Memoirs of the Court and Cabinets of George the Third Volume II Part 36

Great anxiety again prevailed here by an account which arrived at midnight, that the delegates were on board the 'London,' and it was feared they were urging for the execution of Colpoys and his captain; but a few hours afterwards, news arrived that Colpoys'

crew had resisted the delegates; that even the most mutinous s.h.i.+ps, viz. the 'Duke' and 'Mars,' were returned to their duty, and that most of the s.h.i.+ps had desired their officers to join them again. I have also read a letter from Payne, who writes in high spirits, and says that there is now a complete hostility on the part of the well-affected as against the mutineers, and that he has just spoke a cutter from the 'Queen Charlotte' with twenty or thirty well-affected men on board, who were going to every s.h.i.+p in the fleet, to insist upon everything being quiet, and upon their going instantly to sail in quest of the French. Lord Howe would arrive about nine this morning, with a warrant under the King's sign-manual, for making such final arrangement as might be necessary for the sailing of the fleet, if he should find it so disposed to sail. Not a word from Lord Bridport, except to acknowledge the communication of the Act of Parliament!

Under these circ.u.mstances, there is every reason to suppose that one may hope the immediate storm is a little blown over, and that no new resource need be looked for such as you suggest; but the apprehension of my mind is still extremely great, because I am more and more convinced that Jacobin management and influence is at the bottom of this evil; and till that influence is traced and rooted out, there is, in my view, no chance of safety. The tampering with the soldiers by conversation and handbills is another unanswerable proof of the system by which all this mischief moves forward; and the activity of Brest in the last accounts, seems to confirm, as far as such preparation can, their knowledge of, if not their partic.i.p.ation in, this mischief.

Orde has written from Plymouth, that he hopes to get the s.h.i.+ps there to sea before any communication is had of this new mutiny.

Things look badly, as I believe, in Ireland; but those of Government, whom I ever see, are so entirely occupied, that I write to you more from my own guess than from their communication.

G.o.d bless you, dearest brother.

I know no foreign news of any sort, nor have I seen William these three or four last days.

A third effort to effect a pacification with France had been entered upon by Lord Grenville in the month of June. On this occasion his Lords.h.i.+p addressed a direct application to M. de la Croix, expressing his readiness without delay to open a discussion of the views and pretensions of both parties. To this communication M. de la Croix replied by accepting the proposal; and the town of Lisle was appointed for the meeting of the amba.s.sadors.

Lord Malmesbury was again appointed on the part of England; and it became evident at once that his re-appearance in that capacity was not very satisfactory to the French Government, M. de la Croix coldly signifying the consent of the Directory to negotiate with Lord Malmesbury, but adding that another choice would have augured more favourably for the speedy conclusion of peace.

The conference at Lisle seems to have taken its colour all throughout from this preliminary distrust of the English envoy. It lasted up to the 17th of September; and ended as it began, in a fruitless debate about Lord Malmesbury's powers to treat in full. In the meanwhile, the event known by the name of the Revolution of Fructidor took place in Paris, the meeting was broken up, and Lord Malmesbury left Lisle on the 18th of September.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Cleveland Row, Sept. 20th, 1797.

MY DEAREST BROTHER,

Late last night we got a messenger from Lord Malmesbury, with an account that he was ordered away from Lisle, and was on his way to London, where he arrived this morning. It is not easy to say beforehand what effects it will produce here, where people's spirits are so susceptible of alarm and depression; but I really think, in the manner of doing the thing, the Directory have done everything they could to play our game.

The dissatisfaction will be great in France, but they seem, for the moment, completely masters there. Ireland is our weakest point, and to that our attention must be most directed; for anything else I have very little apprehension.

I think it probable that the consequences of this new state of things will be to detain me in and about town, and to put an end to my hopes of a journey to Stowe or Wotton; but I am not yet quite sure as to this. I hope we shall not be in a hurry to meet Parliament, as I understand that it will not be necessary, in point of finance, till about the middle of November. Between this and that time many things may still happen to raise people's spirits, which I should fear would in the present moment be much depressed, whatever pains we took to raise them.

Ever, my dearest brother, most affectionately yours, G.

1798.

CONDITION OF ENGLAND--PLANS FOR THE NATIONAL DEFENCES--THE AUGMENTATION OF THE MILITIA--VOLUNTARY SUBSCRIPTIONS--A REBELLION BREAKS OUT IN IRELAND--LORD CORNWALLIS SUCCEEDS LORD CAMDEN AS LORD-LIEUTENANT--LORD BUCKINGHAM VOLUNTEERS FOR IRELAND--DIFFERENCES WITH LORD CORNWALLIS--MR.

THOMAS GRENVILLE IS APPOINTED ON A MISSION TO VIENNA AND BERLIN.

A rebellion in Ireland, and a threat of invasion from France, for which active preparations were making on the coast and in the Channel, almost exclusively absorbed the attention of Government at the beginning of the year 1798, and demanded all the resources which the devotion of the people could contribute to the protection of the country. The extremity of the public danger had the effect of uniting all cla.s.ses in a combined effort for self-preservation; and the national enthusiasm was p.r.o.nounced so strongly and unanimously on this point, that the heads of the Opposition, shattered and enfeebled, retired from the fruitless contest they had been so long waging against the Administration, and left Mr.

Pitt and his colleagues in almost undisturbed possession of both Houses of Parliament.

But security was not to be purchased without great sacrifices. The expenditure of the past year had amounted to the enormous sum of twenty-five millions and a half; and Mr. Pitt found it necessary, in order to provide a supply equal to the emergencies of the future, to introduce an entirely new system of finance. He proposed to triple the amount of the existing a.s.sessed taxes, with a limitation, restraining the maximum of taxation to the tenth of each person's income; and to borrow the remainder of what was required without creating any additional debt, by appropriating the produce of the sinking fund.

There was a violent resistance in both Houses to this plan; Mr. Fox, Mr.

Sheridan, and others, who had previously seceded, re-appearing in their places for the express purpose of opposing it; but it was carried, nevertheless, by large majorities. Several other measures, to provide means for carrying on the war, and strengthening the national defences, were also introduced; and at no period, since the commencement of hostilities, was public opinion declared so energetically in favour of the ministerial policy. Numerous circ.u.mstances contributed to feed the popular ardour as the year advanced. Splendid naval victories inspired the highest confidence in the ultimate issues of the war; commerce once more resumed its former activity; the harvest was unusually abundant; and all branches of trade and industry reached a height of prosperity that completely relieved the depression under which they had suffered during the preceding year.

The most active measures were set on foot to promote the common object of protecting the empire against foreign invasion and domestic treason.

The most prominent of them was a plan for augmenting the Militia, afterwards matured and introduced by Mr. Dundas; and the collection of subscriptions towards the formation of a national defence fund. No greater proof could be given of the zeal of the people, at a period when their burthens were already so excessive, than the munificence and prompt.i.tude of their contributions on this occasion. At a meeting of bankers and merchants held in the open square of the Royal Exchange, upwards of forty-six thousand pounds were collected on the spot; the King subscribed 20,000; the Queen 5,000; numerous mercantile firms and private individuals contributed large sums, varying from 3,000 to 10,000; and the Bank of England, the n.o.ble tribute of 200,000. That this urgent necessity should have pressed heavily upon those public men whose position made a heavy demand upon their patriotism, was to be expected, and in some instances, sacrifices were made to an extent which rendered unavoidable the reduction of their domestic establishments; but no considerations of personal inconvenience were suffered to interfere with the paramount claims of duty. The subjoined letters throw considerable light on these transactions, and are of especial interest from the minute details they present respecting the measures that were adopted in this great emergency for augmenting and organizing the Militia force of the kingdom.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Cleveland Row, Feb. 2nd, 1798.

MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I saw yesterday in Pitt's hands your letter to him. The sacrifice you make is certainly very great, and such as I could not have thought myself at liberty to advise, though I am glad on the whole that your determination is such as it is; not that I am very much attached (but quite the contrary) to the idea of raising public supplies by voluntary contributions, and still less by contributions _soi-disant_ voluntary, but in reality extorted by popular clamour and prejudice. But after that business has been carried as far as it has, it would have been too invidious for you to have put yourself in a breach which I think ought never to have been made. I am much concerned at what you say in your letter to Pitt respecting the personal inconvenience to which this step will subject you, and particularly as to the idea of your doing anything that can look like an avowed intention of suspending your residence at Stowe. It seems to me that nothing is more natural than that this state of things should lead to reduction of your establishments; and I believe in so doing you will only follow a very general example, though I appear to be selected as a much more striking instance of it than I have yet been able, with my best endeavours, to make myself. It will also be very easy for you, quartered in Ess.e.x, to be as much or as little as you please at Stowe in the course of the year; but any avowal of quitting that residence would, I think, do you a needless injury.

You will receive in a day or two the circular letter for calling out the supplementary Militia, with the explanation of the manner in which this is intended to be executed, so as to make it a _muster_ of the whole, but an embodying only of a part.

War with America and Portugal seems quite determined on at Paris; nor do I see how Denmark can keep herself out of the sc.r.a.pe, though she will most certainly do her best. The general opinion is that Mulin has established his superiority over Barras and Buonaparte. There can be no doubt of the intention to invade us here or in Ireland, or both.

The capture of the packet leaves us still without official or direct accounts from the West Indies, but all the accounts we get are favourable.

I enclose you, in confidence, a paper, which I think will be interesting to you. You will be so good as _not to have seen_ it, and to return it to me. It is of course to be kept under lock and key. It is unpublished, and meant to remain so.

Ever most affectionately yours, G.

MR. T. GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Charles Street, April 27th, 1798.

MY DEAREST BROTHER,

It is only from your letter to William that I have learnt what is the actual state of the discussion which you had begun upon the subject of the flank companies of the Militia, and very sorry I am to find that it is likely to take any shape which can be unpleasant or disagreeable to you. The measure itself is one which I have understood to be one of the few measures upon which, in point of necessary military preparation, all our officers are agreed, and which, if I recollect right, you yourself are as strongly inclined to as anybody, though not precisely in the mode recommended by the Commander-in-chief; if the objections which you felt on the point of _Militia_ establishment had been equally felt and adopted by the generality of the commanding officers of Militia, some way or other must, I suppose, have been found to accommodate the difficulties of such a representation; but in the present instance (as far as I could collect from Fortescue, who was at a pretty numerous meeting of all the Militia commanders who were in town), there was not any one of those who did not express their readiness to adopt this plan, and their approbation of it; so that, in fact, this matter, so far from being taken up by the generality of commanding officers in the same light in which you had objected to it, has really the sanction of every commanding officer, except, as I am told, Lord Berkeley, Lord Carnarvon and yourself.

Under these circ.u.mstances, much as I regret that any arrangement could be proposed and could be likely to be carried, which is so disagreeable to you, you will, however, I am sure, agree with me that it stands upon very different ground, when it stands upon the ground of individual opinions, from what it would have done if it had been taken up by the whole or the majority or a large part of the Militia. My best hopes are that some mode may yet be found which may place your own regiment in the shape that you had wished; and William has, I know, taken all the pains he can to urge the adoption of all or of any of the modifications of this order, which may make it less objectionable to you; and I cannot therefore but hope that his zeal and anxiety in this will carry it to a better shape for you as far as you are immediately interested. But we live in times of such pressing public duty, and the military post to which you are called and in which you are placed, is one so forward both in danger and in honourable distinction to you, that I should not do my duty by you if I did not (however uncalled upon for that opinion) add that, in my poor judgment, no state of military arrangements or orders can for a moment admit of the possibility of your giving up your command in an hour of danger, as immediate as that in which I write. I know you will give me credit for the honesty of this opinion, as well as for the affection which calls it forth from me.

G.o.d bless you, my dearest brother.

Ever most affectionately yours, T. G.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Cleveland Row, April 27th, 1798.

MY DEAREST BROTHER,

On receiving your letter to Pitt, I sent it to him, and have since seen him and Dundas. I understand from them that you have been misinformed about the idea of their intending to bring in any new Bill on the subject of forming the flank companies of Militia into light infantry battalions, as the opinion both of the Attorney and Solicitor-General is quite clear on the interpretation of the present law. With respect to the measure itself, I must say that as far as I understand it, my opinion is and always has been clearly for it. But what is much more important is, that the Duke of York, all the Generals of districts and Lord Cornwallis, the only military Cabinet Minister, all put the salvation of the country upon it. In this situation I do not think that Pitt, or Dundas, or any of us, could take upon ourselves the responsibility of omitting a measure, stated to be clearly within the law, and in which so large a proportion of the Militia officers are disposed to acquiesce with cordiality and cheerfulness.

Nothing certainly can be further from their wishes, even as public men only, than to place you in any unpleasant or difficult situation; but you will not think this a moment when points of real importance can be given up to personal considerations of regard and good-will.

It has occurred, that adopting the measure generally, the application of it to your particular regiment might be avoided, by permitting you to form a separate light infantry battalion, under the command of Fremantle, he being an army officer, and one whom the Duke of York himself allows to be as fit for that purpose as any he could select; and that this permission may, under certain circ.u.mstances and conditions, be extended to other colonels desirous of taking that mode preferably to the other.

But this is not without its difficulty, nor is it possible for any man, beforehand, to engage for the Duke of York's consent to a measure, on which he has so much right not only to have _voix au chapitre_ but to have a voice nearly decisive, so long as his regulations do not interfere with the law. All, therefore, that I can say is, that I am persuaded Dundas will do whatever he can to promote this arrangement, the only solution that I see to difficulties, one side of which, in the alternative stated by you, present consequences to which I am very sure, whatever else happens, you will never bring yourself to look. If I had the least doubt upon that point, I certainly could and should say much of the time, of the situation of the country, of the local position of your regiment in its present quarters, and of the possibility of any man, under such circ.u.mstances, resigning a command because he disapproves in his own judgment, even supposing him right in that judgment, of a military order which the Commander-in-chief has clearly a right to give, and for the omission, as well as the giving of which, he and the Government are exclusively responsible.

I know nothing more of the supplementary Militia than that they are to be immediately called out.