Summa Theologica Part III (Secunda Secundae) Part 189

_On the contrary,_ The Philosopher (Ethic. ii, 7; iii, 7) states that timidity is opposed to fort.i.tude.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (Q. 19, A. 3; I-II, Q. 43, A. 1), all fear arises from love; since no one fears save what is contrary to something he loves. Now love is not confined to any particular kind of virtue or vice: but ordinate love is included in every virtue, since every virtuous man loves the good proper to his virtue; while inordinate love is included in every sin, because inordinate love gives use to inordinate desire. Hence in like manner inordinate fear is included in every sin; thus the covetous man fears the loss of money, the intemperate man the loss of pleasure, and so on. But the greatest fear of all is that which has the danger of death for its object, as we find proved in _Ethic._ iii, 6. Wherefore the inordinateness of this fear is opposed to fort.i.tude which regards dangers of death. For this reason timidity is said to be antonomastically* opposed to fort.i.tude. [*Antonomasia is the figure of speech whereby we subst.i.tute the general for the individual term; e.g. The Philosopher for Aristotle: and so timidity, which is inordinate fear of any evil, is employed to denote inordinate fear of the danger of death.]

Reply Obj. 1: The pa.s.sages quoted refer to inordinate fear in its generic acceptation, which can be opposed to various virtues.

Reply Obj. 2: Human acts are estimated chiefly with reference to the end, as stated above (I-II, Q. 1, A. 3; Q. 18, A. 6): and it belongs to a brave man to expose himself to danger of death for the sake of a good. But a man who exposes himself to danger of death in order to escape from slavery or hards.h.i.+ps is overcome by fear, which is contrary to fort.i.tude. Hence the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7), that "to die in order to escape poverty, l.u.s.t, or something disagreeable is an act not of fort.i.tude but of cowardice: for to shun hards.h.i.+ps is a mark of effeminacy."

Reply Obj. 3: As stated above (I-II, Q. 45, A. 2), fear is the beginning of despair even as hope is the beginning of daring.

Wherefore, just as fort.i.tude which employs daring in moderation presupposes hope, so on the other hand despair proceeds from some kind of fear. It does not follow, however, that any kind of despair results from any kind of fear, but that only from fear of the same kind. Now the despair that is opposed to hope is referred to another kind, namely to Divine things; whereas the fear that is opposed to fort.i.tude regards dangers of death. Hence the argument does not prove.

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THIRD ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 125, Art. 3]

Whether Fear Is a Mortal Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that fear is not a mortal sin. For, as stated above (I-II, Q. 23, A. 1), fear is in the irascible faculty which is a part of the sensuality. Now there is none but venial sin in the sensuality, as stated above (I-II, Q. 74, A. 4). Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 2: Further, every mortal sin turns the heart wholly from G.o.d.

But fear does not this, for a gloss on Judges 7:3, "Whosoever is fearful," etc., says that "a man is fearful when he trembles at the very thought of conflict; yet he is not so wholly terrified at heart, but that he can rally and take courage." Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.

Obj. 3: Further, mortal sin is a lapse not only from perfection but also from a precept. But fear does not make one lapse from a precept, but only from perfection; for a gloss on Deut. 20:8, "What man is there that is fearful and fainthearted?" says: "We learn from this that no man can take up the profession of contemplation or spiritual warfare, if he still fears to be despoiled of earthly riches."

Therefore fear is not a mortal sin.

_On the contrary,_ For mortal sin alone is the pain of h.e.l.l due: and yet this is due to the fearful, according to Apoc. 21:8, "But the fearful and unbelieving and the abominable," etc., "shall have their portion in the pool burning with fire and brimstone which is the second death." Therefore fear is a mortal sin.

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 1), fear is a sin through being inordinate, that is to say, through shunning what ought not to be shunned according to reason. Now sometimes this inordinateness of fear is confined to the sensitive appet.i.tes, without the accession of the rational appet.i.te's consent: and then it cannot be a mortal, but only a venial sin. But sometimes this inordinateness of fear reaches to the rational appet.i.te which is called the will, which deliberately shuns something against the dictate of reason: and this inordinateness of fear is sometimes a mortal, sometimes a venial sin.

For if a man through fear of the danger of death or of any other temporal evil is so disposed as to do what is forbidden, or to omit what is commanded by the Divine law, such fear is a mortal sin: otherwise it is a venial sin.

Reply Obj. 1: This argument considers fear as confined to the sensuality.

Reply Obj. 2: This gloss also can be understood as referring to the fear that is confined within the sensuality. Or better still we may reply that a man is terrified with his whole heart when fear banishes his courage beyond remedy. Now even when fear is a mortal sin, it may happen nevertheless that one is not so wilfully terrified that one cannot be persuaded to put fear aside: thus sometimes a man sins mortally by consenting to concupiscence, and is turned aside from accomplis.h.i.+ng what he purposed doing.

Reply Obj. 3: This gloss speaks of the fear that turns man aside from a good that is necessary, not for the fulfilment of a precept, but for the perfection of a counsel. Such like fear is not a mortal sin, but is sometimes venial: and sometimes it is not a sin, for instance when one has a reasonable cause for fear.

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FOURTH ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 125, Art. 4]

Whether Fear Excuses from Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that fear does not excuse from sin. For fear is a sin, as stated above (A. 1). But sin does not excuse from sin, rather does it aggravate it. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.

Obj. 2: Further, if any fear excuses from sin, most of all would this be true of the fear of death, to which, as the saying is, a courageous man is subject. Yet this fear, seemingly, is no excuse, because, since death comes, of necessity, to all, it does not seem to be an object of fear. Therefore fear does not excuse from sin.

Obj. 3: Further, all fear is of evil, either temporal or spiritual.

Now fear of spiritual evil cannot excuse sin, because instead of inducing one to sin, it withdraws one from sin: and fear of temporal evil does not excuse from sin, because according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6), "one should not fear poverty, nor sickness, nor anything that is not a result of one's own wickedness." Therefore it seems that in no sense does fear excuse from sin.

_On the contrary,_ It is stated in the Decretals (I, Q. 1, Cap.

Constat.): "A man who has been forcibly and unwillingly ordained by heretics, has an ostensible excuse."

_I answer that,_ As stated above (A. 3), fear is sinful in so far as it runs counter to the order of reason. Now reason judges certain evils to be shunned rather than others. Wherefore it is no sin not to shun what is less to be shunned in order to avoid what reason judges to be more avoided: thus death of the body is more to be avoided than the loss of temporal goods. Hence a man would be excused from sin if through fear of death he were to promise or give something to a robber, and yet he would be guilty of sin were he to give to sinners, rather than to the good to whom he should give in preference. On the other hand, if through fear a man were to avoid evils which according to reason are less to be avoided, and so incur evils which according to reason are more to be avoided, he could not be wholly excused from sin, because such like fear would be inordinate. Now the evils of the soul are more to be feared than the evils of the body, and evils of the body more than evils of external things. Wherefore if one were to incur evils of the soul, namely sins, in order to avoid evils of the body, such as blows or death, or evils of external things, such as loss of money; or if one were to endure evils of the body in order to avoid loss of money, one would not be wholly excused from sin. Yet one's sin would be extenuated somewhat, for what is done through fear is less voluntary, because when fear lays hold of a man he is under a certain necessity of doing a certain thing. Hence the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 1) says that these things that are done through fear are not simply voluntary, but a mixture of voluntary and involuntary.

Reply Obj. 1: Fear excuses, not in the point of its sinfulness, but in the point of its involuntariness.

Reply Obj. 2: Although death comes, of necessity, to all, yet the shortening of temporal life is an evil and consequently an object of fear.

Reply Obj. 3: According to the opinion of Stoics, who held temporal goods not to be man's goods, it follows in consequence that temporal evils are not man's evils, and that therefore they are nowise to be feared. But according to Augustine (De Lib. Arb. ii) these temporal things are goods of the least account, and this was also the opinion of the Peripatetics. Hence their contraries are indeed to be feared; but not so much that one ought for their sake to renounce that which is good according to virtue.

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QUESTION 126

OF FEARLESSNESS (In Two Articles)

We must now consider the vice of fearlessness: under which head there are two points of inquiry:

(1) Whether it is a sin to be fearless?

(2) Whether it is opposed to fort.i.tude?

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FIRST ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 126, Art. 1]

Whether Fearlessness Is a Sin?

Objection 1: It seems that fearlessness is not a sin. For that which is reckoned to the praise of a just man is not a sin. Now it is written in praise of the just man (Prov. 28:1): "The just, bold as a lion, shall be without dread." Therefore it is not a sin to be without fear.

Obj. 2: Further, nothing is so fearful as death, according to the Philosopher (Ethic. iii, 6). Yet one ought not to fear even death, according to Matt. 10:28, "Fear ye not them that kill the body,"

etc., nor anything that can be inflicted by man, according to Isa.

51:12, "Who art thou, that thou shouldst be afraid of a mortal man?"

Therefore it is not a sin to be fearless.

Obj. 3: Further, fear is born of love, as stated above (Q. 125, A.

2). Now it belongs to the perfection of virtue to love nothing earthly, since according to Augustine (De Civ. Dei xiv), "the love of G.o.d to the abas.e.m.e.nt of self makes us citizens of the heavenly city."

Therefore it is seemingly not a sin to fear nothing earthly.

_On the contrary,_ It is said of the unjust judge (Luke 18:2) that "he feared not G.o.d nor regarded man."

_I answer that,_ Since fear is born of love, we must seemingly judge alike of love and fear. Now it is here a question of that fear whereby one dreads temporal evils, and which results from the love of temporal goods. And every man has it instilled in him by nature to love his own life and whatever is directed thereto; and to do so in due measure, that is, to love these things not as placing his end therein, but as things to be used for the sake of his last end. Hence it is contrary to the natural inclination, and therefore a sin, to fall short of loving them in due measure. Nevertheless, one never lapses entirely from this love: since what is natural cannot be wholly lost: for which reason the Apostle says (Eph. 5:29): "No man ever hated his own flesh." Wherefore even those that slay themselves do so from love of their own flesh, which they desire to free from present stress. Hence it may happen that a man fears death and other temporal evils less than he ought, for the reason that he loves them*

less than he ought. [*Viz. the contrary goods. One would expect 'se'

instead of 'ea.' We should then read: For the reason that he loves himself less than he ought.] But that he fear none of these things cannot result from an entire lack of love, but only from the fact that he thinks it impossible for him to be afflicted by the evils contrary to the goods he loves. This is sometimes the result of pride of soul presuming on self and despising others, according to the saying of Job 41:24, 25: "He [Vulg.: 'who'] was made to fear no one, he beholdeth every high thing": and sometimes it happens through a defect in the reason; thus the Philosopher says (Ethic. iii, 7) that the "Celts, through lack of intelligence, fear nothing." [*"A man would deserve to be called insane and senseless if there were nothing that he feared, not even an earthquake nor a storm at sea, as is said to be the case with the Celts."] It is therefore evident that fearlessness is a vice, whether it result from lack of love, pride of soul, or dullness of understanding: yet the latter is excused from sin if it be invincible.

Reply Obj. 1: The just man is praised for being without fear that withdraws him from good; not that he is altogether fearless, for it is written (Ecclus. 1:28): "He that is without fear cannot be justified."

Reply Obj. 2: Death and whatever else can be inflicted by mortal man are not to be feared so that they make us forsake justice: but they are to be feared as hindering man in acts of virtue, either as regards himself, or as regards the progress he may cause in others.

Hence it is written (Prov. 14:16): "A wise man feareth and declineth from evil."

Reply Obj. 3: Temporal goods are to be despised as hindering us from loving and serving G.o.d, and on the same score they are not to be feared; wherefore it is written (Ecclus. 34:16): "He that feareth the Lord shall tremble at nothing." But temporal goods are not to be despised, in so far as they are helping us instrumentally to attain those things that pertain to Divine fear and love.

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SECOND ARTICLE [II-II, Q. 126, Art. 2]