A History of the Japanese People Part 88

The next day, September 17th, j.a.pan achieved an equally conspicuous success at sea. Fourteen Chinese wars.h.i.+ps and six torpedo-boats, steering homeward after convoying a fleet of transports to the mouth of the Yalu River, fell in with eleven j.a.panese war-vessels cruising in the Yellow Sea. The Chinese squadron was not seeking an encounter.

Their commanding officer did not appear to appreciate the value of sea-power. His fleet included two armoured battle-s.h.i.+ps of over seven thousand tons' displacement, whereas the j.a.panese had nothing stronger than belted cruisers of four thousand. Therefore a little enterprise on China's part might have severed j.a.pan's maritime communications and compelled her to evacuate Korea. The Chinese, however, used their war-vessels as convoys only, keeping them carefully in port when no such duty was to be performed. It is evident that, as a matter of choice, they would have avoided the battle of the Yalu, though when compelled to fight they fought stoutly. After a sharp engagement, four of their vessels were sunk, and the remainder steamed into Weihaiwei, their retreat being covered by torpedo-boats.

By this victory the maritime route to China lay open to j.a.pan. She could now attack Talien, Port Arthur, and Weihaiwei, naval stations on the Liaotung and Shantung peninsulas, where strong permanent fortifications had been built under the direction of European experts. These forts fell one by one before the a.s.saults of the j.a.panese troops as easily as the castle of Pyong-yang had fallen.

Only by the remains of the Chinese fleet at Weihaiwei was a stubborn resistance made, under the command of Admiral Ting. But, after the entire squadron of torpedo craft had been captured, and after three of the largest Chinese s.h.i.+ps had been sent to the bottom by j.a.panese torpedoes, and one had met the same fate by gunfire, the remainder surrendered, and their gallant commander, Admiral Ting, rejecting all overtures from the j.a.panese, committed suicide.

The fall of Weihaiwei ended the war. It had lasted seven and a half months, and during that time the j.a.panese had operated with five columns aggregating 120,000 men. "One of these columns marched northward from Seoul, won the battle of Pyong-yang, advanced to the Yalu, forced its way into Manchuria, and moved towards Mukden by Feng-hw.a.n.g, fighting several minor engagements, and conducting the greater part of its operations amid deep snow in midwinter. The second column diverged westward from the Yalu, and, marching through southern Manchuria, reached Haicheng, whence it advanced to the capture of Niuchw.a.n.g. The third landed on the Liaotung peninsula, and, turning southward, carried Talien and Port Arthur by a.s.sault.

The fourth moved up the Liaotung peninsula, and, having seized Kaiping, advanced against Niuchw.a.n.g, where it joined hands with the second column. The fifth crossed from Port Arthur to Weihaiwei, which it captured." In all these operations the j.a.panese casualties totalled 1005 killed and 4922 wounded; the deaths from disease aggregated 16,866, and the monetary expenditure amounted to twenty millions sterling, about $100,000,000. It had been almost universally believed that, although j.a.pan might have some success at the outset, she would ultimately be shattered by impact with the enormous ma.s.s and the overwhelming resources of China. Never was forecast more signally contradicted by events.

CONCLUSION OF PEACE

Li Hung-chang, viceroy of Pehchili, whose troops had been chiefly engaged during the war, and who had been mainly responsible for the diplomacy that had led up to it, was sent by China as plenipotentiary to discuss terms of peace. The conference took place at s.h.i.+monoseki, j.a.pan being represented by Marquis (afterwards Prince) Ito, and on the 17th of April, 1895, the treaty was signed. It recognized the independence of Korea; ceded to j.a.pan the littoral of Manchuria lying south of a line drawn from the mouth of the river Anping to the estuary of the Liao, together with the islands of Formosa and the Pescadores; pledged China to pay an indemnity of two hundred million taels; provided for the occupation of Weihaiwei by j.a.pan pending payment of that sum; secured the opening of four new places to foreign trade and the right of foreigners to engage in manufacturing enterprises in China, and provided for a treaty of commerce and amity between the two empires, based on the lines of China's treaty with Occidental powers.

FOREIGN INTERFERENCE

Scarcely was the ink dry upon this agreement when Russia, Germany, and France presented a joint note to the Tokyo Government, urging that the permanent occupation of the Manchurian littoral by j.a.pan would endanger peace. j.a.pan had no choice but to bow to this mandate.

The Chinese campaign had exhausted her treasury as well as her supplies of war material, and it would have been hopeless to oppose a coalition of three great European powers. She showed no sign of hesitation. On the very day of the ratified treaty's publication, the Emperor of j.a.pan issued a rescript, in which, after avowing his devotion to the cause of peace, he "yielded to the dictates of magnanimity, and accepted the advice of the three powers."

But although the Tokyo Government sought to soften the situation by the grace of speedy acquiescence, the effect produced upon the nation was profound. There was no difficulty in appreciating the motives of Russia and France. It was natural that the former should object to the propinquity of a warlike people like the j.a.panese, and it was natural that France should remain true to her ally. But Germany's case defied interpretation. She had no interest in the owners.h.i.+p of Manchuria, and she professed herself a warm friend of j.a.pan. It seemed, therefore, that she had joined in s.n.a.t.c.hing from the lips of the j.a.panese the fruits of their victory simply for the sake of establis.h.i.+ng some shadowy t.i.tle to Russia's good-will.

THE CHINESE CRISIS OF 1900

In the second half of the year 1900 an anti-foreign outbreak, known as the "Boxer Rebellion," broke out in the province of Shantung, and, spreading thence to Pehchili, produced a situation of imminent peril for the foreign communities of Peking and Tientsin. No Western power could intervene with sufficient promptness. j.a.pan alone was within easy reach of the commotion. But j.a.pan held back. She had fully fathomed the distrust with which the growth of her military strength had inspired some European nations, and she appreciated the wisdom of not seeming to grasp at an opportunity for armed display. In fact, she awaited a clear mandate from Europe and America, and, on receiving it, she rapidly sent a division (20,000 men) to Pehchili.

Tientsin was relieved first, and then a column of troops provided by several powers, the j.a.panese in the van, marched to the succour of Peking. In this campaign the j.a.panese greatly enhanced their belligerent reputation as they fought under the eyes of competent military critics. Moreover, after the relief of the legations in Peking, they withdrew one-half of their forces, and they subsequently cooperated heartily with Western powers in negotiating peace terms, thus disarming the suspicions with which they had been regarded at first.

WAR WITH RUSSIA

From the time (1895) when the three-power mandate dictated to j.a.pan a cardinal alteration of the s.h.i.+monoseki treaty, j.a.panese statesmen concluded that their country must one day cross swords with Russia.

Not a few Occidental publicists shared that view, but the great majority, arguing that the little Island Empire of the Far East would never risk annihilation by such an encounter, believed that forbearance sufficient to avert serious trouble would always be forthcoming on j.a.pan's side. Yet neither geographical nor historical conditions warranted that confidence. The Sea of j.a.pan, which, on the east, washes the sh.o.r.es of the j.a.panese islands and on the west those of Russia and Korea, has virtually only two routes communicating with the Pacific Ocean. One is in the north, namely, the Tsugaru Strait; the other is in the south, namely, the channel between the Korean peninsula and the j.a.panese island of Kyushu. Tsugaru Strait is practically under j.a.pan's complete control; she can close it at any moment with mines. But the channel between the Korean peninsula and Kyushu has a width of 102 miles, and would therefore be a fine open seaway were it free from islands. Midway in this channel, however, lie the twin islands of Tsus.h.i.+ma, and the s.p.a.ce that separates them from j.a.pan is narrowed by another island, Iki. Tsus.h.i.+ma and Iki have belonged to j.a.pan from time immemorial, and thus the avenues from the Pacific Ocean to the Sea of j.a.pan are controlled by the j.a.panese empire. In other words, access to the Pacific from Korea's eastern and southern coasts, and access to the Pacific from Russia's Maritime Province depend upon j.a.pan's good-will.

These geographical conditions had no great concern for Korea in former days. But with Russia the case was different. Vladivostok, the princ.i.p.al port in the Far East, lay at the southern extremity of the Maritime Province. Freedom of pa.s.sage by the Tsus.h.i.+ma Strait was therefore a matter of vital importance, and to secure it one of two things was essential, namely, that she herself should possess a fortified port on the Korean side, or that j.a.pan should be restrained from acquiring such a port. Here, then, was a strong inducement for Russian aggression in Korea. When the eastward movement of the great northern power brought it to the mouth of the Amur, the acquisition of Nikolaievsk for a naval basis was the immediate reward. But Nikolaievsk, lying in an inhospitable region, far away from all the main routes of the world's commerce, offered itself only as a stepping-stone to further acquisitions. To push southward from this new port became an immediate object.

There lay an obstacle in the way. The long strip of seacoast from the mouth of the Amur to the Korean frontier--an area then called the Usuri region because that river forms part of its western boundary--belonged to China, and she, having conceded much to Russia in the way of the Amur, showed no inclination to make further concessions in the matter of the Usuri. She was persuaded to agree, however, that the region should be regarded as common property, pending a convenient opportunity for clear delimitation. That opportunity soon came. Seizing the moment (1860) when China had been beaten to her knees by England and France, Russia secured the final cession of the Usuri region, which then became the Maritime Province of Siberia. Then Russia s.h.i.+fted her naval basis in the Pacific to a point ten degrees south from Nikolaievsk, namely, Vladivostok.

Immediately after this transfer an attempt was made to obtain possession of Tsus.h.i.+ma. A Russian man-of-war proceeded thither, and quietly began to establish a settlement which would soon have const.i.tuted a t.i.tle of owners.h.i.+p had not Great Britain interfered.

The same instinct that led Russia from the mouth of the Amur to Vladivostok prompted the acquisition of Saghalien also, which, as already related, was accomplished in 1875.

But all this effort did not procure for Russia an un.o.bstructed avenue from Vladivostok to the Pacific or an ice-free port in the Far East.

In Korea seemed to lie a facile hope of saving the maritime results of Russia's great trans-Asian march from Lake Baikal to the Maritime Province and to Saghalien. Korea seemed to offer every facility for such an enterprise. Her people were unprogressive; her resources undeveloped; her self-defensive capacities insignificant; her government corrupt. On the other hand, it could not be expected that j.a.pan and China would acquiesce in any aggressions against their neighbour, Korea, and it became necessary that Russia should seek some other line of communication supplementing the Amur waterway and the long ocean route. Therefore she set about the construction of a railway across Asia. This railway had to be carried along the northern bank of the Amur where engineering and economic difficulties abound. Moreover, the river makes a huge semicircular sweep northward, and a railway following its northern bank to Vladivostok must make the same detour. If, on the contrary, the road could be carried south of the river along the diameter of the semicircle, it would be a straight, and therefore a shorter, line, technically easier and economically better. To follow this diameter, however, would involve pa.s.sing through Chinese territory, namely, Manchuria, and an excuse for soliciting China's permission was not in sight. In 1894, however, war broke out between j.a.pan and China, and in its sequel j.a.pan pa.s.sed into possession of the southern littoral of Manchuria, which meant that Russia could never get nearer to the Pacific than Vladivostok, unless she swept j.a.pan from her path. It is here, doubtless, that we must find Russia's true motive in inducing Germany and France to unite with her for the purpose of ousting j.a.pan from Manchuria. The "notice to quit" gave for reasons that the tenure of the Manchurian littoral by j.a.pan would menace the security of the Chinese capital, would render the independence of Korea illusory, and would const.i.tute an obstacle to the peace of the Orient. Only one saving clause offered for j.a.pan--to obtain from China a guarantee that no portion of Manchuria should thereafter be leased or ceded to a foreign State. But France warned the Tokyo Government that to press for such a guarantee would offend Russia, and Russia declared that, for her part, she entertained no design of trespa.s.sing in Manchuria.

Thus, j.a.pan had no choice but to surrender quietly the main fruits of her victory. She did so, and proceeded to double her army and treble her navy.

RUSSIA'S AND GERMANY'S REWARDS

As a recompense for the a.s.sistance nominally rendered to China in the above matter, Russia obtained permission in Peking to divert her trans-Asian railway from the huge bend of the Amur to the straight line through Manchuria. Neither Germany nor France received any immediate compensation. But three years later, by way of indemnity for the murder of two missionaries by a Chinese mob, Germany seized a portion of the province of Shantung, and forthwith Russia obtained a lease of the Liaotung peninsula, from which she had driven j.a.pan in 1895. This act she followed by extorting from China permission to construct a branch of the trans-Asian railway from north to south, that is to say from Harbin through Mukden to Talien and Port Arthur.

Russia's maritime aspirations had now a.s.sumed a radically altered phase. Hitherto her programme had been to push southward from Vladivostok along the coast of Korea, but she had now suddenly leaped Korea and found access to the Pacific by the Liaotung peninsula.

Nothing was wanting to establish her as practical mistress of Manchuria except a plausible excuse for garrisoning the place. Such an excuse was furnished by the Boxer rising, in 1900. The conclusion of that complication found her in practical occupation of the whole region. But here her diplomacy fell somewhat from its usually high standard. Imagining that the Chinese could be persuaded, or intimidated, to any concession, she proposed a convention virtually recognizing her t.i.tle to Manchuria.

j.a.pAN'S ATt.i.tUDE

j.a.pan watched all these things with profound anxiety. If there were any reality in the dangers which Russia, Germany, and France had declared to be incidental to j.a.panese occupation of a part of Manchuria, the same dangers must be doubly incidental to Russian occupation of the whole of Manchuria. There were other considerations, also. The reasons already adduced show that the independence of Korea was an object of supreme solicitude to j.a.pan.

It was to establish that independence that she fought with China, in 1894, and the same motive led her after the war to annex the Manchurian littoral adjacent to Korea's northern frontier. If Russia came into possession of all Manchuria, her subsequent absorption of Korea would be almost inevitable. Manchuria is larger than France and the United Kingdom put together. The addition of such an immense area to Russia's East Asiatic dominions, together with its littoral on the Gulf of Pehchili and the Yellow Sea, would necessitate a corresponding expansion of her naval force in the Far East. With the exception of Port Arthur and Talien, however, the Manchurian coast does not offer any convenient naval base. It is only in the harbours of southern Korea that such bases can be found. In short, without Korea, Russia's East Asian extension would have been economically incomplete and strategically defective.

If it be asked why, apart from history and national sentiment, j.a.pan should object to Russia in Korea, the answer is, first, because there would thus be planted almost within cannon-shot of her sh.o.r.es a power of enormous strength and traditional ambition; secondly, because whatever voice in Manchuria's destiny Russia derived from her railway, the same voice in Korea's destiny was possessed by j.a.pan, as the sole owner of the railways in the Korean peninsula; thirdly, that whereas Russia had an altogether insignificant share in the foreign commerce of Korea and scarcely ten bona fide settlers, j.a.pan did the greater part of the oversea trade and had tens of thousands of settlers; fourthly, that if Russia's dominions stretched uninterruptedly from the sea of Okhotsk to the Gulf of Pehchili, her ultimate absorption of northern China would be inevitable, and fifthly, that such domination and such absorption would involve the practical closure of all that immense region to the commerce and industry of every Western nation except Russia.

This last proposition did not rest solely on the fact that in opposing artificial barriers to free compet.i.tion lies Russia's sole hope of utilizing, to her own benefit, any commercial opportunities brought within her reach. It rested, also, on the fact that Russia had objected to foreign settlement at the Manchurian marts recently opened, by j.a.pan's treaty with China, to American and j.a.panese subjects. Without settlements, trade at those marts would be impossible, and thus Russia had constructively announced that there should be no trade but the Russian, if she could prevent it. Against such dangers j.a.pan would have been justified in adopting any measure of self-protection. She had foreseen them for six years and had been strengthening herself to avert them. But she wanted peace. She wanted to develop her material resources and to acc.u.mulate some measure of wealth without which she must remain insignificant among the nations.

Two pacific programmes offered and she adopted them both. Russia, instead of trusting time to consolidate her tenure of Manchuria, had made the mistake of pragmatically importuning China for a conventional t.i.tle. If, then, Peking could be strengthened to resist this demand, some arrangement of a distinctly terminable nature might be made. The United States, Great Britain, and j.a.pan, joining hands for that purpose, did succeed in so far stiffening China's backbone that her show of resolution finally induced Russia to sign a treaty pledging herself to withdraw her troops from Manchuria in three installments, each step of evacuation to be accomplished by a fixed date. That was one of the pacific programmes. The other suggested itself in connexion with the new commercial treaties which China had agreed to negotiate in the sequel of the Boxer troubles. These doc.u.ments contained clauses providing for the opening of three places in Manchuria to foreign trade. It seemed a reasonable hope that the powers, having secured commercial access to Manchuria by covenant with its sovereign, would not allow Russia to restrict arbitrarily their privileges. Both of these hopes were disappointed. When the time came for evacuation, Russia behaved as though no promise had been given. She proposed new conditions which would have strengthened her grasp of Manchuria instead of loosening it.

NEGOTIATION BETWEEN RUSSIA AND j.a.pAN

China being powerless to offer any practical protest, and j.a.pan's interest ranking next in order of importance, the Tokyo Government approached Russia direct. They did not ask for anything that could hurt her pride or impair her position. Appreciating fully the economical status she had acquired in Manchuria by large outlays of capital, they offered to recognize that status, provided that Russia would extend similar recognition to j.a.pan's status in Korea; would promise, in common with j.a.pan, to respect the sovereignty and the territorial integrity of China and Korea, and would be a party to a mutual engagement that all nations should have equal commercial and industrial opportunities in Manchuria and in the Korean peninsula. In a word, they invited Russia to subscribe the policy originally enunciated by the United States and Great Britain, the policy of the open door and of the integrity of the Chinese and Korean empires.

Thus commenced negotiations which lasted five and a half months.

j.a.pan gradually reduced her demands to a minimum. Russia never made any appreciable reduction of hers. She refused to listen to j.a.pan for one moment about Manchuria. Eight years previously, j.a.pan had been in military possession of the littoral of Manchuria when Russia, with the a.s.sistance of Germany and France, had expelled her for reasons which concerned j.a.pan much more than they concerned any of these three powers. Now, Russia had the a.s.surance to declare that none of these things concerned j.a.pan at all. The utmost she would admit was j.a.pan's partial right to be heard about Korea. At the same time, she herself commenced a series of aggressions in northern Korea. That was not all. While she studiously deferred her answers to j.a.pan's proposals, and while she protracted the negotiations to an extent visibly contemptuous, she hastened to make substantial additions to her fleet and her army in far-eastern Asia. It was impossible to mistake her purpose. She intended to yield nothing, but to prepare such a parade of force that her obduracy would command submission.

The only alternatives for j.a.pan were war or permanent effacement in Asia. She chose war.

EXTRATERRITORIAL JURISDICTION

Before pa.s.sing to the story of this war, it is necessary to refer to two incidents of j.a.pan's foreign relations, both of which preceded her struggle with Russia. The first was the restoration of her judicial autonomy. It has always been regarded as axiomatic that the subjects or citizens of Western countries, when they travel or reside in Oriental territories, should be exempted from the penalties and processes of the latter's criminal laws. In other words, there is reserved to a Christian the privilege, when within the territories of a pagan State, of being tried for penal offences by Christian judges.

In civil cases the jurisdiction is divided, the question at issue being adjudicated by a tribunal of the defendant's nationality; but in criminal cases jurisdiction is wholly reserved. Therefore powers making treaties with Oriental nations establish within the latter's borders consular courts which exercise what is called "extraterritorial jurisdiction." This system was, of course, pursued in j.a.pan's case. It involved the confinement of the foreign residents to settlements grouped around the sites of their consular courts; for it would plainly have been imprudent that such residents should have free access to provincial districts remote from the only tribunals competent to control them.

This provision, though inserted without difficulty in the early treaties with j.a.pan, provoked much indignation among the conservative statesmen in Kyoto. Accordingly, no sooner had the Meiji Restoration been effected than an emba.s.sy was despatched to the Occident to negotiate for a revision of the treaties so as to remove the clause about consular jurisdiction, and to restore the customs tariff to the figure at which it had stood prior to Sir Harry Parkes' naval demonstration at Hyogo. The j.a.panese Government was ent.i.tled to raise this question in 1871, for the treaties were textually subject to revision in that year. No time was lost in despatching the emba.s.sy.

But its failure was a foregone conclusion. The conditions originally necessitating extraterritorial jurisdiction had not, by 1871 undergone any change justifying its abolition. It is not to be denied, on the other hand, that the consular courts themselves invited criticism. Some of the great Western powers had organized competent tribunals with expert judicial officials, but others, whose trade with j.a.pan was comparatively insignificant, were content to entrust consular duties to merchants, who not only lacked legal training but were also themselves engaged in the commercial transactions upon which they might, at any moment, be required to adjudicate magisterially.

ENGRAVING: DANJURO, A FAMOUS ACTOR, AS BENKEI IN KANJINCHO (A PLAY)

It cannot be contended that this obviously imperfect system was disfigured by many abuses. On the whole, it worked pa.s.sably well, and if its organic faults helped to discredit it, there is no denying that it saved the j.a.panese from complications which would inevitably have arisen had they been entrusted with jurisdiction which they were not prepared to exercise satisfactorily. Moreover, the system had vicarious usefulness; for the ardent desire of j.a.panese patriots to recover the judicial autonomy, which is a fundamental attribute of every sovereign State, impelled them to recast their laws and reorganize their law courts with a degree of diligence which would otherwise have probably been less conspicuous. Twelve years of this work, carried on with the aid of thoroughly competent foreign jurists, placed j.a.pan in possession of codes of criminal and civil law in which the best features of European jurisprudence were applied to the conditions and usages of j.a.pan. Then, in 1883, j.a.pan renewed her proposal for the abolition of consular jurisdiction, and by way of compensation she promised to throw the country completely open and to remove all restrictions. .h.i.therto imposed on foreign trade, travel, and residence within her realm.

But this was a problem against whose liberal solution the international prejudice of the West was strongly enlisted. No Oriental State had ever previously sought such recognition, and the Occident, without exception, was extremely reluctant to entrust the lives and properties of its subjects and citizens to the keeping of a "pagan" people. Not unnaturally the foreigners resident in j.a.pan, who would have been directly affected by the change, protested against it with great vehemence. Many of them, though not averse to trusting j.a.pan, saw that her reforms had been consummated with celerity amounting to haste, and a great majority fought simply for consular jurisdiction as a privilege of inestimable value, not to be surrendered without the utmost deliberation. The struggle that ensued between foreign distrust and j.a.panese aspirations often developed painful phases, and did much to intensify the feeling of antagonism which had existed between the j.a.panese and the foreign residents at the outset and which even to-day has not wholly disappeared. The Government and citizens of the United States of America never failed to show sympathy with j.a.panese aspirations in this matter, and, as a general rule, "foreign tourists and publicists discussed the problem liberally and fairly, perhaps because, unlike the foreign communities resident in j.a.pan, they had no direct interest in its solution."

The end was not reached until 1894. Then Great Britain agreed that from July, 1899, jurisdiction over all British subjects within the confines of j.a.pan should be entrusted to j.a.panese tribunals, provided that the new j.a.panese codes of law should have been in operation during at least one year before the surrender of jurisdiction. j.a.pan, on her side, promised to throw the whole country open from the same date, removing all limitations upon trade, travel, and residence of foreigners.

Tariff autonomy had been an almost equal object of j.a.panese ambition, and it was arranged that she should recover it after a period of twelve years, an increased scale of import duties being applied in the interval. It will be observed that Great Britain took the lead in abandoning the old system. It was meet that she should do so; for, in consequence of her preponderating commercial interests, she had stood at the head of the combination of powers by which the irksome conditions were originally imposed upon j.a.pan. The other Occidental States followed her example with more or less celerity, and the foreign residents, now that nothing was to be gained by continuing the struggle, showed clearly that they intended to bow gracefully to the inevitable. The j.a.panese also took some conspicuous steps.

"An Imperial rescript declared in unequivocal terms that it was the sovereign's policy and desire to abolish all distinctions between natives and foreigners, and that, by fully carrying out the friendly purpose of the treaties, his people would best consult his wishes, maintain the character of the nation, and promote its prestige. The premier and other ministers of State issued instructions to the effect that the responsibility now devolved on the Government, and the duty on the people, of enabling foreigners to reside confidently and contentedly in every part of the country. Even the chief Buddhist prelates addressed to the priests and paris.h.i.+oners of their dioceses injunctions pointing out that freedom of conscience being now guaranteed by the Const.i.tution, men professing alien creeds must be treated as courteously as the disciples of Buddhism and must enjoy the same privileges."*

*Brinkley, article "j.a.pan," Encyclopaedia Britannica, 11th Edition.

It may here be stated once for all that j.a.pan's recovery of her judicial autonomy has not been attended by any of the disastrous results freely predicted at one time. Her laws are excellent, and her judiciary is competent and just.

FIRST ANGLO-j.a.pANESE ALLIANCE

The second of the two incidents alluded to above was an alliance between England and j.a.pan, signed on January 30, 1902. The preamble of this agreement--the first of its kind ever concluded between England and an Oriental power--affirmed that the contracting parties were solely actuated by a desire to preserve the status quo and the general peace of the Far East; that they were both specially interested in maintaining the independence and territorial integrity of the empires of China and Korea, and in securing equal opportunities in these countries for all nations; that they mutually recognized it as admissible for either of the contracting parties to take such measures as might be indispensable to safeguard these interests against a threat of aggressive action by any other power, or against disturbances in China or Korea, and that, if one of the contracting parties became involved in war in defence of these interests, the other should maintain strict neutrality and endeavour to prevent any third power from joining in hostilities against its ally. Finally, should a third power join in such hostilities, then the other contracting party promised to come to the a.s.sistance of its ally, to conduct the war in common, and to make peace by mutual agreement only. The alliance was to hold good for five years from the date of signature, but if either ally was engaged in war at such time, the alliance was to continue until the conclusion of peace.

It is unnecessary to dwell upon the influence exerted by this compact on the Russo-j.a.panese war. It kept the field clear for j.a.pan and guaranteed her against a repet.i.tion of such a combination as that which must be regarded as the remote cause of the struggle.

THE EARLY PHASES OF THE WAR

j.a.pan's great problem in crossing swords with Russia was to obtain a safe avenue for her troops over the sea. Russia might at once have gained an overwhelming advantage had she seized and controlled the lines of communication between the j.a.panese islands and the continent of Asia. Her strategists can scarcely have failed to appreciate that fact, and would doubtless have acted accordingly had they obtained a few months' leisure to ma.s.s an overwhelmingly strong fleet in the seas of China and j.a.pan. They had such a fleet actually in esse; for, at the moment when war broke out, the Russian squadrons a.s.sembled in the East, or en route thither, comprised no less than fifty-nine fighting s.h.i.+ps, mounting 1350 guns and manned by 18,000 men. But these figures included the Mediterranean squadron which, surprised by the outbreak of hostilities, abandoned its journey to the Pacific.

Obviously, j.a.pan's wisest course was to antic.i.p.ate the combination of Russia's sea forces, and consciousness of that fact operated to hasten the current of events.