The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja Part 25

5. But (there is) denotation of the superintending (deities), on account of distinction and entering.

The word 'but' is meant to set aside the objection started. In texts such as 'to him the earth said,' the terms 'earth' and so on, denote the divinities presiding over earth and the rest.--How is this known?--'

Through distinction and connexion.' For earth and so on are denoted by the distinctive term 'divinities'; so e.g. 'Let me enter into those three divinities' (Ch. Up. VI, 3, 2), where fire, water, and earth are called divinities; and Kau. Up. II, 14, 'All divinities contending with each other as to pre-eminence,' and 'all these divinities having recognised pre-eminence in prana.' The 'entering' of the Sutra refers to Ait. Ar. II, 4, 2, 4, 'Agni having become speech entered into the mouth; Aditya having become sight entered into the eyes,' &c., where the text declares that Agni and other divine beings entered into the sense-organs as their superintendents.

We therefore adhere to our conclusion that the world, being non- intelligent and hence essentially different in nature from Brahman, cannot be the effect of Brahman; and that therefore, in agreement with Smriti confirmed by reasoning, the Vedanta-texts must be held to teach that the Pradhana is the universal material cause. This prima facie view is met by the following Sutra.

6. But it is seen.

The 'but' indicates the change of view (introduced in the present Sutra).

The a.s.sertion that Brahman cannot be the material cause of the world because the latter differs from it in essential nature, is unfounded; since it is a matter of observation that even things of different nature stand to each other in the relation of cause and effect. For it is observed that from honey and similar substances there originate worms and other little animals.--But it has been said above that in those cases there is sameness of nature, in so far as the relation of cause and effect holds good only between the non-intelligent elements in both!-- This a.s.sertion was indeed made, but it does not suffice to prove that equality of character between cause and effect which you have in view.

For, being apprehensive that from the demand of equality of character in some point or other only it would follow that, as all things have certain characteristics in common, anything might originate from anything, you have declared that the equality of character necessary for the relation of cause and effect is const.i.tuted by the persistence, in the effect, of those characteristic points which differentiate the cause from other things. But it is evident that this restrictive rule does not hold good in the case of the origination of worms and the like from honey and so on; and hence it is not unreasonable to a.s.sume that the world also, although differing in character from Brahman, may originate from the latter. For in the case of worms originating from honey, scorpions from dung, &c., we do _not_ observe--what indeed we _do_ observe in certain other cases, as of pots made of clay, ornaments made of gold--that the special characteristics distinguis.h.i.+ng the causal substance from other things persist in the effects also.

7. If it be said that (the effect is) non-existing; we say no, there being a mere denial.

But, an objection is raised, if Brahman, the cause, differs in nature from the effect, viz. the world, this means that cause and effect are separate things and that hence the effect does not exist in the cause, i.

e. Brahman; and this again implies that the world originates from what has no existence!--Not so, we reply. For what the preceding Sutra has laid down is merely the denial of an absolute rule demanding that cause and effect should be of the same nature; it was not a.s.serted that the effect is a thing altogether different and separate from the cause. We by no means abandon our tenet that Brahman the cause modifies itself so as to a.s.sume the form of a world differing from it in character. For such is the case with the honey and the worms also. There is difference of characteristics, but--as in the case of gold and golden bracelets-- there is oneness of substance.--An objection is raised.

8. On account of such consequences in reabsorption (the Vedanta-texts would be) inappropriate.

The term 'reabsorption' here stands as an instance of all the states of Brahman, reabsorption, creation, and so on--among which it is the first as appears from the texts giving instruction about those several states 'Being only was this in the beginning'; 'The Self only was this in the beginning.' If we accept the doctrine of the oneness of substance of cause and effect, then, absorption, creation, &c. of the world all being in Brahman, the different states of the world would connect themselves with Brahman, and the latter would thus be affected by all the imperfections of its effect; in the same way as all the attributes of the bracelet are present in the gold also. And the undesirable consequence of this would be that contradictory attributes as predicated in different Vedanta-texts would have to be attributed to one and the same substance; cp. 'He who is all-knowing' (Mu. Up. I, 1, 9); 'Free from sin, free from old age and death' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1, 5); 'Of him there is known neither cause nor effect' (Svet. Up. VI, 8); 'Of these two one eats the sweet fruit' (Svet. Up. IV, 6); 'The Self that is not a Lord is bound because he has to enjoy' (Svet. Up. I, 8); 'On account of his impotence he laments, bewildered' (Svet. Up. IV, 7).--Nor can we accept the explanation that, as Brahman in its causal as well as its effected state has all sentient and non-sentient beings for its body; and as all imperfections inhere in that body only, they do not touch Brahman in either its causal or effected state. For it is not possible that the world and Brahman should stand to each other in the relation of effect and cause, and if it were possible, the imperfections due to connexion with a body would necessarily cling to Brahman. It is not, we say, possible that the intelligent and non-intelligent beings together should const.i.tute the body of Brahman. For a body is a particular aggregate of earth and the other elements, depending for its subsistence on vital breath with its five modifications, and serving as an abode to the sense-organs which mediate the experiences of pleasure and pain retributive of former works: such is in Vedic and worldly speech the sense connected with the term 'body.' But numerous Vedic texts--'Free from sin, from old age and death' (Ch. Up. VIII, 1); 'Without eating the other one looks on' (Svet. Up. IV, 6); 'Grasping without hands, hasting without feet, he sees without eyes, he hears without ears' (Svet. Up.

III, 19); 'Without breath, without mind' (Mu. Up. II, 1, 2)--declare that the highest Self is free from karman and the enjoyment of its fruits, is not capable of enjoyment dependent on sense-organs, and has no life dependent on breath: whence it follows that he cannot have a body const.i.tuted by all the non-sentient and sentient beings. Nor can either non-sentient beings in their individual forms such as gra.s.s, trees, &c., or the aggregate of all the elements in their subtle state be viewed as the abode of sense-activity (without which they cannot const.i.tute a body); nor are the elements in their subtle state combined into earth and the other gross elements (which again would be required for a body). And sentient beings which consist of mere intelligence are of course incapable of all this, and hence even less fit to const.i.tute a body. Nor may it be said that to have a body merely means to be the abode of fruition, and that Brahman may possess a body in this latter sense; for there are abodes of fruition, such as palaces and the like, which are not considered to be bodies. Nor will it avail, narrowing the last definition, to say that that only is an abode of enjoyment directly abiding in which a being enjoys pain and pleasure; for if a soul enters a body other than its own, that body is indeed the abode in which it enjoys the pains and pleasures due to such entering, but is not admitted to be in the proper sense of the word the _body_ of the soul thus entered. In the case of the Lord, on the other hand, who is in the enjoyment of self-established supreme bliss, it can in no way be maintained that he must be joined to a body, consisting of all sentient and non-sentient beings, for the purpose of enjoyment.--That view also according to which a 'body' means no more than a _means_ of enjoyment is refuted hereby.

You will now possibly try another definition, viz. that the body of a being is const.i.tuted by that, the nature, subsistence and activity of which depend on the will of that being, and that hence a body may be ascribed to the Lord in so far as the essential nature, subsistence, and activity of all depend on him.--But this also is objectionable; since in the first place it is not a fact that the nature of a body depends on the will of the intelligent soul joined with it; since, further, an injured body does not obey in its movements the will of its possessor; and since the persistence of a dead body does not depend on the soul that tenanted it. Dancing puppets and the like, on the other hand, are things the nature, subsistence, and motions of which depend on the will of intelligent beings, but we do not on that account consider them to be the bodies of those beings. As, moreover, the nature of an eternal intelligent soul does not depend on the will of the Lord, it cannot be its body under the present definition.--Nor again can it be said that the body of a being is const.i.tuted by that which is exclusively ruled and supported by that being and stands towards it in an exclusive subservient relation (sesha); for this definition would include actions also. And finally it is a fact that several texts definitely declare that the Lord is without a body, 'Without hands and feet he grasps and hastens' &c.

As thus the relation of embodied being and body cannot subsist between Brahman and the world, and as if it did subsist, all the imperfections of the world would cling to Brahman; the Vedanta--texts are wrong in teaching that Brahman is the material cause of the world.

To this prima facie view the next Sutra replies.

9. Not so; as there are parallel instances.

The teaching of the Vedanta-texts is not inappropriate, since there are instances of good and bad qualities being separate in the case of one thing connected with two different states. The 'but' in the Sutra indicates the impossibility of Brahman being connected with even a shadow of what is evil. The meaning is as follows. As Brahman has all sentient and non-sentient things for its body, and const.i.tutes the Self of that body, there is nothing contrary to reason in Brahman being connected with two states, a causal and an effected one, the essential characteristics of which are expansion on the one hand and contraction on the other; for this expansion and contraction belong (not to Brahman itself, but) to the sentient and non-sentient beings. The imperfections adhering to the body do not affect Brahman, and the good qualities belonging to the Self do not extend to the body; in the same way as youth, childhood, and old age, which are attributes of embodied beings, such as G.o.ds or men, belong to the body only, not to the embodied Self; while knowledge, pleasure and so on belong to the conscious Self only, not to the body. On this understanding there is no objection to expressions such as 'he is born as a G.o.d or as a man' and 'the same person is a child, and then a youth, and then an old man' That the character of a G.o.d or man belongs to the individual soul only in so far as it has a body, will be shown under III, 1, 1.

The a.s.sertion made by the Purvapaks.h.i.+n as to the impossibility of the world, comprising matter and souls and being either in its subtle or its gross condition, standing to Brahman in the relation of a body, we declare to be the vain outcome of altogether vicious reasoning springing from the idle fancies of persons who have never fully considered the meaning of the whole body of Vedanta-texts as supported by legitimate argumentation. For as a matter of fact all Vedanta-texts distinctly declare that the entire world, subtle or gross, material or spiritual, stands to the highest Self in the relation of a body. Compare e.g.the antaryamin-brahmana, in the Kanva as well as the Madhyandina-text, where it is said first of non-sentient things ('he who dwells within the earth, whose body the earth is' &c.), and afterwards separately of the intelligent soul ('he who dwells in understanding,' according to the Kanvas; 'he who dwells within the Self,' according to the Madhyandinas) that they const.i.tute the body of the highest Self. Similarly the Subala- Upanishad declares that matter and souls in all their states const.i.tute the body of the highest Self ('He who dwells within the earth' &c.), and concludes by saying that that Self is the soul of all those beings ('He is the inner Self of all' &c.). Similarly Smriti, 'The whole world is thy body'; 'Water is the body of Vishnu'; 'All this is the body of Hari'; 'All these things are his body'; 'He having reflected sent forth from his body'--where the 'body' means the elements in their subtle state. In ordinary language the word 'body' is not, like words such as _jar_, limited in its denotation to things of one definite make or character, but is observed to be applied directly (not only secondarily or metaphorically) to things of altogether different make and characteristics--such as worms, insects, moths, snakes, men, four-footed animals, and so on. We must therefore aim at giving a definition of the word that is in agreement with general use. The definitions given by the Purvapaks.h.i.+n--'a body is that which causes the enjoyment of the fruit of actions' &c.--do not fulfil this requirement; for they do not take in such things as earth and the like which the texts declare to be the body of the Lord. And further they do not take in those bodily forms which the Lord a.s.sumes according to his wish, nor the bodily forms released souls may a.s.sume, according to 'He is one' &c. (Ch. Up. VII, 36, 2); for none of those embodiments subserve the fruition of the results of actions. And further, the bodily forms which the Supreme Person a.s.sumes at wish are not special combinations of earth and the other elements; for Smriti says, 'The body of that highest Self is not made from a combination of the elements.' It thus appears that it is also too narrow a definition to say that a body is a combination of the different elements. Again, to say that a body is that, the life of which depends on the vital breath with its five modifications is also too narrow, viz in respect of plants; for although vital air is present in plants, it does not in them support the body by appearing in five special forms.

Nor again does it answer to define a body as either the abode of the sense-organs or as the cause of pleasure and pain; for neither of these definitions takes in the bodies of stone or wood which were bestowed on Ahalya and other persons in accordance with their deeds. We are thus led to adopt the following definition--Any substance which a sentient soul is capable of completely controlling and supporting for its own purposes, and which stands to the soul in an entirely subordinate relation, is the body of that soul. In the case of bodies injured, paralysed, &c., control and so on are not actually perceived because the power of control, although existing, is obstructed; in the same way as, owing to some obstruction, the powers of fire, heat, and so on may not be actually perceived. A dead body again begins to decay at the very moment in which the soul departs from it, and is actually dissolved shortly after; it (thus strictly speaking is not a body at all but) is spoken of as a body because it is a part of the aggregate of matter which previously const.i.tuted a body. In this sense, then, all sentient and non-sentient beings together const.i.tute the body of the Supreme Person, for they are completely controlled and supported by him for his own ends, and are absolutely subordinate to him. Texts which speak of the highest Self as 'bodiless among bodies' (e.g. Ka. Up. I. 2, 22), only mean to deny of the Self a body due to karman; for as we have seen, Scripture declares that the Universe is his body. This point will be fully established in subsequent adhikaranas also. The two preceding Sutras (8 and 9) merely suggest the matter proved in the adhikarana beginning with II, 1, 21.

10. And on account of the objections to his view.

The theory of Brahman being the universal cause has to be accepted not only because it is itself free from objections, but also because the pradhana theory is open to objections, and hence must be abandoned. For on this latter theory the origination of the world cannot be accounted for. The Sankhyas hold that owing to the soul's approximation to Prakriti the attributes of the latter are fict.i.tiously superimposed upon the soul which in itself consists entirely of pure intelligence free from all change, and that thereon depends the origination of the empirical world. Now here we must raise the question as to the nature of that approximation or nearness of Prakriti which causes the superimposition on the changeless soul of the attributes of Prakriti.

Does that nearness mean merely the existence of Prakriti or some change in Prakriti? or does it mean some change in the soul?--Not the latter; for the soul is a.s.sumed to be incapable of change.--Nor again a change in Prakriti; for changes in Prakriti are supposed, in the system, to be the effects of superimposition, and cannot therefore be its cause. And if, finally, the nearness of Prakriti means no more than its existence, it follows that even the released soul would be liable to that superimposition (for Prakriti exists always).--The Sankhya is thus unable to give a rational account of the origination of the world. This same point will be treated of fully in connexion with the special refutation of the Sankhya theory. (II, 2, 6.)

11. Also in consequence of the ill-foundedness of reasoning.

The theory, resting on Scripture, of Brahman being the universal cause must be accepted, and the theory of the Pradhana must be abandoned, because all (mere) reasoning is ill-founded. This latter point is proved by the fact that the arguments set forth by Buddha, Kanada, Akshapada, Jina, Kapila and Patanjali respectively are all mutually contradictory.

12. Should it be said that inference is to be carried on in a different way; (we reply that) thus also it follows that (the objection raised) is not got rid of.

Let us then view the matter as follows. The arguments actually set forth by Buddha and others may have to be considered as invalid, but all the same we may arrive at the Pradhana theory through other lines of reasoning by which the objections raised against the theory are refuted.-- But, we reply, this also is of no avail. A theory which rests exclusively on arguments derived from human reason may, at some other time or place, be disestablished by arguments devised by people more skilful than you in reasoning; and thus there is no getting over the objection founded on the invalidity of all mere argumentation. The conclusion from all this is that, with regard to supersensuous matters, Scripture alone is authoritative, and that reasoning is to be applied only to the support of Scripture. In agreement herewith Manu says, 'He who supports the teaching of the Ris.h.i.+s and the doctrine as to sacred duty with arguments not conflicting with the Veda, he alone truly knows sacred duty' (Manu XII, 106). The teaching of the Sankhyas which conflicts with the Veda cannot therefore be used for the purpose of confirming and elucidating the meaning of the Veda.--Here finishes the section treating of 'difference of nature.'

13. Thereby also the remaining (theories) which are not comprised (within the Veda) are explained.

Not comprised means those theories which are not known to be comprised within (countenanced by) the Veda. The Sutra means to say that by the demolition given above of the Sankhya doctrine which is not comprised within the Veda the remaining theories which are in the same position, viz. the theories of Kanada, Akshapada, Jina, and Buddha, must likewise be considered as demolished.

Here, however, a new objection may be raised, on the ground namely that, since all these theories agree in the view of atoms const.i.tuting the general cause, it cannot be said that their reasoning as to the causal substance is ill-founded.--They indeed, we reply, are agreed to that extent, but they are all of them equally founded on Reasoning only, and they are seen to disagree in many ways as to the nature of the atoms which by different schools are held to be either fundamentally void or non-void, having either a merely cognitional or an objective existence, being either momentary or permanent, either of a definite nature or the reverse, either real or unreal, &c. This disagreement proves all those theories to be ill-founded, and the objection is thus disposed of.--Here finishes the section of 'the remaining (theories) non-comprised (within the Veda).'

14. If it be said that from (Brahman) becoming an enjoyer, there follows non-distinction (of Brahman and the individual soul); we reply--it may be as in ordinary life.

The Sankhya here comes forward with a new objection. You maintain, he says, that the highest Brahman has the character either of a cause or an effect according as it has for its body sentient and non-sentient beings in either their subtle or gross state; and that this explains the difference in nature between the individual soul and Brahman. But such difference is not possible, since Brahman, if embodied, at once becomes an enjoying subject (just like the individual soul). For if, possessing a body, the Lord necessarily experiences all pain and pleasure due to embodiedness, no less than the individual soul does.--But we have, under I, 2, 8, refuted the view of the Lord's being liable to experiences of pleasure and pain!--By no means! There you have shown only that the Lord's abiding within the heart of a creature so as to const.i.tute the object of its devotion does not imply fruition on his part of pleasure and pain. Now, however, you maintain that the Lord is embodied just like an individual soul, and the unavoidable inference from this is that, like that soul, he undergoes pleasurable and painful experiences. For we observe that embodied souls, although not capable of partic.i.p.ating in the changing states of the body such as childhood, old age, &c., yet experience pleasures and pains caused by the normal or abnormal condition of the matter const.i.tuting the body. In agreement with this Scripture says, 'As long as he possesses a body there is for him no escape from pleasure and pain; but when he is free of the body then neither pleasure nor pain touches him' (Ch. Up. VIII, 12, 1). As thus, the theory of an embodied Brahman const.i.tuting the universal cause does not allow of a distinction in nature between the Lord and the individual soul; and as, further, the theory of a mere Brahman (i.e. an absolutely h.o.m.ogeneous Brahman) leads to the conclusion that Brahman is the abode of all the imperfections attaching to the world, in the same way as a lump of clay or gold partic.i.p.ates in the imperfections of the thing fas.h.i.+oned out of it; we maintain that the theory of the Pradhana being the general cause is the more valid one.

To this objection the Sutra replies in the words, 'it may be, as in ordinary life.' The desired distinction in nature between the Lord and the individual soul may exist all the same. That a soul experiences pleasures and pains caused by the various states of the body is not due to the fact of its being joined to a body, but to its karman in the form of good and evil deeds. The scriptural text also which you quote refers to that body only which is originated by karman; for other texts ('He is onefold, he is threefold'; 'If he desires the world of the Fathers'; 'He moves about there eating, playing, rejoicing'; Ch. Up. VII, 26, 2; VIII, 2, 1; 12, 3) show that the person who has freed himself from the bondage of karman and become manifest in his true nature is not touched by a shadow of evil while all the same he has a body. The highest Self, which is essentially free from all evil, thus has the entire world in its gross and its subtle form for its body; but being in no way connected with karman it is all the less connected with evil of any kind.--'As in ordinary life.' We observe in ordinary life that while those who either observe or transgress the ordinances of a ruler experience pleasure or pain according as the ruler shows them favour or restrains them, it does not follow from the mere fact of the ruler's having a body that he himself also experiences the pleasure and pain due to the observance or transgression of his commands. The author of the Dramida-bhashya gives expression to the same view, 'As in ordinary life a prince, although staying in a very unpleasant place infested with mosquitoes and full of discomforts of all kind is yet not touched by all these troubles, his body being constantly refreshed by fans and other means of comfort, rules the countries for which he cares and continues to enjoy all possible pleasures, such as fragrant odours and the like; so the Lord of creation, to whom his power serves as an ever-moving fan as it were, is not touched by the evils of that creation, but rules the world of Brahman and the other worlds for which he cares, and continues to enjoy all possible delights.' That the nature of Brahman should undergo changes like a lump of clay or gold we do not admit, since many texts declare Brahman to be free from all change and imperfection.--Others give a different explanation of this Sutra. According to them it refutes the purvapaksha that on the view of Brahman being the general cause the distinction of enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment cannot be accounted for--proving the possibility of such distinction by means of the a.n.a.logous instance of the sea and its waves and flakes of foam. But this interpretation is inappropriate, since for those who hold that creation proceeds from Brahman connected with some power or Nescience or a limiting adjunct (upadhi) no such prima facie view can arise. For on their theory the enjoying subject is that which is conditioned by the power or Nescience or upadhi inhering in the causal substance, and the power or Nescience or upadhi is the object of enjoyment; and as the two are of different nature, they cannot pa.s.s over into each other. The view of Brahman itself undergoing an essential change (on which that prima facie view might possibly be held to arise) is not admitted by those philosophers; for Sutra II, 1, 35 teaches that the individual souls and their deeds form a stream which has no beginning (so that the distinction of enjoying subjects and objects of enjoyment is eternal).

But even if it be held that Brahman itself undergoes a change, the doubt as to the non-distinction of subjects and objects of enjoyment does not arise; for the distinction of the two groups will, on that view, be a.n.a.logous to that of jars and platters which are modifications of the one substance clay, or to that of bracelets and crowns fas.h.i.+oned out of the one substance gold. And on the view of Brahman itself undergoing a change there arises a further difficulty, viz. in so far as Brahman (which is nothing but pure non-conditioned intelligence) is held to transform itself into (limited) enjoying souls and (non-sentient) objects of enjoyment.

15. The non-difference (of the world) from that (viz. Brahman) follows from what begins with the word arambhana.

Under II, 1, 7 and other Sutras the non-difference of the effect, i.e.

the world from the cause, i.e. Brahman was a.s.sumed, and it was on this basis that the proof of Brahman being the cause of the world proceeded.

The present Sutra now raises a prima facie objection against that very non-difference, and then proceeds to refute it.

On the point in question the school of Kanada argues as follows. It is in no way possible that the effect should be non-different from the cause. For cause and effect are the objects of different ideas: the ideas which have for their respective objects threads and a piece of cloth, or a lump of clay and a jar, are distinctly not of one and the same kind. The difference of words supplies a second argument; n.o.body applies to mere threads the word 'piece of cloth,' or vice versa. A third argument rests on the difference of effects: water is not fetched from the well in a lump of clay, nor is a well built with jars. There, fourthly, is the difference of time; the cause is prior in time, the effect posterior. There is, fifthly, the difference of form: the cause has the shape of a lump, the effect (the jar) is shaped like a belly with a broad basis; clay in the latter condition only is meant when we say 'The jar has gone to pieces.' There, sixthly, is a numerical difference: the threads are many, the piece of cloth is one only. In the seventh place, there is the uselessness of the activity of the producing agent (which would result from cause and effect being identical); for if the effect were nothing but the cause, what could be effected by the activity of the agent?--Let us then say that, although the effect _exists_ (at all times), the activity of the agent must be postulated as helpful towards the effect.--But in that case the activity of the agent would have to be a.s.sumed as taking place perpetually, and as hence everything would exist always, there would be no distinction between eternal and non-eternal things!--Let us then say that the effect, although always existing, is at first non-manifest and then is manifested through the activity of the agent; in this way that activity will not be purposeless, and there will be a distinction between eternal and non-eternal things!-- This view also is untenable. For if that manifestation requires another manifestation (to account for it) we are driven into a _regressus in infinitum_. If, on the other hand, it is independent of another manifestation (and hence eternal), it follows that the effect also is eternally perceived. And if, as a third alternative, the manifestation is said to originate, we lapse into the asatkaryavada (according to which the effect does not exist before its origination). Moreover, if the activity of the agent serves to manifest the effect, it follows that the activity devoted to a jar will manifest also waterpots and similar things. For things which admittedly possess manifesting power, such as lamps and the like, are not observed to be restricted to particular objects to be manifested by them: we do not see that a lamp lit for showing a jar does _not_ at the same time manifest waterpots and other things. All this proves that the activity of the agent has a purpose in so far only as it is the cause of the origination of an effect which previously did _not_ exist; and thus the theory of the previous existence of the effect cannot be upheld. Nor does the fact of definite causes having to be employed (in order to produce definite effects; clay e.g. to produce a jar) prove that that only which already exists can become an effect; for the facts explain themselves also on the hypothesis of the cause having definite potentialities (determining the definite effect which will result from the cause).