Summa Theologica Part I (Prima Pars) Part 64

We now consider the persons in reference to the notional acts, concerning which six points of inquiry arise:

(1) Whether the notional acts are to be attributed to the persons?

(2) Whether these acts are necessary, or voluntary?

(3) Whether as regards these acts, a person proceeds from nothing or from something?

(4) Whether in G.o.d there exists a power as regards the notional acts?

(5) What this power means?

(6) Whether several persons can be the term of one notional act?

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FIRST ARTICLE [I, Q. 41, Art. 1]

Whether the Notional Acts Are to Be Attributed to the Persons?

Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are not to be attributed to the persons. For Boethius says (De Trin.): "Whatever is predicated of G.o.d, of whatever genus it be, becomes the divine substance, except what pertains to the relation." But action is one of the ten genera. Therefore any action attributed to G.o.d belongs to His essence, and not to a notion.

Obj. 2: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. v, 4,5) that, "everything which is said of G.o.d, is said of Him as regards either His substance, or relation." But whatever belongs to the substance is signified by the essential attributes; and whatever belongs to the relations, by the names of the persons, or by the names of the properties.

Therefore, in addition to these, notional acts are not to be attributed to the persons.

Obj. 3: Further, the nature of action is of itself to cause pa.s.sion.

But we do not place pa.s.sions in G.o.d. Therefore neither are notional acts to be placed in G.o.d.

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum ii) says: "It is a property of the Father to beget the Son." Therefore notional acts are to be placed in G.o.d.

_I answer that,_ In the divine persons distinction is founded on origin. But origin can be properly designated only by certain acts.

Wherefore, to signify the order of origin in the divine persons, we must attribute notional acts to the persons.

Reply Obj. 1: Every origin is designated by an act. In G.o.d there is a twofold order of origin: one, inasmuch as the creature proceeds from Him, and this is common to the three persons; and so those actions which are attributed to G.o.d to designate the proceeding of creatures from Him, belong to His essence. Another order of origin in G.o.d regards the procession of person from person; wherefore the acts which designate the order of this origin are called notional; because the notions of the persons are the mutual relations of the persons, as is clear from what was above explained (Q. 32, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 2: The notional acts differ from the relations of the persons only in their mode of signification; and in reality are altogether the same. Whence the Master says that "generation and nativity in other words are paternity and filiation" (Sent. i, D, xxvi). To see this, we must consider that the origin of one thing from another is firstly inferred from movement: for that anything be changed from its disposition by movement evidently arises from some cause. Hence action, in its primary sense, means origin of movement; for, as movement derived from another into a mobile object, is called "pa.s.sion," so the origin of movement itself as beginning from another and terminating in what is moved, is called "action." Hence, if we take away movement, action implies nothing more than order of origin, in so far as action proceeds from some cause or principle to what is from that principle. Consequently, since in G.o.d no movement exists, the personal action of the one producing a person is only the habitude of the principle to the person who is from the principle; which habitudes are the relations, or the notions. Nevertheless we cannot speak of divine and intelligible things except after the manner of sensible things, whence we derive our knowledge, and wherein actions and pa.s.sions, so far as these imply movement, differ from the relations which result from action and pa.s.sion, and therefore it was necessary to signify the habitudes of the persons separately after the manner of act, and separately after the manner of relations. Thus it is evident that they are really the same, differing only in their mode of signification.

Reply Obj. 3: Action, so far as it means origin of movement, naturally involves pa.s.sion; but action in that sense is not attributed to G.o.d. Whence, pa.s.sions are attributed to Him only from a grammatical standpoint, and in accordance with our manner of speaking, as we attribute "to beget" with the Father, and to the Son "to be begotten."

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SECOND ARTICLE [I, Q. 41, Art. 2]

Whether the Notional Acts Are Voluntary?

Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts are voluntary. For Hilary says (De Synod.): "Not by natural necessity was the Father led to beget the Son."

Obj. 2: Further, the Apostle says, "He transferred us to the kingdom of the Son of His love" (Col. 1:13). But love belongs to the will.

Therefore the Son was begotten of the Father by will.

Obj. 3: Further, nothing is more voluntary than love. But the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love from the Father and the Son. Therefore He proceeds voluntarily.

Obj. 4: Further, the Son proceeds by mode of the intellect, as the Word. But every word proceeds by the will from a speaker. Therefore the Son proceeds from the Father by will, and not by nature.

Obj. 5: Further, what is not voluntary is necessary. Therefore if the Father begot the Son, not by the will, it seems to follow that He begot Him by necessity; and this is against what Augustine says (Ad Orosium qu. vii).

_On the contrary,_ Augustine says, in the same book, that, "the Father begot the Son neither by will, nor by necessity."

_I answer that,_ When anything is said to be, or to be made by the will, this can be understood in two senses. In one sense, the ablative designates only concomitance, as I can say that I am a man by my will--that is, I will to be a man; and in this way it can be said that the Father begot the Son by will; as also He is G.o.d by will, because He wills to be G.o.d, and wills to beget the Son. In the other sense, the ablative imports the habitude of a principle as it is said that the workman works by his will, as the will is the principle of his work; and thus in that sense it must be said the G.o.d the Father begot the Son, not by His will; but that He produced the creature by His will. Whence in the book _De Synod.,_ it is said: "If anyone say that the Son was made by the Will of G.o.d, as a creature is said to be made, let him be anathema." The reason of this is that will and nature differ in their manner of causation, in such a way that nature is determined to one, while the will is not determined to one; and this because the effect is a.s.similated to the form of the agent, whereby the latter acts. Now it is manifest that of one thing there is only one natural form whereby it exists; and hence such as it is itself, such also is its work. But the form whereby the will acts is not only one, but many, according to the number of ideas understood. Hence the quality of the will's action does not depend on the quality of the agent, but on the agent's will and understanding.

So the will is the principle of those things which may be this way or that way; whereas of those things which can be only in one way, the principle is nature. What, however, can exist in different ways is far from the divine nature, whereas it belongs to the nature of a created being; because G.o.d is of Himself necessary being, whereas a creature is made from nothing. Thus, the Arians, wis.h.i.+ng to prove the Son to be a creature, said that the Father begot the Son by will, taking will in the sense of principle. But we, on the contrary, must a.s.sert that the Father begot the Son, not by will, but by nature.

Wherefore Hilary says (De Synod.): "The will of G.o.d gave to all creatures their substance: but perfect birth gave the Son a nature derived from a substance impa.s.sible and unborn. All things created are such as G.o.d willed them to be; but the Son, born of G.o.d, subsists in the perfect likeness of G.o.d."

Reply Obj. 1: This saying is directed against those who did not admit even the concomitance of the Father's will in the generation of the Son, for they said that the Father begot the Son in such a manner by nature that the will to beget was wanting; just as we ourselves suffer many things against our will from natural necessity--as, for instance, death, old age, and like ills. This appears from what precedes and from what follows as regards the words quoted, for thus we read: "Not against His will, nor as it were, forced, nor as if He were led by natural necessity did the Father beget the Son."

Reply Obj. 2: The Apostle calls Christ the Son of the love of G.o.d, inasmuch as He is superabundantly loved by G.o.d; not, however, as if love were the principle of the Son's generation.

Reply Obj. 3: The will, as a natural faculty, wills something naturally, as man's will naturally tends to happiness; and likewise G.o.d naturally wills and loves Himself; whereas in regard to things other than Himself, the will of G.o.d is in a way, undetermined in itself, as above explained (Q. 19, A. 3). Now, the Holy Ghost proceeds as Love, inasmuch as G.o.d loves Himself, and hence He proceeds naturally, although He proceeds by mode of will.

Reply Obj. 4: Even as regards the intellectual conceptions of the mind, a return is made to those first principles which are naturally understood. But G.o.d naturally understands Himself, and thus the conception of the divine Word is natural.

Reply Obj. 5: A thing is said to be necessary "of itself," and "by reason of another." Taken in the latter sense, it has a twofold meaning: firstly, as an efficient and compelling cause, and thus necessary means what is violent; secondly, it means a final cause, when a thing is said to be necessary as the means to an end, so far as without it the end could not be attained, or, at least, so well attained. In neither of these ways is the divine generation necessary; because G.o.d is not the means to an end, nor is He subject to compulsion. But a thing is said to be necessary "of itself" which cannot but be: in this sense it is necessary for G.o.d to be; and in the same sense it is necessary that the Father beget the Son.

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THIRD ARTICLE [I, Q. 41, Art. 3]

Whether the Notional Acts Proceed from Something?

Objection 1: It would seem that the notional acts do not proceed from anything. For if the Father begets the Son from something, this will be either from Himself or from something else. If from something else, since that whence a thing is generated exists in what is generated, it follows that something different from the Father exists in the Son, and this contradicts what is laid down by Hilary (De Trin. vii) that, "In them nothing diverse or different exists." If the Father begets the Son from Himself, since again that whence a thing is generated, if it be something permanent, receives as predicate the thing generated therefrom just as we say, "The man is white," since the man remains, when not from white he is made white--it follows that either the Father does not remain after the Son is begotten, or that the Father is the Son, which is false. Therefore the Father does not beget the Son from something, but from nothing.

Obj. 2: Further, that whence anything is generated is the principle regarding what is generated. So if the Father generate the Son from His own essence or nature, it follows that the essence or nature of the Father is the principle of the Son. But it is not a material principle, because in G.o.d nothing material exists; and therefore it is, as it were, an active principle, as the begetter is the principle of the one begotten. Thus it follows that the essence generates, which was disproved above (Q. 39, A. 5).

Obj. 3: Further, Augustine says (De Trin. vii, 6) that the three persons are not from the same essence; because the essence is not another thing from person. But the person of the Son is not another thing from the Father's essence. Therefore the Son is not from the Father's essence.

Obj. 4: Further, every creature is from nothing. But in Scripture the Son is called a creature; for it is said (Ecclus. 24:5), in the person of the Wisdom begotten,"I came out of the mouth of the Most High, the first-born before all creatures": and further on (Ecclus.

24:14) it is said as uttered by the same Wisdom, "From the beginning, and before the world was I created." Therefore the Son was not begotten from something, but from nothing. Likewise we can object concerning the Holy Ghost, by reason of what is said (Zech. 12:1): "Thus saith the Lord Who stretcheth forth the heavens, and layeth the foundations of the earth, and formeth the spirit of man within him"; and (Amos 4:13) according to another version [*The Septuagint]: "I Who form the earth, and create the spirit."

_On the contrary,_ Augustine (Fulgentius, De Fide ad Petrum i, 1) says: "G.o.d the Father, of His nature, without beginning, begot the Son equal to Himself."

_I answer that,_ The Son was not begotten from nothing, but from the Father's substance. For it was explained above (Q. 27, A. 2; Q. 33, AA. 2 ,3) that paternity, filiation and nativity really and truly exist in G.o.d. Now, this is the difference between true "generation,"

whereby one proceeds from another as a son, and "making," that the maker makes something out of external matter, as a carpenter makes a bench out of wood, whereas a man begets a son from himself. Now, as a created workman makes a thing out of matter, so G.o.d makes things out of nothing, as will be shown later on (Q. 45, A. 1), not as if this nothing were a part of the substance of the thing made, but because the whole substance of a thing is produced by Him without anything else whatever presupposed. So, were the Son to proceed from the Father as out of nothing, then the Son would be to the Father what the thing made is to the maker, whereto, as is evident, the name of filiation would not apply except by a kind of similitude. Thus, if the Son of G.o.d proceeds from the Father out of nothing, He could not be properly and truly called the Son, whereas the contrary is stated (1 John 5:20): "That we may be in His true Son Jesus Christ."

Therefore the true Son of G.o.d is not from nothing; nor is He made, but begotten.

That certain creatures made by G.o.d out of nothing are called sons of G.o.d is to be taken in a metaphorical sense, according to a certain likeness of a.s.similation to Him Who is the true Son. Whence, as He is the only true and natural Son of G.o.d, He is called the "only begotten," according to John 1:18, "The only begotten Son, Who is in the bosom of the Father, He hath declared Him"; and so as others are ent.i.tled sons of adoption by their similitude to Him, He is called the "first begotten," according to Rom. 8:29: "Whom He foreknew He also predestinated to be made conformable to the image of His Son, that He might be the first born of many brethren." Therefore the Son of G.o.d is begotten of the substance of the Father, but not in the same way as man is born of man; for a part of the human substance in generation pa.s.ses into the substance of the one begotten, whereas the divine nature cannot be parted; whence it necessarily follows that the Father in begetting the Son does not transmit any part of His nature, but communicates His whole nature to Him, the distinction only of origin remaining as explained above (Q. 40, A. 2).

Reply Obj. 1: When we say that the Son was born of the Father, the preposition "of" designates a consubstantial generating principle, but not a material principle. For that which is produced from matter, is made by a change of form in that whence it is produced. But the divine essence is unchangeable, and is not susceptive of another form.

Reply Obj. 2: When we say the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father, as the Master of the Sentences explains (Sent. i, D, v), this denotes the habitude of a kind of active principle, and as he expounds, "the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father"--that is, of the Father Who is essence; and so Augustine says (De Trin. xv, 13): "When I say of the Father Who is essence, it is the same as if I said more explicitly, of the essence of the Father."

This, however, is not enough to explain the real meaning of the words. For we can say that the creature is from G.o.d Who is essence; but not that it is from the essence of G.o.d. So we may explain them otherwise, by observing that the preposition "of" [de] always denotes consubstantiality. We do not say that a house is "of" [de] the builder, since he is not the consubstantial cause. We can say, however, that something is "of" another, if this is its consubstantial principle, no matter in what way it is so, whether it be an active principle, as the son is said to be "of" the father, or a material principle, as a knife is "of" iron; or a formal principle, but in those things only in which the forms are subsisting, and not accidental to another, for we can say that an angel is "of" an intellectual nature. In this way, then, we say that the Son is begotten 'of' the essence of the Father, inasmuch as the essence of the Father, communicated by generation, subsists in the Son.

Reply Obj. 3: When we say that the Son is begotten of the essence of the Father, a term is added which saves the distinction. But when we say that the three persons are 'of' the divine essence, there is nothing expressed to warrant the distinction signified by the preposition, so there is no parity of argument.