Memoirs of the Court and Cabinets of George the Third Volume II Part 41

The negotiations which the French had been carrying on at Rastadt relative to the German boundaries, were broken off in consequence of the Emperor having permitted the Russian troops to enter his dominions; and on the 1st of March, the Directory having declared war against him, Jourdan, at the head of forty thousand men, crossed the Rhine at Kehl and Basle. Austria was now fairly committed to the war, and, strengthened by the Russians, who entered into it with enthusiasm, achieved a succession of important movements. On the 5th of March, the Arch-Duke Charles crossed the Leck; and on the 25th, defeated Jourdan at the battle of Stockach, and, leaving ten thousand men dead or expiring on the field, compelled the French to retire towards the Rhine. This triumph was followed up vigorously by the battle of Magnan, on the 5th of April, in which the Austrians, under Kray, joined by the vanguard of the Russians, effected so signal a victory, that Scherer, beaten for the third time in the course of the campaign, fled in precipitation across the Nincio. The effect of these encouraging successes was utterly lost on the Court of Prussia, where the policy, or no-policy, of doing nothing still prevailed over the counsels of friends, and the menaces of enemies. The picture Mr. Grenville gives of the weakness and incapacity of the Government suggests the only intelligible explanation of the conduct they pursued at this juncture.

MR. T. GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Berlin, April 17th, 1799.

If I am behind-hand, my dearest brother, in thanking you for your two letters of the 11th and 24th of March, I am less so than those dates would lead you to imagine, for the messengers did not bring me the first of them till a week ago, and the last arrived here only the day before yesterday. The amities of the 'Proserpine' are out of date with me, and would long ago have been forgotten, if they were not daily recalled to me by new and continued proofs of the affectionate interest which has been taken in them. To know what you would feel in a state of anxiety and suspense which I could not relieve, was a distress greater to me than the fatigue and danger which accompanied my escape. It has ended well, and I trust it will not be long before we shall laugh over it together.

I presume that you will have heard from William how exactly the politics of Berlin have continued to remain in _statu quo_; how much more occupied they are in enumerating the follies and disgraces of Austria, than in adapting their own conduct to any wise system or any liberal principles, and how little applicable are the measures which they take, either to the danger which they fear, or to the hopes which they entertain. Their fear of France is, however, not dissembled by them, and certainly is not affected by them; it engrosses all their attention, and furnishes to them great and constant disquietude in the present, and serious apprehension for the future. But as there is no man of leading and commanding talents enough to show them the greatness of their danger, and to provoke from the public the adequate means of resisting it, there is nothing done by the Government, and they are living on from day to day, conscious of all they have to fear, but dest.i.tute of energy and activity, and submitting to a state of things which could only be produced by the most extreme weakness and incapacity; for you will certainly have remarked that the little influence which Prussia exercises, either from her hopes or fears, in Europe, is not owing to the defeat of any great and ambitious projects, is not to be attributed to the disappointment of any great plans, civil or military, but to a total absence of any leading and governing talents in those who direct the measures which prevail here.

It has been the fas.h.i.+on, I know, to consider the influencing men here as having views and principles of a bad description, and as being engaged in a systematic course of conduct pursued by them with great address and dissimulation. It is perhaps presumptuous in a stranger, as I am, to trust to any opinion formed upon so short a residence amongst them, but if I am sure of anything, I tell myself I may be sure that the miserable policy which is seen here is very much more weak than wicked, and the wretched state of Government much more to be attributed to the absence of great talents than the influence of deep and dangerous designs. Whatever be the cause, the effect is the same; and although it seems to be a pretty universal opinion that Prussia must and will at length be driven into war, they are content rather to let their enemy choose that moment for the commencement of hostilities, than make common cause and fight one common battle, which in my conscience I believe would be successful. Indeed, the Austrian successes in driving the French to the Rhine, if they are followed by similar success in Switzerland, will almost justify one's hope that, even without Prussia, the French may in this campaign be pushed back upon their own country; and the continued state of insurrection in the Low Countries, where the republican troops can scarcely restrain the inhabitants, give good hopes on that side as soon as any solid force could be made to bear in that quarter. The zeal and enthusiasm of the Court of Petersburg increases every hour, and they will become very immediately princ.i.p.als in the war against France, both by word and deed.

In this immediate state of the negotiation, I am remaining here more because there is an inclination in London to think I can do good, than from any great good that is likely to be done. I am very much obliged to you for your offer of a loan, which, however, I hope will be unnecessary by the shortness of my stay. If that should unexpectedly be prolonged, I will then have recourse to you to a.s.sist by an advance the tardy payment of His Majesty's Envoys Extraordinary and Ministers Plenipotentiary, who are always left in arrears seven quarters for the better credit of the Court that employs them. I hope my loss by the 'Proserpine' will turn out not to exceed 600, as many things have been saved.

I trust you are now happy and well at Stowe. G.o.d bless you, dearest brother.

By this time, Lord Buckingham had returned to England, and the next despatch from Berlin is addressed to Stowe. The account of the vacillation of the Court, and the sketch Mr. Grenville gives of the King, are full of interest. Since he had last written, Suwaroff had taken the command of the Austro-Russian armies in Italy, and in a short time had expelled the French from the princ.i.p.al towns of the North, which forced Macdonald to evacuate Naples, and cross the Apennines.

MR. T. GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Berlin, May 25th, 1799.

MY DEAREST BROTHER,

My last letters from Cleveland Row have, thank G.o.d, brought you back safe and sound to your own fireside and to the many who share the comforts of it with you; it cannot, I presume, be very long before I may reckon myself of that number, although as I do not like to do anything by halves, I consider myself as liable to duty as long there is any fair demand to be made upon me. You will have heard from William all that was to be heard of our hopes and of our disappointments, and you will know likewise from him that our stock of those articles is not yet exhausted, although the briskness of the market is a little affected by the absence of the King. The Berlin reviews being over, he has begun a military progress, which will carry him through Brunswick, Minden and Wesel to Ca.s.sel and to Ans.p.a.ch, and after various reviews in those places he will return to Potsdam in the first week of July.

Whether in the first of these places, or in the last, or in any of them, he will have determined to take his part with us, remains to be decided, and it will be less hazardous to abide the event than to pretend to foretel it. It is certain that the inclination to war has grown very much of late among all the thinking men in the country, and the regular Ministers have agreed in recommending it very strongly to the King; the disinclination to it is chiefly found in the confidential aides-de-camp and the subordinate characters, whose familiar habits with the King enable them to exercise a very governing influence upon him.

The King himself is, I believe, of a very well-disposed and honest character; his inclinations are English, and his personal respect for the King of England is very striking; his suspicion and dislike of the French is also beyond all question, and there are so many ingredients in his situation and character that should lead him to an open declaration against France, that it is not easy to account for the different line which he pursues; it must, however, be attributed to the influence of the very weak persons who are in familiar confidence with him, and to his being too diffident in himself to decide upon the important measure of engaging Prussia in war. I am, however, inclined to believe that such will at last be his decision, though there is too much hesitation in his own mind to give us any solid ground of reliance until he shall be completely embarked.

Meantime, all is going on prosperously under the active exertions of Suwaroff, who is daily hemming in and menacing Turin, and who has now advanced to Chiva.s.so, and has detached Kaim with a considerable force to the Valais. The general opinion here is that the French will evacuate Switzerland whenever their line at Luceinsteig and Coire is forced, and some accounts to-day seem to announce that event as having happened.

Moreau, with seventeen thousand men, is at Alexandria, and I suppose the Naples army will try to join him, although Macdonald will find that junction rather difficult to accomplish.

We are all still waiting in anxious expectation for news of the fleet. The Ministers here think the Mediterranean is the object, and to me it seems not unlikely that they may pursue that object, and at the same time detach to Ireland.

G.o.d bless you, dearest brother.

The occupation which was given by the Austrians and Russians to the French troops in Italy and Germany, appearing to offer a favourable opportunity to rescue Holland from the hands of the republicans, an expedition, under the command of Sir Ralph Abercromby, set sail from England on the 13th of August, and disembarked off the Helder. On the 30th, the Dutch fleet surrendered, and hoisted the Orange flag. In order, probably, to give more weight and effect to a mission which had for its object the restoration of the Stadtholder, it was proposed that Lord Grenville should undertake an emba.s.sy to Holland, and that Mr.

Thomas Grenville (who had in the interim returned home) should proceed to St. Petersburg.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Dropmore, Sept. 5th, 1799.

MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I was much obliged to you for your kindness to us in writing on the subject of Lady B. We earnestly hope that all cause of uneasiness to you on her account has ceased, and that both fever and cold are gone. If you would let anybody write us a line to say so, you would much oblige us.

You will have seen that, in spite of wind, we have succeeded at the Texel. The Lieutenant says that the Dutch fleet had cut the buoys, and run up into the Zuyder Zee. Lord D. was preparing to lay the buoys down again, and to follow them, but it was not expected that Storey would make any further resistance, more than half his fleet being Stadtholderians.

The wind is now changed to the N.E., as if to bring our Russians.

The Dutch reported that they were to have had nine thousand French at the Helder by the Wednesday night, but that is doubted. I have not learnt what their actual force is, but it appears that there were some Trench there. We have now about seventeen thousand men there, and when the transports return, we can, if necessary, send ten thousand more, besides our eighteen thousand Russians. I trust, therefore, I am not very sanguine in thinking the business as nearly certain as one can allow oneself to call anything in these times.

But for the plans which we have in view, supposing this to terminate well, and soon, we want full twenty thousand more British force. Do you think it is possible to get them from the Militia?

and how? Dundas is revolving in his mind projects for the purpose, but I should much wish to know from you whether you think the thing practicable for a great object, and in what manner.

An idea has been proposed to me, which I think I shall not be at liberty to decline, if, when the time comes, I should myself be satisfied that I could be of more use than other people: it is to go to Holland as Amba.s.sador Extraordinary, carrying myself and my office there for about a month or six weeks, to help to fix Old Stadt a little more firmly in his chair. You know I had destined Tom to this service, and if he should go, I still think my going would be quite superfluous. He had agreed to undertake the service as a temporary one only; but I have been since urged to press him to go to Petersburg, to establish a further concert there, and I trust he will not refuse the earnest entreaties we have made him on that subject. You may suppose that I do not look to this as a very pleasant interlude to my other business, but I cannot deny that it is at least possible I may be of use there, and if so, I must practise as I preach.

G.o.d bless you, my dearest brother.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Dropmore, Sept. 5th, 1799.

MY DEAREST BROTHER,

Your letter, which I received yesterday, though a little more satisfactory than your former account, still leaves room for so much uneasiness, that Lady G. and I are extremely anxious to hear again from you, and I trust in G.o.d the answer will be such as to set us quite at our ease; but the complaints of which you speak are of so ugly a nature, that one cannot feel satisfied while any trace of them remains.

I have not yet my answer from Tom; but by an intermediate letter, I guess that he will be very little disposed to undertake this jaunt to Petersburg. Even if he should not, but should go to Holland, I am not quite sure that I must not go, for as short a time as I speak of, to a.s.sist him in Holland; not that personally I have the vanity to think that I could do any part of the business better, or as well as he, but my red boxes and my seals would have a great effect in enabling me to expedite, and even in some degree to _brusque_ a business which, if left to Dutch arrangement only, or with nothing more than the usual aid of an English Amba.s.sador, would take not six months, as you say, but six years, and not be done at last.

I fully understand the nature of your offer, and should not certainly have suspected even, if you had not explained it, that you were canva.s.sing for the delectable amus.e.m.e.nt of leaving Stowe and England, to figure at the Hague or Petersburg. But the best negotiation you can carry on for us just now would be one with the Militia for giving us twenty thousand more men. I hardly dare say, or let myself think, what we could do, or rather what we could not do, with such a reinforcement, supposing Holland to go on quick, and our troops not to suffer much from sickness; for of their suffering in battle there, I am not much afraid.

If any fresh parliamentary authority is necessary, we can now call Parliament together in a fortnight. I will write to Dundas, as you desire. If I had known of his coming to town to review his East India regiment, I would have proposed precisely the Dropmore plan you speak of; but I fear you could hardly have looked at it at that moment, and I presume he is gone back to Walmer; I shall, however, expect his answer.

Ever most affectionately yours, G.

LORD GRENVILLE TO THE MARQUIS OF BUCKINGHAM.

Dropmore, Sept. 9th, 1799.

MY DEAREST BROTHER,

I hope, from your account, that the worst is over, and that Lady B.

will continue to mend, but we shall be very anxious to hear that it is so. If nothing new arise, and if we shall not be troublesome to you, we think of being with you on Wednesday in next week; but pray let us know if you would wish us to delay our visit.

If the project holds respecting Holland, it is likely, I think, that I shall not be much longer before I am called upon to begin my preparations. I have as yet no answer from Tom, but I shall have one to-day or to-morrow; for we know that the wind changed to the eastward on the other side the water on Friday, and we have three mails due.

Our first division of Russians, five thousand two hundred men, are arrived, and are under sailing orders for the Texel. Popham left the second division at Elsineur on Sunday last; and calculates that both this and the rear division, amounting together to above eleven thousand men, will be here by Tuesday or Wednesday next. Our own transports were also beginning to arrive, so that we shall have to send them in the course of a week or ten days a reinforcement of twenty-six thousand men, besides cavalry. I have no doubt that this is more than sufficient, with tolerable activity and enterprise, to do our work completely, and in a very few weeks--I might almost say days--for we have the command of the Zuyder Zee, by which we can turn the enemy on their right, and of the North Sea, which equally turns their left; and they have, I am confident, no means of a.s.sembling an army of half the force of ours, to oppose it in front. All this, however, is a question of time; for if that is allowed them, one can answer for nothing.

We have not heard of Abercromby (nor indeed could we) since the 31st. He was then preparing to march forward to Alkmaar. Have you got Wiebeking's map of Holland and Utrecht? If not, let anybody write for it for you from Hamburgh. You will see, indeed, in any map, a little promontory that runs forward opposite to Amsterdam, on the north bank of the Y., between Buyksloot and Newdam. The opinion of persons of the country is, that if we can make ourselves masters of that point, Amsterdam is open to be bombarded, and must capitulate on the first summons. All the other advantages of the country we have to act in, upon our line of march, are obvious by looking at the map. The disadvantages are, the facility of r.e.t.a.r.ding our march by defending the d.y.k.es and narrow causeways along which we must pa.s.s; but a great superiority of force will enable us to surmount many of these. The French papers talk of having marched against us the garrisons of the Generality. So much the better if it is so, for then we shall not find them there, and the fact itself proves (if even our intelligence were defective) how little other force they have in the country.

I am greatly obliged to you for what you have written on the subject of the Militia. It seems to me that allowing the Militia to volunteer by companies for a fixed time is the best suggestion I have yet heard. But it would be necessary to consider, on a statement of numbers, how many could be so procured from all the Militias--English, Scotch, and Irish--though, with respect to these last, there is, I fear, an insurmountable difficulty, from the necessity of a.s.sembling Parliament, which could not be done in Ireland without broaching the question of Union before we are prepared for it.

Less than twenty thousand men would not, on the most sanguine calculations, answer our object, and the issue of the war so much depends upon it that we should be unpardonable to omit any possible effort that we could make for it. What we want is to be able to garrison Holland with twenty thousand men so as to have as soon as possible after the conquest of it the means of disposing of our whole army now there. It is a very doubtful question, I think, whether our Militia volunteering would be more or less promoted if we confined our proposal to that particular service, and sent our Militia battalions into the Dutch garrisons, employing the army now there in the active service, or if we took the offer generally for foreign service, and made such distribution between the two as might best suit our convenience.

There would be no difficulty as to Parliament; we can call them together at a fortnight's notice. We would do so for this object alone. The King would speak of nothing else, and ask no supply; and we could easily, in a moment of triumph like the present, exclude all other discussions, so that the execution, were the plan once arranged to the satisfaction of the Militia officers, would take up not more than ten days or a fortnight at most.