Great Britain and the American Civil War Part 46

From Mason's view-point the prime need was to secure money; from Slidell's (at least so a.s.serted) it was to place a loan with the purpose of establis.h.i.+ng strong friends. It had been agreed to suspend the operations of Spence until the result of Erlanger's offer was learned, but pressure brought by Caleb Huse, purchasing agent of the Confederacy, caused a further sale of "cotton warrants[1056]." Spence, fearing he was about to be shelved, became vexed and made protest to Mason, while Slidell regarded Spence[1057] as a weak and meddlesome agent[1058]. But on February 14, 1863, Erlanger's agents returned to Paris and uncertainty was at an end. Spence went to Paris, saw Erlanger, and agreed to co-operate in floating the loan[1059]. Then followed a remarkable bond market operation, interesting, not so much as regards the financial returns to the South, for these were negligible, as in relation to the declared object of Slidell and the Richmond Government--namely, the "strong influences" that would accompany the successful flotation of a loan.

Delay in beginning operations was caused by the failure to receive promptly the authenticated copy of the Act of Congress authorizing the loan, which did not arrive until March 18. By this contract Erlanger & Company, sole managers of the loan, had guaranteed flotation of the entire $15,000,000 at not less than 77, the profit of the Company to be five per cent., plus the difference between 77 and the actual price received, but the first $300,000 taken was to be placed at once at the disposal of the Government. The bonds were put on the market March 19, in London, Liverpool, Paris, Amsterdam and Frankfurt, but practically all operations were confined to England. The bid for the loan was ent.i.tled "_Seven per Cent. Cotton Loan of the Confederate States of America for_ 3 _Millions Sterling at_ 90 _per Cent_." The bonds were to bear interest at seven per cent. and were to be exchangeable for cotton at the option of the holder at the price of sixpence "for each pound of cotton, at any time not later than six months after the ratification of a treaty of peace between the present belligerents." There were provisions for the gradual redemption of the bonds in gold for those who did not desire cotton. Subscribers were to pay 5 per cent. on application. 10 per cent. on allotment, 10 per cent. on each of the days, the first of May, June and July, 1863, and 15 per cent. on the first of August, September and October.

Since the price of cotton in England was then 21 pence per pound it was thought here was a sufficiently wide margin to offer at least a good chance of enormous profits to the buyer of the bonds. True "the loan was looked upon as a wild cotton speculation[1060]," but odds were so large as to induce a heavy gamblers' plunge, for it seemed hardly conceivable that cotton could for some years go below sevenpence per pound, and even that figure would have meant profit, _if_ the Confederacy were established. Moreover, even though the loan was not given official recognition by the London stock exchange, the financial columns of the _Times_ and the _Economist_ favoured it and the subscriptions were so prompt and so heavy that in two days the loan was reported as over-subscribed three times in London alone[1061]. With the closing of the subscription the bonds went up to 95-1/2. Slidell wrote: "It is a financial recognition of our independence, emanating from a cla.s.s proverbially cautious, and little given to be influenced by sentiment or sympathy[1062]." On Friday, March 27, the allotment took place and three days later Mason wrote, "I think I may congratulate you, therefore, on the triumphant success of our infant credit--it shows, _malgre_ all detraction and calumny, that cotton is king at last[1063]."

"Alas for the King! Two days later his throne began to tremble and it took all the King's horses and all the King's men to keep him in state[1064]." On April 1, the flurry of speculation had begun to falter and the loan was below par; on the second it dropped to 3-1/2 discount, and by the third the promoters and the Southern diplomats were very anxious. They agreed that someone must be "bearing" the bonds and suspected Adams of supplying Northern funds for that purpose[1065].

Spence wrote from Liverpool in great alarm and coincidently Erlanger & Company urged that Mason should authorize the use of the receipts already secured to hold up the price of the bonds. Mason was very reluctant to do this[1066], but finally yielded when informed of the result of an interview between Spence, Erlanger, and the latter's chief London agent, Schroeder. Spence had proposed a withdrawal of a part of the loan from the market as likely to have a stabilizing effect, and opposed the Erlanger plan of using the funds already in hand. But Schroeder coolly informed him that if the Confederate representative refused to authorize the use of these funds to sustain the market, then Erlanger would regard his Company as having "completed their contract ... which was simply to issue the Loan." "Having issued it, they did not and do not guarantee that the public would pay up their instalments. If the public abandon the loan, the 15 per cent sacrificed is, in point of fact, not the property of the Government at all, but the profits of Messrs. Erlanger & Co., actually in their hands, and they cannot be expected to take a worse position. At any rate they will not do so, and unless the compact can be made on the basis we name, matters must take their course[1067]."

In the face of this ultimatum, Spence advised yielding as he "could not hesitate ... seeing that nothing could be so disastrous politically, as well as financially, as the public break-down of the Loan[1068]." Mason gave the required authorization and this was later approved from Richmond. For a time the "bulling" of the loan was successful, but again and again required the use of funds received from actual sales of bonds and in the end the loan netted very little to the Confederacy. Some $6,000,000 was squandered in supporting the market and from the entire operation it is estimated that less than $7,000,000 was realized by the Confederacy, although, as stated by the _Economist_, over $12,000,000 of the bonds were outstanding and largely in the hands of British investors at the end of the war[1069].

The loan soon became, not as had been hoped and prophesied by Slidell, a source of valuable public support, but rather a mere barometer of Southern fortunes[1070]. From first to last the Confederate Cotton Loan bore to subscribers the aspect of a speculative venture and lacked the regard attached to sound investment. This fact in itself denied to the loan any such favourable influence, or "financial recognition of the Confederacy," as Mason and Slidell, in the first flush of success, attributed to it. The rapid fluctuations in price further discredited it and tended to emphasize the uncertainty of Southern victory. Thus "confidence in the South" was, if anything, lessened instead of increased by this turning from political to financial methods of bringing pressure upon the Government[1071].

Southern political and parliamentary pressure had indeed been reserved from January to June, 1863. Public attention was distracted from the war in America by the Polish question, which for a time, particularly during the months of March and April, 1863, disturbed the good relations existing between England and France since the Emperor seemed bent on going beyond British "meddling," even to pursuing a policy that easily might lead to war with Russia. Europe diverted interest from America, and Napoleon himself was for the moment more concerned over the Polish question than with American affairs, even though the Mexican venture was still a worry to him. It was no time for a British parliamentary "push"

and when a question was raised on the cotton famine in Lancas.h.i.+re little attention was given it, though ordinarily it would have been seized upon as an opportunity for a pro-Southern demonstration. This was a bitter attack by one Ferrand in the Commons, on April 27, directed against the cotton manufacturers as lukewarm over employees' sufferings.

Potter, a leading cotton manufacturer, replied to the attack. Potter and his brother were already prominent as strong partisans of the North, yet no effort was made to use the debate to the advantage of the South[1072].

In late May both necessity and fortuitous circ.u.mstance seemed to make advisable another Southern effort in Parliament. The cotton loan, though fairly strong again because of Confederate governmental aid, was in fact a failure in its expected result of public support for the South; something must be done to offset that failure. In Polish affairs France had drawn back; presumably Napoleon was again eager for some active effort. Best of all, the military situation in America was thought to indicate Southern success; Grant's western campaign had come to a halt with the stubborn resistance of the great Mississippi stronghold at Vicksburg, while in Virginia, Lee, on May 2-3, had overwhelmingly defeated Hooker at Chancellorsville and was preparing, at last, a definite offensive campaign into Northern territory. Lee's advance north did not begin until June 10, but his plan was early known in a select circle in England and much was expected of it. The time seemed ripe, therefore, and the result was notification by Roebuck of a motion for the recognition of the Confederacy--first step the real purpose of which was to attempt that 'turning to the Tories' which had been advocated by Spence in January, but postponed on the advice of Gregory[1073]. _The Index_ clearly indicated where lay the wind: "No one," it declared "now asks what will be the policy of Great Britain towards America; but everybody anxiously waits on what the Emperor of the French will do."

"... England to-day pays one of the inevitable penalties of free government and of material prosperity, that of having at times at the head of national affairs statesmen who belong rather to the past than to the present, and whose skill and merit are rather the business tact and knowledge of details, acquired by long experience, than the quick and prescient comprehension of the requirements of sudden emergencies....

"The nominal conduct of Foreign Affairs is in the hands of a diplomatic Malaprop, who has never shown vigour, activity, or determination, except where the display of these qualities was singularly unneeded, or even worse than useless.... From Great Britain, then, under her actual Government, the Cabinet at Was.h.i.+ngton has nothing to fear, and the Confederate States nothing to expect[1074]."

Of main interest to the public was the military situation. The _Times_ minimized the western campaigns, regarding them as required for political effect to hold the north-western states loyal to the Union, and while indulging in no prophecies as to the fate of Vicksburg, expressing the opinion that, if forced to surrender it, the South could easily establish "a new Vicksburg" at some other point[1075]. Naturally _The Index_ was pleased with and supported this view[1076]. Such ignorance of the geographic importance of Vicksburg may seem like wilful misleading of the public; but professed British military experts were equally ignorant. Captain Chesney, Professor of Military History at Sandhurst College, published in 1863, an a.n.a.lysis of American campaigns, centering all attention on the battles in Maryland and Virginia and reaching the conclusion that the South could resist, indefinitely, any Northern attack[1077]. He dismissed the western campaigns as of no real significance. W.H. Russell, now editor of the _Army and Navy Gazette_, better understood Grant's objectives on the Mississippi but believed Northern reconquest of the South to the point of restoration of the Union to be impossible. If, however, newspaper comments on the success of Southern armies were to be regarded as favourable to Roebuck's motion for recognition, W.H. Russell was against it.

"If we could perceive the smallest prospect of awaking the North to the truth, or of saving the South from the loss and trials of the contest by recognition, we would vote for it to-morrow. But next to the delusion of the North that it can breathe the breath of life into the corpse of the murdered Union again, is the delusion of some people in England who imagine that by recognition we would give life to the South, divide the nations on each side of the black and white line for ever, and bring this war to the end. There is probably not one of these clamourers for recognition who could define the limits of the State to be recognized.... And, over and above all, recognition, unless it meant 'war,' would be an aggravation of the horrors of the contest; it would not aid the South one whit, and it would add immensely to the unity and the fury of the North[1078]."

The British Foreign Secretary was at first little concerned at Roebuck's motion, writing to Lyons, "You will see that Roebuck has given notice of a motion to recognize the South. But I think it certain that neither Lord Derby nor Cobden will support it, and I should think no great number of the Liberal party. Offshoots from all parties will compose the minority[1079]." Russell was correct in this view but not so did it appear to Southern agents who now became active at the request of Roebuck and Lindsay in securing from the Emperor renewed expressions of willingness to act, and promptly, if England would but give the word.

There was no real hope that Russell would change his policy, but there seemed at least a chance of replacing the Whig Ministry with a Tory one.

The date for the discussion of the motion had been set for June 30. On June 13, Lindsay, writing to Slidell, enclosed a letter from Roebuck asking for an interview with Napoleon[1080], and on June 16, Mason wrote that if Slidell saw the Emperor it was of the greatest importance that he, Mason, should be at once informed of the results and how far he might communicate them to "our friends in the House[1081]." Slidell saw the Emperor on June 18, talked of the possibility of "forcing the English Cabinet to act or to give way to a new ministry," asked that an interview be given Lindsay and Roebuck, and hinted that Lord Malmesbury, a warm friend of the Emperor, would probably be the Foreign Secretary in a Tory cabinet. Napoleon made no comment indicating any purpose to aid in upsetting the Palmerston Government; but consented to the requested interview and declared he would go to the length of officially informing the British Ministry that France was very ready to discuss the advisability of recognizing the South[1082].

This was good news. June 22, Slidell received a note from Mocquard stating that Baron Gros, the French Amba.s.sador at London, had been instructed to sound Russell. Meanwhile, Roebuck and Lindsay had hurried to Paris, June 20, saw Napoleon and on the twenty-fifth, Slidell reported that they were authorized to state in the House of Commons that France was "not only willing but anxious to recognize the Confederate States with the co-operation of England[1083]." Slidell added, however, that Napoleon had not promised Roebuck and Lindsay to make a formal proposal to Great Britain. This rested on the a.s.surances received by Slidell from Mocquard, and when Mason, who had let the a.s.surance be known to his friends, wrote that Russell, replying to Clanricarde, on June 26, had denied any official communication from France, and asked for authority from Slidell to back up his statements by being permitted to give Roebuck a copy of the supposed instruction[1084], he received a reply indicating confusion somewhere:

"I called yesterday on my friend at the Affaires Etrangeres on the subject of your note of Sat.u.r.day: he has just left me.

M.D. de Lh. will not give a copy of his instructions to Baron Gros--but this is the substance of it. On the 19th he directed Baron Gros to take occasion to say to leading Members of Parliament that the Emperor's opinions on the subject of American affairs were unchanged. That he was disposed with the co-operation of England immediately to recognize the Confederate States; this was in the form of a draft letter, not a despatch. On the 22nd, he officially instructed the Baron to sound _Palmerston_ on the subject and to inform him of the Emperor's views and wishes. This was done in consequence of a note from the Emperor, to the Minister, in which he said, 'Je me demande, s'il ne serait bien d'avertir Lord Palmerston, que je suis decide a reconnaitre le Sud.' This is by far the most significant thing that the Emperor has said, either to me or to the others. It renders me comparatively indifferent what England may do or omit doing. At all events, let Mr. Roebuck press his motion and make his statement of the Emperor's declaration. Lord Palmerston will not dare to dispute it and the responsibility of the continuance of the war will rest entirely upon him. M. Drouyn de Lhuys has not heard from Baron Gros the result of his interview with Palmerston. I see that the latter has been unwell and it is probable that the former had not been able to see him. There can be no impropriety in Mr. Roebuck's seeing Baron Gros, who will doubtless give him information which he will use to advantage. I write in great haste; will you do me the favour to let Lord Campbell know the substance of this note, omitting that portion of it which relates to the Emperor's inclination to act alone. Pray excuse me to Lord Campbell for not writing to him, time not permitting me to do so[1085]."

This did not satisfy Mason; he telegraphed on the twenty-ninth, "Can I put in hands of Roebuck copy of Mocquard's note brought by Corcoran[1086]." To which Slidell replied by letter:

"For fear the telegraph may commit some blunder I write to say that M. Mocquard's note, being confidential, cannot be _used in any way_. I showed it to Messrs. Roebuck and Lindsay when they were here and have no objection that they should again see it confidentially[1087]."

On June 29, Roebuck went to Baron Gros and received the information that no formal communication had been made to Russell. The next day in an effort in some way to secure an admission of what Mason and his friends believed to be the truth, Lord Campbell asked Russell in the House of Lords if he had received either a doc.u.ment or a verbal communication outlining Napoleon's desires. Russell replied that Baron Gros had told him "an hour ago" that he had not even received any instruction to deliver such a communication[1088]. This was in the hours preceding the debate, now finally to occur in the Commons. Evidently there had been an error in the understanding of Napoleon by Slidell, Roebuck and Lindsay, or else there was a question of veracity between Russell, Baron Gros and Napoleon.

Roebuck's motion was couched in the form of a request to the Queen to enter into negotiations with foreign powers for co-operation in recognition of the Confederacy. Roebuck argued that the South had in fact established its independence and that this was greatly to England's advantage since it put an end to the "threatening great power" in the West. He repeated old arguments based on suffering in Lancas.h.i.+re--a point his opponents brushed aside as no longer of dangerous concern--attacked British anti-slavery sentiment as mere hypocrisy and minimized the dangers of a war with the North, prophesying an easy victory for Great Britain. Then, warmed to the real attack on the Government Roebuck related at length his interview with Napoleon, claiming to have been commissioned by the Emperor to urge England to action and a.s.serting that since Baron Gros had been instructed to apply again to the British Cabinet it must be evident that the Ministry was concealing something from Parliament. Almost immediately, however, he added that Napoleon had told him no formal French application could be renewed to Great Britain since Russell had revealed to Seward, through Lyons, the contents of a former application.

Thus following the usual pro-Southern arguments, now somewhat perfunctorily given, the bolt against the Government had been shot with all of Roebuck's accustomed "vigour" of utterance[1089]. Here was direct attack; that it was a futile one early became evident in the debate.

Lord Robert Montagu, while professing himself a friend of the South, was sarcastic at the expense of Roebuck's entrance into the field of diplomacy, enlarged upon the real dangers of becoming involved in the war, and moved an amendment in favour of continued British neutrality.

Palmerston was absent, being ill, but Gladstone, for the Government, while carefully avoiding expressions of sympathy for either North or South, yet going out of his way to pa.s.s a moral judgment on the disaster to political liberty if the North should wholly crush the South, was positive in a.s.sertion that it would be unwise to adopt either Roebuck's motion or Montagu's amendment. Great Britain should not _commit_ herself to any line of policy, especially as military events were "now occurring" which might greatly alter the whole situation, though "the main result of the contest was not doubtful." Here spoke that element of the Ministry still convinced of ultimate Southern success.

If Gladstone's had been the only reply to Roebuck he and his friends might well have thought they were about to secure a ministerial change of front. But it soon appeared that Gladstone spoke more for himself than for the Government. Roebuck had made a direct accusation and in meeting this, Layard, for the Foreign Office, entered a positive and emphatical denial, in which he was supported by Sir George Grey, Home Secretary, who added sharp criticism of Roebuck for permitting himself to be made the channel of a French complaint against England. It early became evident to the friends of the South that an error in tactics had been committed and in two directions; first, in the a.s.sertion that a new French offer had been made when it was impossible to present proof of it; and second, in bringing forward what amounted to an attempt to unseat the Ministry without previously committing the Tories to a support of the motion. Apparently Disraeli was simply letting Roebuck "feel out" the House. The only member of the Tory party strongly supporting him was Lord Robert Cecil, in a speech so clearly a mere party one that it served to increase the strength of ministerial resistance. Friends of the North quickly appreciated the situation and in strong speeches supported the neutrality policy of the Government.

Forster laid stress upon the danger of war and the strength of British emanc.i.p.ation sentiment as did Bright in what was, read to-day, the most powerful of all his parliamentary utterances on the American war. In particular Bright voiced a general disbelief in the accuracy of Roebuck's report of his interview with Napoleon, called upon his "friend" Lindsay for his version[1090] of the affair, and concluded by recalling former speeches by Roebuck in which the latter had been fond of talking about the "perjured lips" of Napoleon. Bright dilated upon the egotism and insolence of Roebuck in trying to represent the Emperor of France on the floor of the House of Commons. The Emperor, he a.s.serted, was in great danger of being too much represented in Parliament[1091].

The result of this first day's debate on June 30 was disconcerting to Southern friends. It had been adjourned without a vote, for which they were duly thankful. Especially disconcerting was Slidell's refusal to permit the citation of Mocquard's note in proof of Roebuck's a.s.sertions.

Mason wrote:

"I have your note of 29th ult. You will see in the papers of to-day the debate in the House last night, at which I was present, and will have seen what in the H.L. Lord Russell said in reply to Lord Campbell. Thus the French affair remains in a 'muss,' unless the Emperor will show his hand _on paper_, we shall never know what he really means, or derive any benefit from his private and individual revelations. As things now stand before the public, there can be but one opinion, i.e., that he holds one language in private communications, though 'with liberty to divulge,'

and another to his amba.s.sador here. The debate is adjourned to to-morrow night, when Lindsay will give in his explanation. It would be uncivil to say that I have no confidence in the Emperor, but certainly what has come from him so far can invite only distrust[1092]."

As in Parliament, so in the public press, immediate recognition of the Confederacy received little support. The _Times_, while sympathetic with the purpose was against Roebuck's motion, considering it of no value unless backed up by force; to this the _Times_ was decidedly opposed[1093]. Of like opinion was the _Economist_, declaring that premature recognition was a justifiable ground for a declaration of war by the North[1094]. July 2, Roebuck asked when the debate was to be renewed and was told that must wait on Palmerston's recovery and return to the House. Bright pressed for an immediate decision. Layard reaffirmed very positively that no communication had been received from France and disclosed that Napoleon's alleged complaint of a British revelation to Seward of French overtures was a myth, since the doc.u.ment in question had been printed in the _Moniteur_, thus attracting Seward's attention[1095]. Thus Roebuck was further discredited. July 4, Spence wrote strongly urging the withdrawal of the motion:

"I have a letter from an eminent member of the House and great friend of the South urging the danger of carrying Mr.

Roebuck's motion to a vote. It is plain it will be defeated by a great majority and the effect of this will encourage the North and distress our friends. It will also strengthen the minority of the Cabinet in favour of the North....

"The fact is the ground of the motion, which was action on the part of France, has failed us--and taken shape which tells injuriously instead of being the great support....

"If a positive engagement were made by Mr. Disraeli to support the motion it would alter the question entirely. In the absence of this I fear the vote would be humiliating and would convey an impression wholly delusive, for the members are 10 to 1 in favour of the South and yet on this point the vote might be 5 to 1 against Southern interests[1096]."

On July 6, Palmerston was back in the House and Roebuck secured an agreement for a resumption of the debate on "Monday next[1097]."

Meantime many powerful organs of the French press had taken up the matter and were full of sharp criticism of Napoleon's supposed policy and actions as stated by Roebuck. The effect in England was to create a feeling that Napoleon might have difficulty in carrying out a pro-Southern policy[1098]. Palmerston, wis.h.i.+ng to avoid further discussion on Napoleon's share in providing fuel for the debate, wrote in a very conciliatory and pleasant way to Roebuck, on July 9:

"Perhaps you will allow me thus privately to urge upon you, and through you upon Mr. Lindsay, the expediency of dropping altogether, whether your debate goes on or not, all further mention or discussion of what pa.s.sed between you and Mr.

Lindsay on the one hand, and the Emperor of the French on the other. In truth the whole proceeding on this subject the other day seems to me to have been very irregular. The British Parliament receives messages and communications from their own sovereign, but not from the sovereigns of other countries...."

"No good can come of touching again upon this matter, nor from fixing upon the Emperor a mistake which amid the multiplicity of things he has to think of he may be excused for making. I am very anxious that neither you nor Mr.

Lindsay should mention those matters any more, as any discussion about them must tend to impair the good relations between the French and English Governments. Might I ask you to show this note to Mr. Lindsay, your fellow traveller[1099]."

The next day, in the Commons, Sir James Ferguson appealed to Roebuck to withdraw his motion altogether as inexpedient, because of the uncertainty of events in America and as sure to be defeated if pressed to a vote. Palmerston approved this suggestion and urged that if the debate be continued speakers should refrain from all further mention of the personal questions that had been raised, since these were not proper matters for discussion in the House and were embarra.s.sing to the French Emperor. But Palmerston's skill in management was unavailing in this case and the "muss" (as Mason called it) was continued when Lindsay entered upon a long account of the interview with Napoleon, renewed the accusations of Russell's "revelations" to Seward and advised Roebuck not to withdraw his motion but to postpone it "until Monday." The _Scotia_, he said was due and any moment news from America might change the governmental policy. Again the fat was in the fire. Palmerston sharply disavowed that news would change policy. Kinglake thought Roebuck's actions should be thoroughly investigated. Forster eagerly pressed for continuation of the debate. There was a general criticism of Roebuck's "diplomacy," and of Lindsay's also. Northern friends were jubilant and those of the South embarra.s.sed and uncertain. Gregory believed that the motion should be withdrawn "in the interest of the South," but Lord Robert Cecil renewed Lindsay's advice to wait "until Monday" and this was finally done[1100].

All England was in fact eagerly waiting for news from America. Lee's advance was known to have pa.s.sed by Was.h.i.+ngton, but no reports were yet at hand of the battle which must determine this first great offensive campaign by the South. July 9, the _Times_ predicted, editorially, that Lee was about to capture Was.h.i.+ngton and that this event would be met by a great cry of joy and relief in the North, now weary of the war and eager to escape from the despotism of Lincoln's administration[1101].

Nevertheless the _Times_, while still confident of Lee's victorious advance and of the welcome likely to be accorded him in the North, came out strongly on July 13 in an appeal to Roebuck to withdraw his motion, arguing that even if he were successful Great Britain ought to make no hurried change of policy[1102]. On this day, the thirteenth, Roebuck moved the discharge of his motion in a speech so mild as to leave the impression that "Tear 'em" had his tail between his legs but, Lindsay, his feelings evidently injured by the aspersions cast upon his own "amateur diplomacy," spoke at much length of the interview with Napoleon and tried to show that on a previous occasion he had been, in fact, "employed" by the Government. Palmerston was pithy and sarcastic in reply. Lindsay, he said, had "employed" himself. He hoped that this would be the "last time when any member of this House shall think it his duty to communicate to the British House of Commons that which may have pa.s.sed between himself and the Sovereign of a foreign country[1103]."

The entire debate on Roebuck's motion was a serious blow to the cause of the South in Parliament. Undertaken on a complete misunderstanding of the position of Tory leaders, begun with a vehemence that led its mover into tactical error, it rapidly dwindled to a mere question of personal veracity and concluded in sharp reproof from the Government. No doubt the very success (so it seemed at the moment) of Southern arms, upon which Roebuck counted to support his motion was, in actual effect, a deterrent, since many Southern sympathizers thought Great Britain might now keep hands off since the South was "winning anyway." There is no evidence that Russell thought this, or that he was moved by any consideration save the fixed determination to remain neutral--even to the extent of reversing a previous decision as to the powers of the Government in relation to Southern s.h.i.+p-building.

Roebuck withdrew his motion, not because of any imminent Southern victory, but because he knew that if pressed to a vote it would be overwhelmingly defeated. The debate was the last one of importance on the topics of mediation or recognition[1104]. News of Lee's check at Gettysburg reached London on July 16, but was described by the _Times_ two days later as virtually a Southern victory since the Northern army had been compelled to act wholly on the defensive. In the same issue it was stated of Vicksburg, "it is difficult to see what possible hope there can be of reducing the city[1105]." But on July 20, full news of the events of July 4, when Vicksburg fell and Lee began his retreat from Gettysburg, was received and its significance acknowledged, though efforts were made to prove that these events simply showed that neither side could conquer the other[1106]. In contradiction of previous a.s.sertions that "another Vicksburg" might easily be set up to oppose Northern advance in the west there was now acknowledgment that the capture of this one remaining barrier on the Mississippi was a great disaster to the South. _The Index_, forgetful that it was supposedly a British publication, declared: "The saddest news which has reached _us_ since the fall of New Orleans is the account of the surrender of Vicksburg. The _very day_ on which the capitulation took place renders the blow heavier[1107]."

"The fall of Vicksburg," wrote Spence, "has made me ill all the week, never yet being able to drive it off my mind[1108]." Adams reported that the news had caused a panic among the holders of the Cotton Loan bonds and that the press and upper cla.s.ses were exceedingly glad they had refused support of Roebuck's motion[1109].

If July, 1863, may in any way be regarded as the "crisis" of Southern effort in England, it is only as a despairing one doomed to failure from the outset, and receiving a further severe set-back by the ill-fortune of Lee's campaign into Pennsylvania. The real crisis of governmental att.i.tude had long since pa.s.sed. Naturally this was not acknowledged by the staunch friends of the South any more than at Richmond it was acknowledged (or understood) that Gettysburg marked the crisis of the Confederacy. But that the end of Southern hope for British intervention had come at Richmond, was made clear by the action of Benjamin, the Confederate Secretary of State. On August 4, he recalled Mason, writing that the recent debates in Parliament showed the Government determined not to receive him:

"Under these circ.u.mstances, your continued residence in London is neither conducive to the interests nor consistent with the dignity of this Government, and the President therefore requests that you consider your mission at an end, and that you withdraw, with your secretary, from London[1110]."

A private letter accompanying the instruction authorized Mason to remain if there were any "marked change" in governmental att.i.tude, but since the decision of the Ministry to seize the Laird Rams had been made public at nearly the same moment when this instruction was received, September 15, Mason could hardly fail to retire promptly. Indeed, the very fact of that seizure gave opportunity for a dramatic exit though there was no connection between Benjamin's instruction and the stopping of Confederate s.h.i.+p-building in England. The real connection was with the failure of the Gettysburg campaign and the humiliating collapse of Roebuck's motion. Even the _Times_ was now expanding upon the "serious reverses" of the South and making it clearly understood that England "has not had and will not have the slightest inclination to intervention or mediation, or to take any position except that of strict neutrality[1111]."

Mason at once notified Slidell of his receipt of the recall instruction and secured the latter's approval of the communication he proposed making to Russell[1112]. A general consultation of Southern agents took place and Mason would have been vexed had he known how small was the regard for his abilities as a diplomat[1113]. _The Index_ hastened to join in a note already struck at Richmond of warm welcome to France in her conquest of Mexico, reprinting on September 17, an editorial from the _Richmond Enquirer_ in which it was declared, "France is the only Power in the world that has manifested any friendly feeling towards the Confederacy in its terrible struggle for independence." Evidently all hope was now centred upon Napoleon, a conclusion without doubt distasteful to Mason and one which he was loth to accept as final.

On September 21, Mason notified Russell of his withdrawal very nearly in the words of Benjamin's instruction. The news was at once made public, calling out from the _Times_ a hectoring editorial on the folly of the South in demanding recognition before it had won it[1114]. In general, however, the press took a tone apparently intended to "let Mason down easily," acknowledging that his act indicated a universal understanding that Great Britain would not alter her policy of strict neutrality, but expressing admiration for the courage and confidence of the South[1115]. September 25, Russell replied to Mason with courtesy but also with seeming finality:

"I have on other occasions explained to you the reasons which have induced Her Majesty's Government to decline the overtures you allude to, and the motives which have hitherto prevented the British Court from recognizing you as the accredited Minister of an established State.

"These reasons are still in force, and it is not necessary to repeat them.