Summa Theologica Part II (Pars Prima Secundae) Part 92

_On the contrary,_ "No man is just who rejoices not in his deeds," as stated in _Ethic._ i, 8. But joy is a pa.s.sion. Therefore justice cannot be without pa.s.sion; and still less can the other virtues be.

_I answer that,_ If we take the pa.s.sions as being inordinate emotions, as the Stoics did, it is evident that in this sense perfect virtue is without the pa.s.sions. But if by pa.s.sions we understand any movement of the sensitive appet.i.te, it is plain that moral virtues, which are about the pa.s.sions as about their proper matter, cannot be without pa.s.sions. The reason for this is that otherwise it would follow that moral virtue makes the sensitive appet.i.te altogether idle: whereas it is not the function of virtue to deprive the powers subordinate to reason of their proper activities, but to make them execute the commands of reason, by exercising their proper acts.

Wherefore just as virtue directs the bodily limbs to their due external acts, so does it direct the sensitive appet.i.te to its proper regulated movements.

Those moral virtues, however, which are not about the pa.s.sions, but about operations, can be without pa.s.sions. Such a virtue is justice: because it applies the will to its proper act, which is not a pa.s.sion. Nevertheless, joy results from the act of justice; at least in the will, in which case it is not a pa.s.sion. And if this joy be increased through the perfection of justice, it will overflow into the sensitive appet.i.te; in so far as the lower powers follow the movement of the higher, as stated above (Q. 17, A. 7; Q. 24, A. 3).

Wherefore by reason of this kind of overflow, the more perfect a virtue is, the more does it cause pa.s.sion.

Reply Obj. 1: Virtue overcomes inordinate pa.s.sion; it produces ordinate pa.s.sion.

Reply Obj. 2: It is inordinate, not ordinate, pa.s.sion that leads to sin.

Reply Obj. 3: The good of anything depends on the condition of its nature. Now there is no sensitive appet.i.te in G.o.d and the angels, as there is in man. Consequently good operation in G.o.d and the angels is altogether without pa.s.sion, as it is without a body: whereas the good operation of man is with pa.s.sion, even as it is produced with the body's help.

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QUESTION 60

HOW THE MORAL VIRTUES DIFFER FROM ONE ANOTHER (FIVE ARTICLES)

We must now consider how the moral virtues differ from one another: under which head there are five points of inquiry:

(1) Whether there is only one moral virtue?

(2) Whether those moral virtues which are about operations, are distinct from those which are about pa.s.sions?

(3) Whether there is but one moral virtue about operations?

(4) Whether there are different moral virtues about different pa.s.sions?

(5) Whether the moral virtues differ in point of the various objects of the pa.s.sions?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 1]

Whether There Is Only One Moral Virtue?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is only one moral virtue.

Because just as the direction of moral actions belongs to reason which is the subject of the intellectual virtues; so does their inclination belong to the appet.i.te which is the subject of moral virtues. But there is only one intellectual virtue to direct all moral acts, viz. prudence. Therefore there is also but one moral virtue to give all moral acts their respective inclinations.

Obj. 2: Further, habits differ, not in respect of their material objects, but according to the formal aspect of their objects. Now the formal aspect of the good to which moral virtue is directed, is one thing, viz. the mean defined by reason. Therefore, seemingly, there is but one moral virtue.

Obj. 3: Further, things pertaining to morals are specified by their end, as stated above (Q. 1, A. 3). Now there is but one common end of all moral virtues, viz. happiness, while the proper and proximate ends are infinite in number. But the moral virtues themselves are not infinite in number. Therefore it seems that there is but one.

_On the contrary,_ One habit cannot be in several powers, as stated above (Q. 56, A. 2). But the subject of the moral virtues is the appet.i.tive part of the soul, which is divided into several powers, as stated in the First Part (Q. 80, A. 2; Q. 81, A. 2). Therefore there cannot be only one moral virtue.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 58, AA. 1, 2, 3), the moral virtues are habits of the appet.i.tive faculty. Now habits differ specifically according to the specific differences of their objects, as stated above (Q. 54, A. 2). Again, the species of the object of appet.i.te, as of any thing, depends on its specific form which it receives from the agent. But we must observe that the matter of the pa.s.sive subject bears a twofold relation to the agent. For sometimes it receives the form of the agent, in the same kind specifically as the agent has that form, as happens with all univocal agents, so that if the agent be one specifically, the matter must of necessity receive a form specifically one: thus the univocal effect of fire is of necessity something in the species of fire. Sometimes, however, the matter receives the form from the agent, but not in the same kind specifically as the agent, as is the case with non-univocal causes of generation: thus an animal is generated by the sun. In this case the forms received into matter are not of one species, but vary according to the adaptability of the matter to receive the influx of the agent: for instance, we see that owing to the one action of the sun, animals of various species are produced by putrefaction according to the various adaptability of matter.

Now it is evident that in moral matters the reason holds the place of commander and mover, while the appet.i.tive power is commanded and moved. But the appet.i.te does not receive the direction of reason univocally so to say; because it is rational, not essentially, but by partic.i.p.ation (Ethic. i, 13). Consequently objects made appetible by the direction of reason belong to various species, according to their various relations to reason: so that it follows that moral virtues are of various species and are not one only.

Reply Obj. 1: The object of the reason is truth. Now in all moral matters, which are contingent matters of action, there is but one kind of truth. Consequently, there is but one virtue to direct all such matters, viz. prudence. On the other hand, the object of the appet.i.tive power is the appetible good, which varies in kind according to its various relations to reason, the directing power.

Reply Obj. 2: This formal element is one generically, on account of the unity of the agent: but it varies in species, on account of the various relations of the receiving matter, as explained above.

Reply Obj. 3: Moral matters do not receive their species from the last end, but from their proximate ends: and these, although they be infinite in number, are not infinite in species.

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SECOND ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 2]

Whether Moral Virtues About Operations Are Different from Those That Are About Pa.s.sions?

Objection 1: It would seem that moral virtues are not divided into those which are about operations and those which are about pa.s.sions.

For the Philosopher says (Ethic. ii, 3) that moral virtue is "an operative habit whereby we do what is best in matters of pleasure or sorrow." Now pleasure and sorrow are pa.s.sions, as stated above (Q.

31, A. 1; Q. 35, A. 1). Therefore the same virtue which is about pa.s.sions is also about operations, since it is an operative habit.

Obj. 2: Further, the pa.s.sions are principles of external action. If therefore some virtues regulate the pa.s.sions, they must, as a consequence, regulate operations also. Therefore the same moral virtues are about both pa.s.sions and operations.

Obj. 3: Further, the sensitive appet.i.te is moved well or ill towards every external operation. Now movements of the sensitive appet.i.te are pa.s.sions. Therefore the same virtues that are about operations are also about pa.s.sions.

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher reckons justice to be about operations; and temperance, fort.i.tude and gentleness, about pa.s.sions (Ethic. ii, 3, 7; v, 1, seqq.).

_I answer that,_ Operation and pa.s.sion stand in a twofold relation to virtue. First, as its effects; and in this way every moral virtue has some good operations as its product; and a certain pleasure or sorrow which are pa.s.sions, as stated above (Q. 59, A. 4, ad 1).

Secondly, operation may be compared to moral virtue as the matter about which virtue is concerned: and in this sense those moral virtues which are about operations must needs differ from those which are about pa.s.sions. The reason for this is that good and evil, in certain operations, are taken from the very nature of those operations, no matter how man may be affected towards them: viz. in so far as good and evil in them depend on their being commensurate with someone else. In operations of this kind there needs to be some power to regulate the operations in themselves: such are buying and selling, and all such operations in which there is an element of something due or undue to another. For this reason justice and its parts are properly about operations as their proper matter. On the other hand, in some operations, good and evil depend only on commensuration with the agent. Consequently good and evil in these operations depend on the way in which man is affected to them. And for this reason in such like operations virtue must needs be chiefly about internal emotions which are called the pa.s.sions of the soul, as is evidently the case with temperance, fort.i.tude and the like.

It happens, however, in operations which are directed to another, that the good of virtue is overlooked by reason of some inordinate pa.s.sion of the soul. In such cases justice is destroyed in so far as the due measure of the external act is destroyed: while some other virtue is destroyed in so far as the internal pa.s.sions exceed their due measure. Thus when through anger, one man strikes another, justice is destroyed in the undue blow; while gentleness is destroyed by the immoderate anger. The same may be clearly applied to other virtues.

This suffices for the Replies to the Objections. For the first considers operations as the effect of virtue, while the other two consider operation and pa.s.sion as concurring in the same effect. But in some cases virtue is chiefly about operations, in others, about pa.s.sions, for the reason given above.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I-II, Q. 60, Art. 3]

Whether There Is Only One Moral Virtue About Operations?

Objection 1: It would seem that there is but one moral virtue about operations. Because the rect.i.tude of all external operations seems to belong to justice. Now justice is but one virtue. Therefore there is but one virtue about operations.

Obj. 2: Further, those operations seem to differ most, which are directed on the one side to the good of the individual, and on the other to the good of the many. But this diversity does not cause diversity among the moral virtues: for the Philosopher says (Ethic.

v, 1) that legal justice, which directs human acts to the common good, does not differ, save logically, from the virtue which directs a man's actions to one man only. Therefore diversity of operations does not cause a diversity of moral virtues.

Obj. 3: Further, if there are various moral virtues about various operations, diversity of moral virtues would needs follow diversity of operations. But this is clearly untrue: for it is the function of justice to establish rect.i.tude in various kinds of commutations, and again in distributions, as is set down in _Ethic._ v, 2. Therefore there are not different virtues about different operations.

_On the contrary,_ Religion is a moral virtue distinct from piety, both of which are about operations.

_I answer that,_ All the moral virtues that are about operations agree in one general notion of justice, which is in respect of something due to another: but they differ in respect of various special notions. The reason for this is that in external operations, the order of reason is established, as we have stated (A. 2), not according as how man is affected towards such operations, but according to the becomingness of the thing itself; from which becomingness we derive the notion of something due which is the formal aspect of justice: for, seemingly, it pertains to justice that a man give another his due. Wherefore all such virtues as are about operations, bear, in some way, the character of justice. But the thing due is not of the same kind in all these virtues: for something is due to an equal in one way, to a superior, in another way, to an inferior, in yet another; and the nature of a debt differs according as it arises from a contract, a promise, or a favor already conferred. And corresponding to these various kinds of debt there are various virtues: e.g. _Religion_ whereby we pay our debt to G.o.d; _Piety,_ whereby we pay our debt to our parents or to our country; _Grat.i.tude,_ whereby we pay our debt to our benefactors, and so forth.

Reply Obj. 1: Justice properly so called is one special virtue, whose object is the perfect due, which can be paid in the equivalent. But the name of justice is extended also to all cases in which something due is rendered: in this sense it is not as a special virtue.

Reply Obj. 2: That justice which seeks the common good is another virtue from that which is directed to the private good of an individual: wherefore common right differs from private right; and Tully (De Inv. ii) reckons as a special virtue, piety which directs man to the good of his country. But that justice which directs man to the common good is a general virtue through its act of command: since it directs all the acts of the virtues to its own end, viz. the common good. And the virtues, in so far as they are commanded by that justice, receive the name of justice: so that virtue does not differ, save logically, from legal justice; just as there is only a logical difference between a virtue that is active of itself, and a virtue that is active through the command of another virtue.

Reply Obj. 3: There is the same kind of due in all the operations belonging to special justice. Consequently, there is the same virtue of justice, especially in regard to commutations. For it may be that distributive justice is of another species from commutative justice; but about this we shall inquire later on (II-II, Q. 61, A. 1).

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