo plot; but they cannot admit the co-operation of Austro-Hungarian officials, as it would be a violation of the Const.i.tution and of the law of criminal procedure;

(7) On this they remark that Major Tankositch was arrested as soon as the note was presented, and that it has not been possible to arrest Ciganovitch, who is an Austro-Hungarian subject, but had been employed (on probation) by the directorate of railways;

(8) to reinforce and extend the measures for preventing illicit traffic of arms and explosives across the frontier;

(9) to give explanations of the remarks made by Servian officials, as soon as the Austro-Hungarian Government have communicated the pa.s.sages and as soon as they have shown that the remarks were actually made by the said officials.

The Austro-Hungarian Government regarded this reply as unsatisfactory and inadequate; they withdrew their Minister from Belgrade the same evening, and on July 28th declared war on Servia. Meanwhile they published a long official explanation[174] of the grounds on which the Servian reply was considered inadequate; in it they criticized and found unsatisfactory every single article of the reply, except that to demand No. 8. It is not worth while to a.n.a.lyze the whole of this; one sample may be sufficient. Sir Edward Grey commented on demand No. 5 and pointed out[175] that it

'would be hardly consistent with the maintenance of Servia's independent sovereignty, if it were to mean, as it seemed that it might, that Austria-Hungary was to be invested with a right to appoint officials who would have authority within the frontiers of Servia.'

Obviously he was in doubt about the meaning and scope of this demand, and the next was equally vague. The Servian reply to these two demands was necessarily guarded: yet the Austro-Hungarian Government treated this as deliberate misrepresentation:--

'The international law, as well as the criminal law, has nothing to do with this question; it is purely a matter of the nature of state police which is to be solved by way of a special agreement. The reserved att.i.tude of Servia is therefore incomprehensible, and on account of its vague general form it would lead to unbridgeable difficulties.

'If the Servian Government misunderstands us here, this is done deliberately, for it must be familiar with the difference between "enquete judiciaire" and simple police researches. As it desired to escape from every control of the investigation which would yield, if correctly carried out, highly undesirable results for it, and as it possesses no means to refuse in a plausible manner the co-operation of our officials (precedents for such police intervention exist in great number), it tries to justify its refusal by showing up our demands as impossible.'[176]

It would have been fairer to Servia to a.s.sume that there had been a genuine misunderstanding, and that the explanation here given by Austria might prove satisfactory to Servia, as the Italian Minister for Foreign Affairs suggested.[177] The persistent refusal of Austria-Hungary to permit any discussion on the basis of the Servian reply goes far to justify Sir Maurice de Bunsen's impression

'that the Austro-Hungarian note was so drawn up as to make war inevitable, that their Government are fully resolved to have war with Servia, that they consider their position as a Great Power to be at stake, and that until punishment has been administered to Servia it is unlikely that they will listen to proposals of mediation'.[178]

Notes:

[Footnote 57: _Correspondence respecting the European Crisis_, No. 2.

Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 22, 1914.]

[Footnote 58: German White Book, p. 4.]

[Footnote 59: _Correspondence_, No. 10. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, July 24.]

[Footnote 60: _Correspondence_, No. 18. Sir H. Rumbold to Sir E. Grey, July 25.]

[Footnote 61: Ibid. No. 32. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 26.

See also German White Book, p. 5.]

[Footnote 62: Ibid. No. 54. M. Sazonof to Count Benckendorff, July 15/28, 1914 (communicated by Count Benckendorff, July 28).]

[Footnote 63: _Correspondence_, No. 139. Sir G. Buchanan to Sir E. Grey, August 1.]

[Footnote 64: _Ibid_. No. 141. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, August 1.]

[Footnote 65: _Ibid_. No. 71. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]

[Footnote 66: _Correspondence_, No. 94. Sir M. de Bunsen to Sir E. Grey, July 29.]

[Footnote 67: German White Book, p. 4 (see _infra_ Appendix I).]

[Footnote 68: _Ibid_. No. 36. Sir E. Grey to Sir F. Bertie, Sir H.

Rumbold, and Sir R. Rodd, July 26.]

[Footnote 69: _Correspondence_, No. 43. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 27.]

[Footnote 70: _Ibid_. No. 60. Sir E. Goschen to Sir E. Grey, July 28.]

[Footnote 71: _Ibid_. No. 84. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 29.]

[Footnote 72: p. 8 and Exhibit 12 (see _infra_ Appendix I).]

[Footnote 73: _Correspondence_, No. 11. Sir E. Grey to Sir II. Rumbold, July 24.]

[Footnote 74: _Correspondence_, No. 46. Sir E. Grey to Sir E. Goschen, July 27.]