The Franco-German War of 1870-71 Part 11

FOOTNOTES:

[28] The IInd and IIIrd Army.

[29] The wording of Bazaine's order dispenses with any speculation on this point. He wrote, "In the event of failure, we shall maintain our positions, strengthen ourselves therein, _and retire in the evening under Forts St. Julien and Queuleu_."

[30] The estimate of the total strength of the Army of the Rhine on the 22nd August is given at 137,728 men in the German Staff History. It deducts for garrison and normal outpost duty details amounting to over 17,000 men; and reckons the marching out strength for the battle of 31st August--1st September at "about 120,000 men."

CHANGE OF GOVERNMENT IN PARIS.

When, in the night of the 4th of September, the news of the disaster of Sedan and the Emperor's surrender became known in Paris, the Legislative Body met in a rapidly successive series of sittings for the purpose of selecting an Administrative Committee. The mob cut those deliberations short by forcing its way into the Chamber and proclaiming the Republic there and at the Hotel de Ville, amidst the acclamations of the people.

Though the troops were under arms in their barracks, the Government till now in power offered no resistance; the Empress left Paris; General Trochu and several members of the Minority in the Chamber combined to form a Government, which they styled "The Government of National Defence and War." "War to the bitter end" was its motto, and the entire nation was to be called to arms. Not an inch of territory, not a stone of the fortresses was to be yielded up to the enemy.

Such a Government, devoid of any legitimate foundation, necessarily thirsted for results, and could be little disposed to allow the war to end in peace.

Notwithstanding all the early reverses of the war, France was too rich in resources to find herself as yet by any means defenceless. General Vinoy was still in the field. All the scattered Corps, the Marine troops and the Gendarmerie could gather to him. There was, too, the "Territorial Militia," numbering 468,000 men, an inst.i.tution which the country owed to Marshal Niel, whose far-seeing work of reorganization had been cut short only too soon. Further, there was available to be called up the falling-due contingent of 100,000 conscripts, as well as the National Guard. It followed that France was thus able to put into the field a million of men, without reckoning Franctireurs and Volunteer Corps. The reserve store of 2000 guns and 400,000 Cha.s.sepots a.s.sured the means of armament, and the workshops of neutral England were ready and willing to fulfil commissions. Such resources for war, backed by the active patriotism of the nation, could maintain a prolonged resistance if a master will should inspire it with energy.

And such a will was disclosed in the person of Gambetta.

Minister of War, he had at the same time, by the French system of government, the direction of military operations, and certainly he was not the man to loosen his grasp of the chief command. For in a Republic, a victorious general at the head of the Army would at once have become Dictator in his stead. M. de Freycinet, another civilian, served under Gambetta as a sort of Chief of the General Staff, and the energetic, but dilettante, commanders.h.i.+p exercised by these gentlemen cost France very dear. Gambetta's rare energy and unrelenting determination availed, indeed, to induce the entire population to take up arms, but not to direct these hasty levies with comprehensive unity of purpose. Without giving them time to be trained into fitness for the field, with ruthless severity he despatched them into the field in utter inefficiency as they were called out, to attempt the execution of ill-digested plans against an enemy on whose firm solidity all their courage and devotion was inevitably wrecked. He prolonged the struggle at the cost of heavy sacrifices on both sides, without turning the balance in favour of France.

In any event the German chiefs had still great difficulties to overcome.

The battles already won had cost heavy losses; in officers especially the losses were irreparable. Half the army was detained before Metz and Strasburg. The transport and guarding of already more than 200,000 prisoners required the services of a large part of the new levies being formed at home. The numerous fortresses had not indeed hindered the invasion of the German army, but they had to be invested or kept under observation to secure the rearward communications, and to safeguard the forwarding and victualling of troops; and each further advance into the enemy's country involved increased drafts of armed men. After the battle of Sedan only 150,000 men were available for further operations in the field. There could be no doubt that the new objective must be Paris, as the seat of the new Government and the centre of gravity, so to speak, of the whole country. On the very day of the capitulation of Sedan, all the dispositions were made for the renewal of the advance.

To spare the troops, the movement was to be carried out on a very broad front, which involved no risk, for of the French Corps, the XIIIth alone could possibly cause any detention. And, indeed, only Blanchard's Division of that Corps was now at Mezieres; its other two Divisions had but just begun their march when they received orders to halt preparatory to returning (to Paris).

RETREAT OF GENERAL VINOY.

General Vinoy's most urgent anxiety was--very rightly--to reach Paris with the least possible loss. This was not very easy to accomplish, since the VIth Prussian Corps, which had taken no part in the battle of Sedan, was at Attigny in such a position that as a matter of distance, as far as to Laon, it could reach any point of any line of the enemy's retreat before, or as soon as the latter. General von Tumpling, commanding that Corps, had already taken possession of Rethel with the 12th Division by the evening of September 1st, thus closing the high-road to Paris. Only extraordinary forced marching and a succession of fortunate circ.u.mstances could save from destruction Blanchard's Division, which had already wasted its ammunition in small conflicts.

General Vinoy supplied the troops with several days' rations, enjoined the strictest discipline on the march, and during the night between 1st and 2nd September set out on the road to Rethel, where he expected to find Exea's Division; which, however, availing itself of the section of railway still undestroyed, had already gone back to Soissons.

It was still early morning (of 2nd) when the French column of march came in contact with the 5th and presently with the 6th Prussian Cavalry Divisions, without, however, being seriously attacked. It was not till about ten o'clock, and within about seven miles of Rethel, that the French general learnt that place was in hostile possession, whereupon he decided on turning westward to Novion Porcien. He sent his rear-guard against the enemy's horse-artillery, but seeing hardly anything but cavalry in its front, it soon resumed the march. At about four in the afternoon the Division reached Novion, where it went into bivouac.

General von Hoffmann (commanding the 12th Prussian Division) had taken up a position at Rethel, and was awaiting the enemy, of whose approach he had been warned. Having ridden out in person, he became aware of Vinoy's deviation from the Rethel road, and at four in the afternoon marched to Ecly, where he arrived late in the evening. Part of his troops scouted forward toward Chateau Porcien.

General Vinoy, on learning that this road, too, was closed to him, quited his bivouac again at half-past one on the morning (of 3rd), leaving his fires burning, and set out on a second night-march in pouring rain and total darkness.

At first he took a northerly direction, to reach Laon at worst by the byways. By tracks fathomless in mud, and with frequent alarms, but without being reached by the enemy, he trudged into Chateau Porcien at half-past seven on the morning of the 3rd, and there halted for a couple of hours. The trend of the roads now compelled him again to take a southerly direction, and when the head of his column reached Seraincourt, the sound of firing told him that his rear had been attacked by the Germans.

The Prussian cavalry had, early the same morning, discovered the French departure, but this important information found General von Hoffmann no longer in Ecly. He had already started thence to search for the enemy at Novion-Porcien, where he might well be expected to be after his first night-march, but at half-past nine the Prussian general found the place empty. Thus, that morning, the German and French Divisions had marched past each other in different directions at a distance apart of little more than four miles. The thick weather had prevented them seeing each other. General Vinoy this day reached Montcornet, in what plight may be imagined. The 12th Division continued its pursuit in the westerly direction, but came up only with the rear stragglers of the fast-retreating enemy, and took up alarm-quarters in Chaumont Porcien.

This march of the enemy ought not indeed to have remained un.o.bserved and unchecked under the eye of two Cavalry Divisions, but it has to be said that these were called off at an unfortunate moment.

It was, in fact, in consequence of a report that the French forces were a.s.sembled at Rheims, that the Headquarter of the IIIrd Army had ordered the immediate return of the VIth Corps and the two Divisions of cavalry.

These at once relinquished the pursuit, and General von Tumpling ordered his two Infantry Divisions to march at once on Rheims. The 11th, which had been holding Rethel, set out forthwith. General von Hoffmann, on the contrary, followed up the French, on his own responsibility, as far as was possible without cavalry to overtake them. Not till the following day did the 12th Division reach the Suippe.

_September 4th._--General Vinoy made his way northward again, by way of Marle, where he received the news of the Emperor's surrender and of the outbreak of the revolution in Paris. His presence there was now of the greatest importance, and on the 13th he reached the French capital with the two other divisions of his Corps from Laon and Soissons.

THE MARCH ON PARIS OF THE IIIRD ARMY AND THE ARMY OF THE MEUSE.

During these occurrences the German armies, on the 4th September, had begun their advance on Paris. The first thing to be done was to disentangle the ma.s.s of troops a.s.sembled in the cramped s.p.a.ce around Sedan. The IIIrd Army, of which the XIth and the Ist Bavarian Corps were still remaining there, had to make two long marches forward in order that the Army of the Meuse should regain its line of supply (Etappen-line).

The news of a great a.s.semblage of French troops at Rheims soon proved to be unfounded. Early on the 4th, detachments of Prussian horse entered the hostile and excited city, the 11th Division arrived that afternoon, and on the following day the German King's head-quarters were established in the old city where the French Kings had been wont to be crowned.

On the 10th of September the IIIrd Army had reached the line Dormans--Sezanne, and the VIth Corps had pushed forward to Chateau Thierry. The Army of the Meuse, after the failure of a coup-de-main on Montmedy, was advancing between Rheims and Laon. Cavalry sent far in advance covered this march executed on a front so exceptionally broad.

The scouts everywhere found the inhabitants in a very hostile temper; the franctireurs attacked with great recklessness, and had to be driven out of several villages by dismounted troopers. The roads were in many places wrecked by the tearing up of the stone pavement, and the bridges were blown up.

On the approach of the 6th Cavalry Division Laon had capitulated. Small detachments of troops of the line were taken prisoners, 25 guns, 100 stores of arms and ammunition were seized as prizes, and 2000 Gardes-Mobiles were dismissed to their homes on parole to take no further part in the war. While friends and foes were a.s.sembled in large numbers in the courtyard of the citadel, the powder-magazine blew up, having probably been intentionally fired, and did great damage both there and in the town. The Prussians had fifteen officers and ninety-nine men killed and wounded; among the wounded were the Division-Commander and his general-staff officer. The French lost 300 men; the commandant of the fortress was mortally wounded.

On the 16th the Army of the Meuse was between Nanteuil and Lizy-on-Ourcq; the 5th Cavalry Division had advanced to Dammartin; the 6th to beyond Beaumont, sending patrols up to before St. Denis. The IIIrd Army was spread over the area from Meaux to Compte Robert. Strong military bridges had been thrown over the Marne at Trilport and Lagny to replace the permanent ones which had been blown up, and on the 17th the Vth Corps reached the Upper Seine.

To secure the draw-bridges at Villeneuve St. Georges, the 17th Brigade pushed on down the right bank of the Seine towards Paris, and at Mont Mesly it encountered Exea's Division, which had been sent out by General Vinoy to bring in or destroy stores of supplies. The fight which ensued ended in the French being driven back under shelter of Fort Charenton.

The IInd Bavarian Corps also reached the Seine on this day and bridged the river at Corbeil. The 2nd Cavalry Division was in observation in front of Saclay, towards Paris. The Royal head-quarter moved to Meaux by way of Chateau Thierry. The complete investment of the French capital was now imminent.

The works constructed under Louis Philippe effectually protected the city from being taken by storm. The artillery armament of the place consisted of over 2627 pieces, including 200 of the largest calibres of naval ordnance. There were 500 rounds for each gun, and in addition a reserve of three million kilogrammes of powder. As concerned the active strength of the garrison, besides the XIIIth Corps which had returned from Mezieres, a new Corps, the XIVth, had been raised in Paris itself.

These 50,000 troops of the line, 14,000 highly efficient and staunch marines and sailors, and about 8000 gensd'armes, customs officers, and forest-guards, formed the core of the defence. There were besides 115,000 Gardes-Mobiles, who had been drawn in from outside at an earlier date. The National Guard was formed into 130 battalions, which, however, being defective in equipment and poorly disciplined, could be employed only in the defence of the inner circle of fortifications. The volunteers, though numerous, proved for the most part useless.

In all the besieged force was over 300,000 strong, thus it was far more than double the strength of the besiegers as yet on the spot, of whom there were at the outside only about 60,000 men available, with 5000 cavalry and 124 field-batteries. On the Seine the defence had five floating batteries and nine section-built gunboats originally intended for the Rhine; on the railways were some guns mounted on armour-plated trucks.

Great difficulties necessarily attended the victualling of two million human beings for a long period; however, the authorities had succeeded in gathering into Paris 3000 oxen, 6000 swine, and 180,000 sheep, with considerable stores of other provisions, so that perfect confidence was justifiable, that Paris could hold out for six weeks at least.

Orders issued from the head-quarter at Meaux charged the Army of the Meuse with the investment of the capital on the right bank of the Seine and Marne,[31] and the IIIrd Army with the section on the left bank of both rivers. As a general rule the troops were to remain beyond range of the fire of the fortress, but, short of that, were to keep as close as possible so as to curtail the circuit of environment. The close connection of the two armies was to be secured above Paris by several bridges across both the rivers, and below the city, by the cavalry occupying Poissy. To the IIIrd Army was to belong the duty of reconnoitring in the direction of Orleans. In case of any attempt to relieve the capital it was to allow the relieving force to approach within a short distance, and then, leaving the investment to be maintained by weak details, to strike the enemy with its main body.

Without relief from outside, a close pa.s.sive blockade must inevitably result in the capitulation of Paris, though probably not for some weeks or even months. As an ultimate compulsory measure there remained recourse to a bombardment.

At the time when Paris was fortified it was not foreseen that improvements in the artillery arm would double or treble the range of fire. The exterior forts, especially on the south, were at so short a distance from the enceinte that the city could easily be reached by the fire of heavy batteries.

The Germans have been blamed for not having had recourse at an earlier date to this expedient of bombardment; but this criticism indicates an inadequate appreciation of the difficulties which stood in the way of its earlier execution.

It may safely be accepted that the attack of a large fortified place in the heart of an enemy's country is simply impossible so long as the invader is not master of the railways or waterways leading to it, by which may be brought up in full quant.i.ty the requisite material. The conveyance of this by the ordinary highways, even for a short distance, is in itself a herculean undertaking. Up to this time the German army had the control of only one railway in French territory, and this was fully occupied in the maintenance of supplies for the armies in the field: in bringing up reinforcements and equipment; in conveying rearward wounded, sick and prisoners. But even this much of railway service ended at Toul; and the attempt to turn that fortress by laying a temporary section of line found insurmountable difficulties in the nature of the ground. Further forward there interposed itself a scarcely inferior obstacle in the complete destruction of the Nanteuil tunnel, to repair which would probably require weeks.

Even then, for the further transport from Nanteuil up to the Paris front of 300 heavy guns with 500 rounds for each gun, there were requisite 4500 four-wheeled waggons, such as were not in use in the country, and 10,000 horses. Thus a bombardment was, in the earlier period, not to be thought of, and in any case the object of it would not be to destroy Paris, but merely to exert a final pressure on the inhabitants; and this influence would be more effectual when a long blockade had shaken the resolution of the besieged than it was likely to be at the beginning of the investment.

_September 18th._--Corresponding directions communicated to the respective army commands, ordered the resumption of the march on the enemy's capital.