Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 67
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Reply Obj. 3: The past deed may be the occasion of fear of future reproach or disgrace: and in this sense shame is a species of fear.
Reply Obj. 4: Not every amazement and stupor are species of fear, but that amazement which is caused by a great evil, and that stupor which arises from an unwonted evil. Or else we may say that, just as laziness shrinks from the toil of external work, so amazement and stupor shrink from the difficulty of considering a great and unwonted thing, whether good or evil: so that amazement and stupor stand in relation to the act of the intellect, as laziness does to external work.
Reply Obj. 5: He who is amazed shrinks at present from forming a judgment of that which amazes him, fearing to fall short of the truth, but inquires afterwards: whereas he who is overcome by stupor fears both to judge at present, and to inquire afterwards. Wherefore amazement is a beginning of philosophical research: whereas stupor is a hindrance thereto.
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QUESTION 42
OF THE OBJECT OF FEAR (In Six Articles)
We must now consider the object of fear: under which head there are six points of inquiry:
(1) Whether good or evil is the object of fear?
(2) Whether evil of nature is the object of fear?
(3) Whether the evil of sin is an object of fear?
(4) Whether fear itself can be feared?
(5) Whether sudden things are especially feared?
(6) Whether those things are more feared against which there is no remedy?
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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 1]
Whether the Object of Fear Is Good or Evil?
Objection 1: It would seem that good is the object of fear. For Augustine says (QQ. 83, qu. 83) that "we fear nothing save to lose what we love and possess, or not to obtain that which we hope for."
But that which we love is good. Therefore fear regards good as its proper object.
Obj. 2: Further, the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "power and to be above another is a thing to be feared." But this is a good thing. Therefore good is the object of fear.
Obj. 3: Further, there can be no evil in G.o.d. But we are commanded to fear G.o.d, according to Ps. 33:10: "Fear the Lord, all ye saints."
Therefore even the good is an object of fear.
_On the contrary,_ Damascene says (De Fide Orth. ii, 12) that fear is of future evil.
_I answer that,_ Fear is a movement of the appet.i.tive power. Now it belongs to the appet.i.tive power to pursue and to avoid, as stated in _Ethic._ vi, 2: and pursuit is of good, while avoidance is of evil.
Consequently whatever movement of the appet.i.tive power implies pursuit, has some good for its object: and whatever movement implies avoidance, has an evil for its object. Wherefore, since fear implies an avoidance, in the first place and of its very nature it regards evil as its proper object.
It can, however, regard good also, in so far as referable to evil.
This can be in two ways. In one way, inasmuch as an evil causes privation of good. Now a thing is evil from the very fact that it is a privation of some good. Wherefore, since evil is shunned because it is evil, it follows that it is shunned because it deprives one of the good that one pursues through love thereof. And in this sense Augustine says that there is no cause for fear, save loss of the good we love.
In another way, good stands related to evil as its cause: in so far as some good can by its power bring harm to the good we love: and so, just as hope, as stated above (Q. 40, A. 7), regards two things, namely, the good to which it tends, and the thing through which there is a hope of obtaining the desired good; so also does fear regard two things, namely, the evil from which it shrinks, and that good which, by its power, can inflict that evil. In this way G.o.d is feared by man, inasmuch as He can inflict punishment, spiritual or corporal. In this way, too, we fear the power of man; especially when it has been thwarted, or when it is unjust, because then it is more likely to do us a harm.
In like manner one fears _to be over another,_ i.e. to lean on another, so that it is in his power to do us a harm: thus a man fears another, who knows him to be guilty of a crime, lest he reveal it to others.
This suffices for the Replies to the Objections.
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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 2]
Whether Evil of Nature Is an Object of Fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that evil of nature is not an object of fear. For the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "fear makes us take counsel." But we do not take counsel about things which happen naturally, as stated in _Ethic._ iii, 3. Therefore evil of nature is not an object of fear.
Obj. 2: Further, natural defects such as death and the like are always threatening man. If therefore such like evils were an object of fear, man would needs be always in fear.
Obj. 3: Further, nature does not move to contraries. But evil of nature is an effect of nature. Therefore if a man shrinks from such like evils through fear thereof, this is not an effect of nature.
Therefore natural fear is not of the evil of nature; and yet it seems that it should be.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 6) that "the most terrible of all things is death," which is an evil of nature.
_I answer that,_ As the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), fear is caused by the "imagination of a future evil which is either corruptive or painful." Now just as a painful evil is that which is contrary to the will, so a corruptive evil is that which is contrary to nature: and this is the evil of nature. Consequently evil of nature can be the object of fear.
But it must be observed that evil of nature sometimes arises from a natural cause; and then it is called evil of nature, not merely from being a privation of the good of nature, but also from being an effect of nature; such are natural death and other like defects. But sometimes evil of nature arises from a non-natural cause; such as violent death inflicted by an a.s.sailant. In either case evil of nature is feared to a certain extent, and to a certain extent not.
For since fear arises "from the imagination of future evil," as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), whatever removes the imagination of the future evil, removes fear also. Now it may happen in two ways that an evil may not appear as about to be. First, through being remote and far off: for, on account of the distance, such a thing is considered as though it were not to be. Hence we either do not fear it, or fear it but little; for, as the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5), "we do not fear things that are very far off; since all know that they shall die, but as death is not near, they heed it not."
Secondly, a future evil is considered as though it were not to be, on account of its being inevitable, wherefore we look upon it as already present. Hence the Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "those who are already on the scaffold, are not afraid," seeing that they are on the very point of a death from which there is no escape; "but in order that a man be afraid, there must be some hope of escape for him."
Consequently evil of nature is not feared if it be not apprehended as future: but if evil of nature, that is corruptive, be apprehended as near at hand, and yet with some hope of escape, then it will be feared.
Reply Obj. 1: The evil of nature sometimes is not an effect of nature, as stated above. But in so far as it is an effect of nature, although it may be impossible to avoid it entirely, yet it may be possible to delay it. And with this hope one may take counsel about avoiding it.
Reply Obj. 2: Although evil of nature ever threatens, yet it does not always threaten from near at hand: and consequently it is not always feared.
Reply Obj. 3: Death and other defects of nature are the effects of the common nature; and yet the individual nature rebels against them as far as it can. Accordingly, from the inclination of the individual nature arise pain and sorrow for such like evils, when present; fear when threatening in the future.
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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 42, Art. 3]
Whether the Evil of Sin Is an Object of Fear?
Objection 1: It would seem that the evil of sin can be an object of fear. For Augustine says on the canonical Epistle of John (Tract.
ix), that "by chaste fear man fears to be severed from G.o.d." Now nothing but sin severs us from G.o.d; according to Isa. 59:2: "Your iniquities have divided between you and your G.o.d." Therefore the evil of sin can be an object of fear.
Obj. 2: Further, Cicero says (Quaest. Tusc. iv, 4, 6) that "we fear when they are yet to come, those things which give us pain when they are present." But it is possible for one to be pained or sorrowful on account of the evil of sin. Therefore one can also fear the evil of sin.
Obj. 3: Further, hope is contrary to fear. But the good of virtue can be the object of hope, as the Philosopher declares (Ethic. ix, 4): and the Apostle says (Gal. 5:10): "I have confidence in you in the Lord, that you will not be of another mind." Therefore fear can regard evil of sin.
Obj. 4: Further, shame is a kind of fear, as stated above (Q. 41, A.
4). But shame regards a disgraceful deed, which is an evil of sin.
Therefore fear does so likewise.
_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher says (Rhet. ii, 5) that "not all evils are feared, for instance that someone be unjust or slow."
_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 40, A. 1; Q. 41, A. 2), as the object of hope is a future good difficult but possible to obtain, so the object of fear is a future evil, arduous and not to be easily avoided. From this we may gather that whatever is entirely subject to our power and will, is not an object of fear; and that nothing gives rise to fear save what is due to an external cause. Now human will is the proper cause of the evil of sin: and consequently evil of sin, properly speaking, is not an object of fear.
Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 67
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