Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 66

Whether Fear Is a Pa.s.sion of the Soul?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a pa.s.sion of the soul.

For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "fear is a power, by way of _systole_"--i.e. of contraction--"desirous of vindicating nature." But no virtue is a pa.s.sion, as is proved in _Ethic._ ii, 5.

Therefore fear is not a pa.s.sion.

Obj. 2: Further, every pa.s.sion is an effect due to the presence of an agent. But fear is not of something present, but of something future, as Damascene declares (De Fide Orth. ii, 12). Therefore fear is not a pa.s.sion.

Obj. 3: Further, every pa.s.sion of the soul is a movement of the sensitive appet.i.te, in consequence of an apprehension of the senses.

But sense apprehends, not the future but the present. Since, then, fear is of future evil, it seems that it is not a pa.s.sion of the soul.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv, 5, seqq.) reckons fear among the other pa.s.sions of the soul.

_I answer that,_ Among the other pa.s.sions of the soul, after sorrow, fear chiefly has the character of pa.s.sion. For as we have stated above (Q. 22), the notion of pa.s.sion implies first of all a movement of a pa.s.sive power--i.e. of a power whose object is compared to it as its active principle: since pa.s.sion is the effect of an agent. In this way, both _to feel_ and _to understand_ are pa.s.sions. Secondly, more properly speaking, pa.s.sion is a movement of the appet.i.tive power; and more properly still, it is a movement of an appet.i.tive power that has a bodily organ, such movement being accompanied by a bodily trans.m.u.tation. And, again, most properly those movements are called pa.s.sions, which imply some deterioration. Now it is evident that fear, since it regards evil, belongs to the appet.i.tive power, which of itself regards good and evil. Moreover, it belongs to the sensitive appet.i.te: for it is accompanied by a certain trans.m.u.tation--i.e. contraction--as Damascene says (Cf. Obj. 1).

Again, it implies relation to evil as overcoming, so to speak, some particular good. Wherefore it has most properly the character of pa.s.sion; less, however, than sorrow, which regards the present evil: because fear regards future evil, which is not so strong a motive as present evil.

Reply Obj. 1: Virtue denotes a principle of action: wherefore, in so far as the interior movements of the appet.i.tive faculty are principles of external action, they are called virtues. But the Philosopher denies that pa.s.sion is a virtue by way of habit.

Reply Obj. 2: Just as the pa.s.sion of a natural body is due to the bodily presence of an agent, so is the pa.s.sion of the soul due to the agent being present to the soul, although neither corporally nor really present: that is to say, in so far as the evil which is really future, is present in the apprehension of the soul.

Reply Obj. 3: The senses do not apprehend the future: but from apprehending the present, an animal is moved by natural instinct to hope for a future good, or to fear a future evil.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 41, Art. 2]

Whether Fear Is a Special Pa.s.sion?

Objection 1: It would seem that fear is not a special pa.s.sion. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 33) that "the man who is not distraught by fear, is neither hara.s.sed by desire, nor wounded by sickness"--i.e. sorrow--"nor tossed about in transports of empty joys." Wherefore it seems that, if fear be set aside, all the other pa.s.sions are removed. Therefore fear is not a special but a general pa.s.sion.

Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Ethic. vi, 2) that "pursuit and avoidance in the appet.i.te are what affirmation and denial are in the intellect." But denial is nothing special in the intellect, as neither is affirmation, but something common to many. Therefore neither is avoidance anything special in the appet.i.te. But fear is nothing but a kind of avoidance of evil. Therefore it is not a special pa.s.sion.

Obj. 3: Further, if fear were a special pa.s.sion, it would be chiefly in the irascible part. But fear is also in the concupiscible: since the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear is a kind of sorrow"; and Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that fear is "a power of desire": and both sorrow and desire are in the concupiscible faculty, as stated above (Q. 23, A. 4). Therefore fear is not a special pa.s.sion, since it belongs to different powers.

_On the contrary,_ Fear is condivided with the other pa.s.sions of the soul, as is clear from Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 12, 15).

_I answer that,_ The pa.s.sions of the soul derive their species from their objects: hence that is a special pa.s.sion, which has a special object. Now fear has a special object, as hope has. For just as the object of hope is a future good, difficult but possible to obtain; so the object of fear is a future evil, difficult and irresistible.

Consequently fear is a special pa.s.sion of the soul.

Reply Obj. 1: All the pa.s.sions of the soul arise from one source, viz. love, wherein they are connected with one another. By reason of this connection, when fear is put aside, the other pa.s.sions of the soul are dispersed; not, however, as though it were a general pa.s.sion.

Reply Obj. 2: Not every avoidance in the appet.i.te is fear, but avoidance of a special object, as stated. Wherefore, though avoidance be something common, yet fear is a special pa.s.sion.

Reply Obj. 3: Fear is nowise in the concupiscible: for it regards evil, not absolutely, but as difficult or arduous, so as to be almost unavoidable. But since the irascible pa.s.sions arise from the pa.s.sions of the concupiscible faculty, and terminate therein, as stated above (Q. 25, A. 1); hence it is that what belongs to the concupiscible is ascribed to fear. For fear is called sorrow, in so far as the object of fear causes sorrow when present: wherefore the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that fear arises "from the representation of a future evil which is either corruptive or painful." In like manner desire is ascribed by Damascene to fear, because just as hope arises from the desire of good, so fear arises from avoidance of evil; while avoidance of evil arises from the desire of good, as is evident from what has been said above (Q. 25, A. 2; Q. 29, A. 2; Q. 36, A. 2).

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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 41, Art. 3]

Whether There Is a Natural Fear?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is a natural fear. For Damascene says (De Fide Orth. iii, 23) that "there is a natural fear, through the soul refusing to be severed from the body."

Obj. 2: Further, fear arises from love, as stated above (A. 2, ad 1).

But there is a natural love, as Dionysius says (Div. Nom. iv).

Therefore there is also a natural fear.

Obj. 3: Further, fear is opposed to hope, as stated above (Q. 40, A.

4, ad 1). But there is a hope of nature, as is evident from Rom.

4:18, where it is said of Abraham that "against hope" of nature, "he believed in hope" of grace. Therefore there is also a fear of nature.

_On the contrary,_ That which is natural is common to things animate and inanimate. But fear is not in things inanimate. Therefore there is no natural fear.

_I answer that,_ A movement is said to be natural, because nature inclines thereto. Now this happens in two ways. First, so that it is entirely accomplished by nature, without any operation of the apprehensive faculty: thus to have an upward movement is natural to fire, and to grow is the natural movement of animals and plants.

Secondly, a movement is said to be natural, if nature inclines thereto, though it be accomplished by the apprehensive faculty alone: since, as stated above (Q. 10, A. 1), the movements of the cognitive and appet.i.tive faculties are reducible to nature as to their first principle. In this way, even the acts of the apprehensive power, such as understanding, feeling, and remembering, as well as the movements of the animal appet.i.te, are sometimes said to be natural.

And in this sense we may say that there is a natural fear; and it is distinguished from non-natural fear, by reason of the diversity of its object. For, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), there is a fear of "corruptive evil," which nature shrinks from on account of its natural desire to exist; and such fear is said to be natural.

Again, there is a fear of "painful evil," which is repugnant not to nature, but to the desire of the appet.i.te; and such fear is not natural. In this sense we have stated above (Q. 26, A. 1; Q. 30, A.

3; Q. 31, A. 7) that love, desire, and pleasure are divisible into natural and non-natural.

But in the first sense of the word "natural," we must observe that certain pa.s.sions of the soul are sometimes said to be natural, as love, desire, and hope; whereas the others cannot be called natural.

The reason of this is because love and hatred, desire and avoidance, imply a certain inclination to pursue what is good or to avoid what is evil; which inclination is to be found in the natural appet.i.te also. Consequently there is a natural love; while we may also speak of desire and hope as being even in natural things devoid of knowledge. On the other hand the other pa.s.sions of the soul denote certain movements, whereto the natural inclination is nowise sufficient. This is due either to the fact that perception or knowledge is essential to these pa.s.sions (thus we have said, Q. 31, AA. 1, 3; Q. 35, A. 1, that apprehension is a necessary condition of pleasure and sorrow), wherefore things devoid of knowledge cannot be said to take pleasure or to be sorrowful: or else it is because such like movements are contrary to the very nature of natural inclination: for instance, despair flies from good on account of some difficulty; and fear shrinks from repelling a contrary evil; both of which are contrary to the inclination of nature. Wherefore such like pa.s.sions are in no way ascribed to inanimate beings.

Thus the Replies to the Objections are evident.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 41, Art. 4]

Whether the Species of Fear Are Suitably a.s.signed?

Objection 1: It would seem that six species of fear are unsuitably a.s.signed by Damascene (De Fide Orth. ii, 15); namely, "laziness, shamefacedness, shame, amazement, stupor, and anxiety." Because, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "fear regards a saddening evil."

Therefore the species of fear should correspond to the species of sorrow. Now there are four species of sorrow, as stated above (Q. 35, A. 8). Therefore there should only be four species of fear corresponding to them.

Obj. 2: Further, that which consists in an action of our own is in our power. But fear regards an evil that surpa.s.ses our power, as stated above (A. 2). Therefore laziness, shamefacedness, and shame, which regard our own actions, should not be reckoned as species of fear.

Obj. 3: Further, fear is of the future, as stated above (AA. 1, 2).

But "shame regards a disgraceful deed already done," as Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius, De Nat. Hom. xx.] says. Therefore shame is not a species of fear.

Obj. 4: Further, fear is only of evil. But amazement and stupor regard great and unwonted things, whether good or evil. Therefore amazement and stupor are not species of fear.

Obj. 5: Further, Philosophers have been led by amazement to seek the truth, as stated in the beginning of _Metaph._ But fear leads to flight rather than to search. Therefore amazement is not a species of fear.

On the contrary suffices the authority of Damascene and Gregory of Nyssa [*Nemesius] (Cf. Obj. 1, 3).

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 2), fear regards a future evil which surpa.s.ses the power of him that fears, so that it is irresistible. Now man's evil, like his good, may be considered either in his action or in external things. In his action he has a twofold evil to fear. First, there is the toil that burdens his nature: and hence arises _laziness,_ as when a man shrinks from work for fear of too much toil. Secondly, there is the disgrace which damages him in the opinion of others. And thus, if disgrace is feared in a deed that is yet to be done, there is _shamefacedness_; if, however, it be a deed already done, there is _shame._

On the other hand, the evil that consists in external things may surpa.s.s man's faculty of resistance in three ways. First by reason of its magnitude; when, that is to say, a man considers some great evil the outcome of which he is unable to gauge: and then there is _amazement._ Secondly, by reason of its being unwonted; because, to wit, some unwonted evil arises before us, and on that account is great in our estimation: and then there is _stupor,_ which is caused by the representation of something unwonted. Thirdly, by reason of its being unforeseen: thus future misfortunes are feared, and fear of this kind is called _anxiety._

Reply Obj. 1: Those species of sorrow given above are not derived from the diversity of objects, but from the diversity of effects, and for certain special reasons. Consequently there is no need for those species of sorrow to correspond with these species of fear, which are derived from the proper division of the object of fear itself.

Reply Obj. 2: A deed considered as being actually done, is in the power of the doer. But it is possible to take into consideration something connected with the deed, and surpa.s.sing the faculty of the doer, for which reason he shrinks from the deed. It is in this sense that laziness, shamefacedness, and shame are reckoned as species of fear.