Great Britain and the American Civil War Part 47

"I regret that circ.u.mstances have prevented my cultivating your personal acquaintance, which, in a different state of affairs, I should have done with much pleasure and satisfaction[1116]."

Thus Mason took his exit. Brief entrances upon the stage in England were still to be his, but the chief role there was now a.s.signed to others and the princ.i.p.al scenes transferred to France. That Mason did not fully concur in this as final, easily as it was accepted by Slidell, is evident from his later correspondence with Lindsay and Spence. He regarded the question of British recognition of the South as mainly an English political question, pinning his hopes on a Tory overthrow of Palmerston's Ministry. This he believed to depend on the life of the Prime Minister and his anxious inquiries as to the health of Palmerston were frequent. Nothing in his instructions indicated a desired course of action and Mason after consulting Slidell and, naturally, securing his acquiescence, determined to remain in Europe waiting events.

If the South was indignant at British inaction the North was correspondingly pleased and after the seizure of the Laird Rams was officially very friendly--at least so Lyons reported[1117]. In this same private letter, however, Lyons ventured a strong protest against a notion which now seems to have occurred to Russell of joint action by England, France and Spain to withdraw belligerent rights _to the North_, unless the United States formally "concede to their enemy the status of a Belligerent for all _international_ purposes." Why or how this idea came to be taken up by Russell is uncertain. Possibly it was the result of irritation created by the persistence of Seward in denying that the war was other than an effort to crush rebellious subjects--theory clearly against the fact yet consistently maintained by the American Secretary of State throughout the entire war and constantly causing difficulties in relations with neutral countries. At any rate Lyons was quick to see the danger. He wrote:

"Such a declaration might produce a furious outburst of wrath from Government and public here. It cannot, however, be denied that the reasoning on which the Declaration would be founded would be incontrovertible, and that in the end firmness answers better with the Americans than coaxing. But then England, France and Spain must be really firm, and not allow their Declaration to be a _brutum fulmen_. If on its being met, as it very probably would be, by a decided refusal on the part of the United States, they did not proceed to break up the Blockade, or at all events to resist by force the exercise of the right of visit on the high seas, the United States Government and people would become more difficult to deal with than ever. I find, however, that I am going beyond my own province, and I will therefore add only an excuse for doing so[1118]."

Lyons followed this up a week later by a long description of America's readiness for a foreign war, a situation very different from that of 1861. America, he said, had steadily been preparing for such a contingency not with any desire for it but that she might not be caught napping[1119]. This was written as if merely an interesting general speculation and was accompanied by the a.s.surance, "I don't think the Government here at all desires to pick a quarrel with us or with any European Power--but the better prepared it is, the less manageable it will be[1120]." Nevertheless, Lyons' concern over Russell's motion of withdrawing belligerent rights to the North was great, and his representations presumably had effect, for no more was heard of the matter. Russell relieved Lyons' mind by writing, November 21:

"I hope you continue to go on quietly with Seward. I think this is better than any violent demonstrations of friends.h.i.+p which might turn sour like beer if there should be a thunder-storm.

"But I am more and more persuaded that amongst the Powers with whose Ministers I pa.s.s my time there is none with whom our relations ought to be so frank and cordial as the United States[1121]."

If relations with the North were now to be so "frank and cordial," there was, indeed, little remaining hope possible to English friends of the South. Bright wrote to Sumner: "Neutrality is agreed upon by all, and I hope a more fair and friendly neutrality than we have seen during the past two years[1122]." George Thompson, at Exeter Hall, lauding Henry Ward Beecher for his speech there, commented on the many crowded open public meetings in favour of the North as compared with the two pro-Southern ones in London, slimly and privately attended[1123].

Jefferson Davis, in addressing the Confederate Congress, December 7, was bitter upon the "unfair and deceptive conduct" of England[1124]. Adams, by mid-December, 1863, was sure that previous British confidence in the ultimate success of the South was rapidly declining[1125].

Such utterances, if well founded, might well have portended the cessation of further Southern effort in England. That a renewal of activity soon occurred was due largely to a sudden s.h.i.+ft in the military situation in America and to the realization that the heretofore largely negative support given to the Southern cause must be replaced by organized and persistent effort. Grant's victorious progress in the West had been checked by the disaster to Rosencrans at Chicamauga, September 18, and Grant's army forced to retrace its steps to recover Chattanooga. It was not until November 24 that the South was compelled to release its grip upon that city. Meanwhile in the East, Lee, fallen back to his old lines before Richmond, presented a still impregnable front to Northern advance. No sudden collapse, such as had been expected, followed the Southern defeats at Vicksburg and Gettysburg.

Again the contest presented the appearance of a drawn battle. Small wonder then that McHenry, confident in his statistics, should now declare that at last cotton was to become in truth King[1126], and count much upon the effect of the arguments advanced in his recently published book[1127]. Small wonder that Southern friends should hurry the organization of the "Southern Independence a.s.sociation." Seeking a specific point of attack and again hoping for Tory support they first fixed their attention on the new trial of the _Alexandra_, on appeal from the decision by the Chief Baron of the Court of Exchequer. On December 4, Lindsay wrote to Mason that he had daily been "journeying to town" with the "old Chief Baron" and was confident the Government would again be defeated--in which case it would be very open to attack for the seizure of the Rams also. Nevertheless he was emphatic in his caution to Mason not to place too high a hope on any change in Government policy or on any expectation that the Tories would replace Palmerston[1128].

FOOTNOTES:

[Footnote 1041: Trollope, _North America_, I, p. 124.]

[Footnote 1042: Mason Papers. Spence to Mason, Jan. 3, 1863. Liverpool.]

[Footnote 1043: The _Index_, Jan. 29, 1863, p. 217. The active agent in control of the _Index_ was Henry Hotze, who, in addition to managing this journal, used secret service funds of the Confederacy to secure the support of writers in the London press. He was in close touch with all the Southern agents sent to Europe at various times, but appears never to have been fully trusted by either Mason or Slidell. In 1912-13 I made notes from various materials originating with Hotze, these being then in the possession of Mr. Charles Francis Adams. These materials were (1) a letter and cash book marked "C.S.A. Commercial Agency, London"; (2) a copy despatch book, January 6, 1862, to December 31, 1864; (3) a copy letter-book of drafts of "private" letters, May 28, 1864, to June 16, 1865. All these materials were secured by Mr. Adams from Professor J.F.

Jameson, who had received them from Henry Vignaud. Since Mr. Adams'

death in 1915 no trace of these Hotze materials has been found. My references, then, to "Hotze Papers," must rest on my notes, and transcripts of many letters, taken in 1912-13. Describing his activities to Benjamin, Hotze stated that in addition to maintaining the _Index_, he furnished news items and _editorials_ to various London papers, had seven paid writers on these papers, and was a pretty constant distributor of "boxes of cigars imported from Havana ... American whiskey and other articles." He added: "It is, of course, out of the question to give vouchers." (Hotze Papers MS. Letter Book. Hotze to Benjamin, No. 19, March 14, 1863.) In Hotze's cash book one of his regular payees was Percy Gregg who afterwards wrote a history of the Confederacy. Hotze complained that he could get no "paid writer" on the _Times_.]

[Footnote 1044: See _ante_, Ch. XI.]

[Footnote 1045: Lyons Papers, Feb. 14, 1863.]

[Footnote 1046: Mason Papers, March 18, 1863.]

[Footnote 1047: Pickett Papers. Slidell to Benjamin, No. 34, May 3, 1863. This despatch is omitted by Richardson.]

[Footnote 1048: Schwab, _The Confederate States of America_ gives the best a.n.a.lysis and history of Southern financing.]

[Footnote 1049: It is possible that a few were disposed of to contractors in payment for materials.]

[Footnote 1050: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, Sept. 27, 1862.]

[Footnote 1051: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, Oct. 2, 1862.]

[Footnote 1052: Slidell's daughter was engaged to be married to Erlanger's son.]

[Footnote 1053: Slidell himself wrote: "I should not have gone so far in recommending these propositions ... had I not the best reason to believe that even in antic.i.p.ation of its acceptance the very strongest influence will be enlisted in our favour." (Richardson, II, p. 340. To Benjamin, Oct. 28, 1862.)]

[Footnote 1054: Schwab, _The Confederate States of America_, pp. 30-31.

Schwab is in error in stating that Erlanger himself went to Richmond, since it appears from Slidell's letters that he was in constant contact with Erlanger in Paris during the time the "agents" were in Richmond.]

[Footnote 1055: Richardson, II, 399-401, Jan. 15, 1863.]

[Footnote 1056: _Ibid_, p. 420. Mason to Benjamin, Feb. 5, 1863.]

[Footnote 1057: Mason Papers, Jan. 23, 1863.]

[Footnote 1058: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, Feb. 15, 1863.]

[Footnote 1059: _Ibid._, Slidell to Mason, Feb. 23, 1863, and Mason to Slidell, Feb. 24, 1863.]

[Footnote 1060: Schwab, p. 33.]

[Footnote 1061: _Ibid._, p. 33. In France permission to advertise the loan was at first refused, but this was changed by the intervention of the Emperor.]

[Footnote 1062: Richardson, II, p. 457. To Benjamin, March 21, 1863.]

[Footnote 1063: Mason's _Mason_, p. 401. To Benjamin, March 30, 1863.]

[Footnote 1064: MS. Thesis, by Walter M. Case, for M.A. degree at Stanford University: _James M. Mason--Confederate Diplomat_ (1915). I am much indebted to Mr. Case's Chapter V: "Mason and Confederate Finance."]

[Footnote 1065: No evidence has been found to support this. Is not the real reason for the change to be found in British Governmental intentions known or suspected? March 27 was the day of the Parliamentary debate seemingly antagonistic to the North: while March 31, on the other hand, the _Alexandra_ case was referred to the Law Officers, and April 4 they recommend her seizure, which was done on April 5. It is to be presumed that rumours of this seeming face-about by the Government had not failed to reach the bond market.]

[Footnote 1066: Mason Papers. Mason to Slidell, April 3, 1863.]

[Footnote 1067: _Ibid._, Spence to Mason, May 9, 1863. This letter was written a month after the event at Mason's request for an exact statement of what had occurred.]

[Footnote 1068: _Ibid._]

[Footnote 1069: Schwab, pp. 39-44. Schwab believes that Erlanger & Company "are certainly open to the grave suspicion of having themselves been large holders of the bonds in question, especially in view of the presumably large amount of lapsed subscriptions, and of having quietly unloaded them on the unsuspecting Confederate agents when the market showed signs of collapsing" (p. 35). Schwab did not have access to Spence's report which gives further ground for this suspicion.]

[Footnote 1070: A newspaper item that Northern s.h.i.+ps had run by Vicksburg sent it down; Lee's advance into Pennsylvania caused a recovery; his retreat from Gettysburg brought it so low as thirty per cent. discount.]

[Footnote 1071: After the war was over Bigelow secured possession of and published an alleged list of important subscribers to the loan in which appeared the name of Gladstone. He repeated this accusation--a serious one if true, since Gladstone was a Cabinet member--in his _Retrospections_ (I, p. 620), and the story has found place in many writings (e.g., G.P. Putnam, _Memoirs_, p. 213). Gladstone's emphatic denial, calling the story a "mischievous forgery," appears in Morley, _Gladstone_, II, p. 83.]

[Footnote 1072: Hansard, 3rd Ser., CLXX, pp. 776-838.]

[Footnote 1073: See _ante_, p. 155.]

[Footnote 1074: The _Index_, May 28, 1863, pp. 72-3.]

[Footnote 1075: The _Times_, June 1, 1863.]

[Footnote 1076: The _Index_, June 4, 1863.]

[Footnote 1077: Chesney, _Military View of Recent Campaigns in Maryland and Virginia_, London, 1863.]