A History of the Japanese People Part 87

Success has not attended this essay. The Throne continues, nominally at all events, to appoint and dismiss ministers. As for the proceedings of the diet, the most salient feature was that, from the very outset, the party politicians in the lower chamber engaged in successive attacks upon the holders of power. This had been fully antic.i.p.ated; for during the whole period of probation antecedent to the meeting of the first Diet, the party politicians had been suffered to discredit the Cabinet by all possible means, whereas the Cabinet had made no effort to win for themselves partisans in the electorates. They relied wholly upon the sovereign's prerogative, and stood aloof from alliances of any kind, apparently indifferent to everything but their duty to their country. Fortunately, the House of Peers ranged itself steadfastly on the side of the Cabinet throughout this struggle, and thus the situation was often saved from apparently pressing danger. The war with China (1894-1895) greatly enhanced the Diet's reputation; for all the political parties, laying aside their differences, without a dissenting voice voted funds for the prosecution of the campaign.

POLITICAL PARTIES

During several years the House of Representatives continued to be divided into two great parties with nearly equally balanced power--the Liberals and the Progressists, together with a few minor coteries. But, in 1898, the Liberals and Progressists joined hands, thus coming to wield a large majority in the lower house. Forthwith, the Emperor, on the advice of Prince Ito, invited Counts Ok.u.ma and Itagaki to form a Cabinet. An opportunity was thus given to the parties to prove the practical possibility of the system they had so long lauded in theory. The united parties called themselves Const.i.tutionists (Kensei-to). Their union lasted barely six months, and then "the new links snapped under the tension of the old enmities."

A strange thing now happened. The Liberals invited Prince Ito to be their leader, and he agreed on condition that his followers should obey him implicitly. A new and powerful party was thus formed under the designation of Friends of the Const.i.tution (Rikken Seiyukai).

Thus, the Liberals not only enlisted under the statesmen whose overthrow they had for nearly twenty years sought to effect, but also they practically expunged from their platform an essential article of faith--parliamentary cabinets. Another proof was here furnished that political combinations in j.a.pan were based rather on persons than on principles.

As for the new party, even Prince Ito's wonderful talents and unequalled prestige failed to hold successfully the reins of the heterogeneous team which he had now undertaken to drive. The House of Peers opposed him on account of his a.s.sociation with political parties, and he at once resigned the premiers.h.i.+p. The party he had formed did not, however, dissolve. Prince Ito, indeed, stepped out of its ranks, but he was succeeded by his intimate friend, Marquis Saionji, one of j.a.pan's blue-blooded aristocrats, and to him the Const.i.tutionists have yielded implicit obedience ever since. For the rest, it is impossible to foresee what the outcome of the parliamentary system will be in j.a.pan. Up to the present the princ.i.p.al lesson learned by politicians seems to have been the value of patience. The Const.i.tutionists have shown that they are quite ready to support a Cabinet entirely independent of parties, where its measures seem conducive to the nation's good. Such a Cabinet was that of Prince Katsura, who, in turn, after three years' tenure of office, stepped down quietly in August, 1911, to make way for the Const.i.tutionists, under Marquis Saionji. In a word, the nation seems to have arrived at the conclusion that these parliamentary problems cannot be safely solved except by long and deliberate experiment.*

*For minute information about party politics and parliamentary procedure see the "Oriental Series," Vol. IV.

AGRICULTURE AND INDUSTRY

The growth of agricultural and industrial enterprise is one of the most remarkable features of modern j.a.pan. Up to the beginning of the Meiji era, agriculture almost monopolized attention, manufacturing industry being altogether of a domestic character. Speaking broadly, the gross area of land in j.a.pan, exclusive of Saghalien, Korea, and Formosa is seventy-five million acres, and of this only some seventeen millions are arable. It may well be supposed that as rice is the princ.i.p.al staple of foodstuff, and as the area over which it can be produced is so limited, the farmers have learned to apply very intensive methods of cultivation. Thus it is estimated that they spend annually twelve millions sterling--$60,000,000--on fertilizers.

By unflinching industry and skilled processes, the total yield of rice has been raised to an annual average of about fifty million koku; that is to say, two hundred and fifty million bushels. But the day cannot be far distant when the growth of the population will outstrip that of this essential staple, and unless the a.s.sistance of Korea and Formosa can be successfully enlisted, a problem of extreme difficulty may present itself. Meanwhile, manufacturing industry has increased by leaps and bounds. Thus, whereas at the opening of the Meiji era, every manufacture was of a domestic character, and such a thing as a joint-stock company did not exist, there are now fully 11,000 factories giving employment to 700,000 operatives, and the number of joint-stock companies aggregates 9000. Evidently, j.a.pan threatens to become a keen compet.i.tor of Europe and America in all the markets of the Orient, for she possesses the advantage of propinquity, and as well an abundance of easily trained labour. But there are two important conditions that offset these advantages. In the first place j.a.panese wages have increased so rapidly that in the last fifteen years they have nearly doubled, and, secondly, it must be remembered that j.a.panese labour is not so efficient as that of Europe and America.

ENGRAVING: SEAL OF MUTSUHITO, THE LATE EMPEROR

RAILWAYS

The work of railway construction, which may be said to have commenced with the Meiji era, has not advanced as rapidly as some other undertakings. The country has now only 5770 miles of lines open to traffic and 1079 miles under construction. All these railways may be said to have been built with domestic capital. Nearly the whole was nationalized in 1907, so that the State has paid out altogether sixty-six million pounds sterling--$325,000,000--on account of railways, an investment which yields a net return of about three and a half millions sterling--$17,000,000--annually.

THE MERCANTILE MARINE

Another direction in which j.a.panese progress has been very marked is in the development of a mercantile marine. At an early period of the country's modern history, her statesmen recognized that transports are as necessary to the safety of a State as are soldiers, and, in fact, that the latter cannot be utilized without the former. The Government, therefore, encouraged with liberal subsidies and grants-in-aid the purchase or construction of s.h.i.+ps, the result being that whereas, in 1871, j.a.pan's mercantile marine comprised only forty-six s.h.i.+ps with a total tonnage of 17,948, the corresponding figures in 1910 were 6436 and 1,564,443 respectively. In the war with China in 1894-1895, as well as in that with Russia in 1904-1905, j.a.pan was able to carry large armies to the Asiatic continent in her own vessels, thus demonstrating the wisdom of the policy pursued by the Government, although it had been habitually denounced by the enemies of subsidies in any circ.u.mstances. s.h.i.+pbuilding yards had also been called into existence, and there are now four of them where vessels aggregating 87,495 tons have been built.

THE ARMY

It has been seen that the Satsuma rebellion of 1877 severely taxed the military resources of the empire. In fact, the organization of special brigades to supplement the conscripts was found necessary.

Therefore, two years later, the conscription law was revised, the total term of service being increased from seven years to ten, with the result that the number of trained soldiers who could be called out in case of war became larger by fully one-half. Further, in 1882, another expansion of armaments was effected in obedience to an Imperial decree, so that when war with China broke out in 1894, j.a.pan possessed an available force of seven divisions (including the guards), and these, raised to a war-footing, represented about 150,000 men. She had already learned that, however civilized the Occident might claim to be, all the great States of the West depended mainly on military and naval force, and that only by a demonstration of that force could international respect be won.

Of course, this creed was not publicly proclaimed. Firmly as j.a.panese statesmen believed it, they could not confess their conviction openly in the Diet, and therefore much difficulty was experienced in inducing the two houses to endorse the Government's scheme of increased armaments. Indeed, the subject came to be a frequent topic of discussion between the Cabinet and the House of Representatives, and in the end j.a.pan was obliged to go into war against China without a single line-of-battle s.h.i.+p, though her adversary possessed two.

Nevertheless, the Island Empire emerged signally victorious.

It might have been supposed that she would then rest content with the a.s.surance of safety her prowess had won. But, in the immediate sequel of the war, three of the great European powers, Russia, Germany, and France, joined hands to deprive j.a.pan of the fruits of her victory by calling upon her to vacate the southern littoral of Manchuria from the mouth of the Yalu to the Liaotung peninsula. j.a.pan thus acquired the conviction that her successes against China were not estimated by Western States as any great evidence of belligerent power, and that it would be necessary for her to fight again if she hoped to win any considerable measure of international respect. Prince Ito, then prime minister, keenly appreciated this necessity. He invited the Diet to vote for a substantial increment of land and sea forces, and after much opposition in the House of Representatives, funds were obtained for raising the army to thirteen divisions and for an increase of the navy which will be by and by spoken of.

The wisdom of these measures found full justification, in 1904, when swords had to be crossed with Russia. After that war, which raised j.a.pan to a leading place among the nations, the old problem came up again for solution. Once more the Elder Statesmen--as the Meiji leaders were called--asked the Diet to maintain the organization of the army at the point to which it had been carried during the war, and once more the lower house of the Diet proved very difficult to persuade. Ultimately, however, the law of military service was revised so that the fixed establishment became nineteen divisions, together with various special corps. It is not possible to speak with absolute accuracy of the force that j.a.pan is now capable of mobilizing, but when the new system is in full working order, she will be able to put something like a million and a half of men into the fighting line. Her military budget amounts to only seven millions sterling--$35,000,000--a wonderfully small sum considering the results obtained.

THE NAVY

It has been shown how, in the year 1636, the Bakufu Government strictly interdicted the building of all vessels of ocean-going capacity. The veto naturally precluded enterprise in the direction of naval expansion, and when Commodore Perry, at the head of a powerful squadron, arrived in Uraga Bay, two centuries afterwards, the j.a.panese were suddenly and vividly instructed in the enormous power of a nation wielding such weapons of war. This object lesson having been most practically inculcated by the bombardments of Kagos.h.i.+ma and s.h.i.+monoseki, j.a.pan saw that she must not lose one moment in equipping herself with a naval force. At first, she had to purchase all her s.h.i.+ps from foreign countries, and so difficult was it to obtain parliamentary support for these acquisitions that, as already stated, when war with the neighbouring empire broke out in 1894, she did not possess a single ironclad, her strongest vessels being four second-cla.s.s cruisers, which, according to modern ideas, would not be worthy of a place in the fighting line.

During the next ten years the teachings of experience took deeper root, and when the great combat with Russia commenced, the j.a.panese navy included four ironclads and six armoured cruisers. The signal victories obtained by her in that war did not induce any sentiment of self-complacency. She has gone on ever since increasing her navy, and the present programme of her statesmen is that by the end of 1921, she will possess twenty-five units of the first fighting line; that figure being based on the principle that she should be competent to encounter the greatest force which any foreign State, England excluded, will be able to ma.s.s in Far Eastern waters ten years hence.

Her annual expenditure on account of the up-keep of her navy is at present three and one-quarter million pounds sterling $17,000,000. No feature is more remarkable than the fact that j.a.pan can now build and equip in her own yards and a.r.s.enals wars.h.i.+ps of the largest size. She is no longer dependent on foreign countries for these essentials of safety.

ENGRAVING: NIJU-BAs.h.i.+ (DOUBLE BRIDGE) (Entrance to the present Imperial Palace, at Tokyo)

CHAPTER XLVII

WARS WITH CHINA AND RUSSIA

THE SAGHALIEN COMPLICATION

ONE of the problems which invited the attention of the new Government early in the Meiji era had been handed down from the days of feudalism. In those days, neither Yezo nor Saghalien nor the Kurile Islands were under effective j.a.panese administration. The feudatory of Matsumae had his castle at the extreme south of Yezo, but the jurisdiction he exercised was only nominal. Yet the earliest explorers of Saghalien were certainly j.a.panese. As far back as 1620, some va.s.sals of the Matsumae feudatory landed on the island and remained there throughout a winter. The supposition then was that Saghalien formed part of the Asiatic mainland. But, in 1806, Mamiya Rinzo, a j.a.panese traveller, voyaged up and down the Amur, and, crossing to Saghalien, discovered that a narrow strait separated it from the continent. There still exists in Europe a theory that Saghalien's insular character was discovered first by a Russian, Captain Nevelskoy, in 1849, but in j.a.pan the fact had already been known.

Saghalien commands the estuary of the Amur, and Muravieff, the distinguished Russian commander in East Asia, appreciated the necessity of acquiring the island for his country. In 1858, he visited j.a.pan with a squadron and demanded that the Strait of La Perouse, which separates Saghalien from Yezo, should be regarded as the Russo-j.a.panese frontier. j.a.pan naturally refused a proposal which would have given the whole of Saghalien to Russia, and Muravieff then resorted to the policy of sending emigrants to settle on the island.

Two futile attempts to prevent this process of gradual absorption were made by the j.a.panese Government; they first proposed a division of the island, and afterwards they offered to purchase the Russian portion for a sum of about 400,000--$2,000,000. St. Petersburg seemed inclined to acquiesce, but the bargain provoked opposition in Tokyo, and not until 1875 was a final settlement reached, the conditions being that j.a.pan should recognize Russia's t.i.tle to the whole of Saghalien and Russia should recognize j.a.pan's t.i.tle to the Kuriles. These latter islands had always been regarded as j.a.panese property, and therefore the arrangement now effected amounted to the purchase of an area of j.a.panese territory by Russia, who paid for it with a part of j.a.pan's belongings. An interesting sequel to this chapter of history is that, thirty years later, Saghalien became the scene of a j.a.panese invasion and was ultimately divided between the two nations along the fiftieth parallel, which was precisely what the Bakufu statesmen had originally proposed.

THE FORMOSAN EXPEDITION

The expedition of Formosa in 1874 has already been spoken of.

Insignificant in itself, the incident derived vicarious interest from its effect upon the relations between j.a.pan and China in connexion with the owners.h.i.+p of the Ryukyu Islands. Lying a little south of j.a.pan, these islands had for some centuries been regarded as an appanage of the Satsuma fief, and the language spoken by their inhabitants showed unmistakable traces of affinity with the j.a.panese tongue. Therefore when, in 1873, the crew of a wrecked Ryukyuan junk was barbarously treated by the Formosan aborigines, the Yedo Government at once sought redress from Peking. But the Chinese paid no attention to this demand until a force of j.a.panese troops had made a punitory visit to Formosa, and China, recognizing that her territory had been invaded, lodged a protest which would probably have involved the two empires in a war had not the British minister in Peking intervened. The arrangement made was that China should indemnify j.a.pan to the extent of the expenses incurred by the latter in punis.h.i.+ng the aborigines.

THE RYUKYU COMPLICATION

A fact collaterally established by the Formosan affair was that the Ryukyu Islands belonged to j.a.pan, and, in 1876, the system of local government already inaugurated in j.a.pan proper was extended to Ryukyu, the ruler of the latter being pensioned. China now formulated a protest. She claimed that Ryukyu had always been a tributary of her empire. But China's interpretation of "tribute" was essentially unpractical. "So long as her own advantage could be promoted, she regarded as a token of va.s.salage the presents periodically carried to her Court from neighbouring States, but so soon as there arose any question of discharging a suzerain's duties, she cla.s.sed these offerings as an insignificant interchange of neighbourly courtesy."

Undoubtedly Ryukyu, from time to time, had followed the custom of despatching gift-bearing envoys to Peking, just as j.a.pan herself had done. But it was on clear record that Ryukyu had been subdued by Satsuma without any attempt whatever on China's part to save the islands from that fate; that thereafter, during two centuries, they had been included in the Satsuma fief, and that China, in the settlement of the Formosan complication, had constructively acknowledged j.a.pan's t.i.tle to the group. Each empire a.s.serted its claims with equal a.s.surance, and things remained thus until 1880, when General Grant, who visited j.a.pan in the course of a tour round the world, suggested a peaceful compromise. A conference met in Peking, and it was agreed that the islands should be divided, j.a.pan taking the northern part and China the southern. But at the moment of signing the convention, China drew back, and the discussion ended in j.a.pan retaining the islands, China's protests being pigeonholed.

KOREAN COMPLICATION

Sufficient reference has already been made in these pages to the series of events that terminated in 1875, when j.a.pan, by a display of partly fict.i.tious force, drew Korea out of international isolation and signed with the Peninsular Kingdom a treaty acknowledging the latter's independence.

WAR WITH CHINA

During the centuries when China occupied the undisputed position of first in might and first in civilization on the Asiatic continent, her habit was to use as buffer states the small countries lying immediately beyond her borders. But she always took care to avoid any responsibilities that might grow out of this arrangement. In a word, the tide of foreign aggression was to be checked by an understanding that these little countries shared the inviolability of great China, but it was understood, at the same time, that the consequences of their own acts must rest upon their own heads. Such a system, having no bases except sentiment and prestige, soon proved futile in the face of Occidental practicality. Burma, Siam, Annam, and Tonking, one by one, ceased to be dependent on China and independent towards all other nations.

In Korea's case, however, the fiction proved more tenacious, since the peninsula furnished easy access to Manchuria, the cradle of the Manchu dynasty. But while seeking to maintain the old-time relations with Korea, Chinese statesmen clung uniformly to traditional methods.

They refrained from declaring Korea a dependency of China, yet they sought to keep up "the romance of ultimate dependency and intermediate sovereignty." It was thus that, in 1876, Korea was allowed to conclude with j.a.pan a treaty describing the former as "an independent State enjoying the same rights as j.a.pan," nor did the Peking Government make any protest when the United States, Great Britain, and other powers concluded similar treaties.

To exercise independence in practice, however, was not permitted to Korea. A Chinese resident was stationed in Seoul, the Korean capital, and he quickly became an imperium in imperio. Thenceforth j.a.pan, in all her dealings with the Peninsular Kingdom, found the latter behaving as a Chinese dependency, obeying the Chinese resident in everything. Again and again, j.a.panese patience was tried by these anomalous conditions, and although nothing occurred of sufficient magnitude to warrant official protest, the Tokyo Government became sensible of perpetual rebuffs and humiliating interferences at China's hands. Korea herself suffered seriously from this state of national irresponsibility. There was no security of life and property, or any effective desire to develop the country's resources.

If the victims of oppression appealed to force, China readily lent military a.s.sistance to suppress them, and thus the royal family of Korea learned to regard its tenure of power as dependent on ability to conciliate China.

On j.a.pan's side, also, the Korean question caused much anxiety. It was impossible for the Tokyo statesmen to ignore the fact that their country's safety depended largely on preserving Korea from the grasp of a Western power. They saw plainly that such a result might at any moment be expected if Korea was suffered to drift into a state of administrative incompetence. Once, in 1882, and again, in 1884, when Chinese soldiers were employed to suppress reform movements which would have impaired the interests of the Korean monarch, the latter's people, counting j.a.pan to be the source of progressive tendencies in the East, destroyed her legation in Seoul, driving its inmates out of the city. j.a.pan was not yet prepared to a.s.sert herself forcibly in redress of such outrages, but in the ensuing negotiations she acquired t.i.tles that "touched the core of China's alleged Suzerainty." Thus, in 1882, j.a.pan obtained recognition of her right to protect her legation with troops; and, in 1885, a convention, signed at Tientsin, pledged each of the contracting parties not to send a military force to Korea without notifying the other.

In spite of these agreements China's arbitrary and unfriendly interference in Korean affairs continued to be demonstrated to j.a.pan.

Efforts to obtain redress proved futile, and even provoked threats of Chinese armed intervention. Finally, in the spring of 1894, an insurrection of some magnitude broke out in Korea, and in response to an appeal from the Royal family, China sent twenty-five hundred troops, who went into camp at Asan, on the southwest coast of the peninsula. Notice was duly given to the Tokyo Government, which now decided that j.a.pan's vital interests as well as the cause of civilization in the East required that an end must be put to Korea's dangerous misrule and to China's arbitrary interference. j.a.pan did not claim for herself anything that she was not willing to accord to China. But the Tokyo statesmen were sensible that to ask their conservative neighbour to promote in the Peninsular Kingdom a progressive programme which she had always steadily rejected and despised in her own case, must prove a chimerical attempt, if ordinary diplomatic methods alone were used. Accordingly, on receipt of Peking's notice as to the sending of troops to the peninsula, j.a.pan gave corresponding notice on her own part, and thus July, 1894, saw a Chinese force encamped at Asan and a j.a.panese force in the vicinity of Seoul.

In having recourse to military aid, China's nominal purpose was to quell the Tonghak insurrection, and j.a.pan's motive was to obtain a position such as would strengthen her demand for drastic treatment of Korea's malady. In giving notice of the despatch of troops, China described Korea as her "tributary State," thus emphasizing a contention which at once created an impossible situation. During nearly twenty years j.a.pan had treated Korea as her own equal, in accordance with the terms of the treaty of 1876, and she could not now agree that the Peninsular Kingdom should be officially cla.s.sed as a tributary of China. Her protests, however, were contemptuously ignored, and Chinese statesmen continued to apply the offensive appellation to Korea, while at the same time they a.s.serted the right of limiting the number of troops sent by j.a.pan to the peninsula as well as the manner of their employment.

Still desirous of preserving the peace, j.a.pan proposed a union between herself and China for the purpose of restoring order in Korea and amending that country's administration. China refused. She even expressed supercilious surprise that j.a.pan, while a.s.serting Korea's independence, should suggest the idea of peremptorily reforming its administration. The Tokyo Cabinet now announced that the j.a.panese troops should not be withdrawn without "some understanding that would guarantee the future peace, order, and good government of Korea," and as China still refused to come to such an understanding, j.a.pan undertook the work single-handed.

The Tonghak rebellion, which Chinese troops were originally sent to quell, had died of inanition before they landed. The troops, therefore, had been withdrawn. But China kept them in Korea, her avowed reason being the presence of the j.a.panese military force near Seoul. In these circ.u.mstances, Peking was notified that a despatch of re-enforcements on China's side must be construed as an act of hostility. Notwithstanding this notice, China not only sent a further body of troops by sea to encamp at Asan, but also despatched an army overland across the Yalu. These proceedings precipitated hostilities.

Three Chinese wars.h.i.+ps, convoying a transport with twelve hundred soldiers on board, met and opened fire on two j.a.panese cruisers. The result was signal. One of the Chinese wars.h.i.+ps was captured, another was so riddled with shot that she had to be beached and abandoned; the third escaped in a dilapidated condition, and the transport, refusing to surrender, was sent to the bottom. These things happened on the 25th of July, 1894, and war was declared by each empire six days subsequently.

The j.a.panese took the initiative. They despatched from Seoul a column of troops and routed the Chinese entrenched at Asan, many of whom fled northward to Pyong-yang, a town on the Tadong River, memorable as the scene of a battle between a Chinese and a j.a.panese army in 1592. Pyong-yang offered great facilities for defence. The Chinese ma.s.sed there a force of seventeen thousand men, and made preparations for a decisive contest, building parapets, mounting guns, and strengthening the position by every device of modern warfare. Their infantry had the advantage of being armed with repeating rifles, and the configuration of the ground offered little cover for an attacking army. Against this strong position the j.a.panese moved in two columns; one marching northward from Seoul, the other striking westward from Yuensan. Forty days elapsed before the j.a.panese forces came into action, and one day's fighting sufficed to carry all the Chinese positions, the attacking armies having only seven hundred casualties and the defenders, six thousand.