The Vedanta-Sutras with the Commentary by Ramanuja Part 26

But, an objection is raised, he also who holds the theory of the previous non-existence of the effect, can really do nothing with the activity of the agent. For as, on his view, the effect has no existence before it is originated, the activity of the agent must be supposed to operate elsewhere than on the effect; and as this 'elsewhere' comprises without distinction all other things, it follows that the agent's activity with reference to threads may give rise to waterpots also (not only to cloth).--Not so, the Vaises.h.i.+ka replies. Activity applied to a certain cause gives rise to those effects only the potentiality of which inheres in that cause.

Now, against all this, the following objection is raised. The effect is non-different from the cause. For in reality there is no such thing as an effect different from the cause, since all effects, and all empirical thought and speech about effects, are based on Nescience. Apart from the causal substance, clay, which is seen to be present in effected things such as jars, the so-called effect, i.e. the jar or pot, rests altogether on Nescience. All effected things whatever, such as jars, waterpots, &c., viewed as different from their causal substance, viz.

clay, which is perceived to exist in these its effects, rest merely on empirical thought and speech, and are fundamentally false, unreal; while the causal substance, i.e. clay, alone is real. In the same way the entire world in so far as viewed apart from its cause, i.e. Brahman which is nothing but pure non-differenced Being, rests exclusively on the empirical a.s.sumption of Egoity and so on, and is false; while reality belongs to the causal Brahman which is mere Being. It follows that there is no such thing as an effect apart from its cause; the effect in fact is identical with the cause. Nor must you object to our theory on the ground that the corroborative instance of the silver erroneously imagined in the sh.e.l.l is inappropriate because the non- reality of such effected things as jars is by no means well proved while the non-reality of the sh.e.l.l-silver is so proved; for as a matter of fact it is determined by reasoning that it is the causal substance of jars, viz. clay, only that is real while the reality of everything apart from clay is disproved by reasoning. And if you ask whereupon that reasoning rests, we reply--on the fact that the clay only is continuous, permanent, while everything different from it is discontinuous, non- permanent. For just as in the case of the snake-rope we observe that the continuously existing rope only--which forms the substrate of the imagined snake--is real, while the snake or cleft in the ground, which is non-continuous, is unreal; so we conclude that it is the permanently enduring clay-material only which is real, while the non-continuous effects, such as jars and pots, are unreal. And, further, since what is real, i. e. the Self, does not perish, and what is altogether unreal, as e.g. the horn of a hare, is not perceived, we conclude that an effected thing, which on the one hand is perceived and on the other is liable to destruction, must be viewed as something to be defined neither as that which is nor as that which is not. And what is thus undefinable, is false, no less than the silver imagined in the sh.e.l.l, the anirvakaniyatva of which is proved by perception and sublation (see above, p. 102 ff.).--We further ask, 'Is a causal substance, such as clay, when producing its effect, in a non-modified state, or has it pa.s.sed over into some special modified condition?' The former alternative cannot be allowed, because thence it would follow that the cause originates effects at all times; and the latter must equally be rejected, because the pa.s.sing over of the cause into a special state would oblige us to postulate a previous pa.s.sing over into a different state (to account for the latter pa.s.sing over) and again a previous one, &c., so that a _regressus in infinitum_ would result.--Let it then be said that the causal substance when giving rise to the effect is indeed unchanged, but connected with a special operative cause, time and place (this connexion accounting for the origination of the effect).--But this also we cannot allow; for such connexion would be with the causal substance either as unchanged or as having entered on a changed condition; and thus the difficulties stated above would arise again.-- Nor may you say that the origination of jars, gold coins, and sour milk from clay, gold, and milk respectively is actually perceived; that this perception is not sublated with regard to time and place--while, on the other hand, the perception of silver in the sh.e.l.l is so sublated--and that hence all those who trust perception must necessarily admit that the effect _does_ originate from the cause. For this argumentation does not stand the test of being set forth in definite alternatives. Does the mere gold, &c., by itself originate the svastika-ornament? or is it the gold coins (used for making ornaments) which originate? or is it the gold, as forming the substrate of the coins [FOOTNOTE 434:1]? The mere gold, in the first place, cannot be originative as there exists no effect different from the gold (to which the originative activity could apply itself); and a thing cannot possibly display originative activity with regard to itself.--But, an objection is raised, the svastika- ornament is perceived as different from the gold!--It is not, we reply, different from the gold; for the gold is recognised in it, and no other thing but gold is perceived.--But the existence of another thing is proved by the fact of there being a different idea, a different word, and so on!--By no means, we reply. Other ideas, words, and so on, which have reference to an altogether undefined thing are founded on error, no less than the idea of, and the word denoting, sh.e.l.l-silver, and hence have no power of proving the existence of another thing. Nor, in the second place, is the _gold coin_ originative of the svastika-ornament; for we do not perceive the coin in the svastika, as we do perceive the threads in the cloth. Nor, in the third place, is the effect originated by the gold in so far as being the substrate of the coin; for the gold in so far as forming the substrate of the coin is not perceived in the svastika. As it thus appears that all effects viewed apart from their causal substances are unreal, we arrive at the conclusion that the entire world, viewed apart from Brahman, is also something unreal; for it also is an effect.

In order to facilitate the understanding of the truth that everything apart from Brahman is false, we have so far reasoned on the a.s.sumption of things such as clay, gold, &c., being real, and have thereby proved the non-reality of all effects. In truth, however, all special causal substances are unreal quite as much as jars and golden ornaments are; for they are all of them equally effects of Brahman.

'In that all this has its Self; it is the True' (Ch. Up. VI, 8, 7); 'There is here no plurality; from death to death goes he who sees here plurality as it were' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'For where there is duality as it were, there one sees another; but when for him the Self only has become all, whereby then should he see and whom should he see?' (Bri. Up.

II, 4, 13); 'Indra goes manifold by means of his mayas' (Bri. Up. II, 5, 19);--these and other similar texts teach that whatever is different from Brahman is false. Nor must it be imagined that the truth intimated by Scripture can be in conflict with Perception; for in the way set forth above we prove that all effects are false, and moreover Perception really has for its object pure Being only (cp. above, p. 30). And if there is a conflict between the two, superior force belongs to Scripture, to which no imperfection can be attributed; which occupies a final position among the means of knowledge; and which, although dependent on Perception, and so on, for the apprehension of the form and meaning of words, yet is independent as far as proving power is concerned. Hence it follows that everything different from Brahman, the general cause, is unreal.

Nor must this conclusion be objected to on the ground that from the falsity of the world it follows that the individual souls also are non- real. For it is Brahman itself which const.i.tutes the individual souls: Brahman alone takes upon itself the condition of individual soul in all living bodies; as we know from many texts: 'Having entered into them with this living Self (Ch. Up. VI, 3); 'The one G.o.d hidden within all beings' (Svet. Up. VI, 11); 'The one G.o.d entered in many places'; 'That Self hidden in all beings does not s.h.i.+ne forth' (Ka. Up. I, 3,12); 'There is no other seer but he' (Bri. Up. III, 3, 23); and others.--But if you maintain that the one Brahman const.i.tutes the soul in all living bodies, it follows that any particular pain or pleasure should affect the consciousness of all embodied beings, just as an agreeable sensation affecting the foot gives rise to a feeling of pleasure in the head; and that there would be no distinction of individual soul and Lord, released souls and souls in bondage, pupils and teachers, men wise and ignorant, and so on.

Now, in reply to this, some of those who hold the non-duality of Brahman give the following explanation. The many individual souls are the reflections of the one Brahman, and their states of pain, pleasure, and so on, remain distinct owing to the different limiting adjuncts (on which the existence of each individual soul as such depends), in the same way as the many reflected images of one and the same face in mirrors, crystals, sword-blades, &c., remain distinct owing to their limiting adjuncts (viz. mirrors, &c.); one image being small, another large, one being bright, another dim, and so on.--But you have said that scriptural texts such as 'Having entered with this living Self show that the souls are not different from Brahman!--They are indeed not different in reality, but we maintain their distinction on the basis of an imagined difference.--To whom then does that imagination belong? Not to Brahman surely whose nature, consisting of pure intelligence, allows no room for imagination of any kind! Nor also to the individual souls; for this would imply a faulty mutual dependence, the existence of the soul depending on imagination and that imagination residing in the soul! Not so, the advaita-vadin replies. Nescience (wrong imagination) and the existence of the souls form an endless retrogressive chain; their relation is like that of the seed and the sprout. Moreover, mutual dependence and the like, which are held to const.i.tute defects in the case of real things, are unable to disestablish Nescience, the very nature of which consists in being that which cannot rationally be established, and which hence may be compared to somebody's swallowing a whole palace and the like (as seen in a dream or under the influence of a magical illusion). In reality the individual souls are non-different from Brahman, and hence essentially free from all impurity; but as they are liable to impurity caused by their limiting adjuncts--in the same way as the face reflected in a mirror is liable to be dimmed by the dimness of the mirror--they may be the abodes of Nescience and hence may be viewed as the figments of wrong imagination. Like the dimness of the reflected face, the imperfection adhering to the soul is a mere error; for otherwise it would follow that the soul can never obtain release.

And as this error of the souls has proceeded from all eternity, the question as to its cause is not to be raised.

This, we reply, is the view of teachers who have no insight into the true nature of aduality, and are prompted by the wish of capturing the admiration and applause of those who believe in the doctrine of duality.

For if, as a first alternative, you should maintain that the abode of Nescience is const.i.tuted by the soul in its essential, not fict.i.tiously imagined, form; this means that Brahman itself is the abode of Nescience.

If, in the second place, you should say that the abode of Nescience is the soul, viewed as different from Brahman and fict.i.tiously imagined in it, this would mean that the Non-intelligent (jada) is the abode of Nescience. For those who hold the view of Non-duality do not acknowledge a third aspect different from these two (i.e. from Brahman which is pure intelligence, and the Non-intelligent fict.i.tiously superimposed on Brahman). And if, as a third alternative, it be maintained that the abode of Nescience is the soul in its essential nature, this nature being however qualified by the fict.i.tiously imagined aspect; we must negative this also, since that which has an absolutely h.o.m.ogeneous nature cannot in any way be shown to be qualified, apart from Nescience.

The soul is qualified in so far only as it is the abode of Nescience, and you therefore define nothing.--Moreover, the theory of Nescience abiding within the individual soul is resorted to for the purpose of establis.h.i.+ng a basis for the distinction of bondage and release, but it really is quite unable to effect this. For if by Release be understood the destruction of Nescience, it follows that when one soul attains Release and Nescience is thus destroyed, the other souls also will be released.--But Nescience persists because other souls are not released!-- Well then the one soul also is not released since Nescience is not destroyed!--But we a.s.sume a different Nescience for each soul; that soul whose Nescience is destroyed will be released, and that whose Nescience is not destroyed will remain in Bondage!--You now argue on the a.s.sumption of a special avidya for each soul. But what about the distinction of souls implied therein? Is that distinction essential to the nature of the soul, or is it the figment of Nescience? The former alternative is excluded, as it is admitted that the soul essentially is pure, non-differenced intelligence; and because on that alternative the a.s.sumption of avidya to account for the distinction of souls would be purposeless. On the latter alternative two subordinate alternatives arise--Does this avidya which gives rise to the fict.i.tious distinction of souls belong to Brahman? or to the individual souls?--If you say 'to Brahman', your view coincides with mine.--Well then, 'to the souls'!-- But have you then quite forgotten that Nescience is a.s.sumed for the purpose of accounting for the distinction of souls?--Let us then view the matter as follows--those several avidyas which are a.s.sumed for the purpose of establis.h.i.+ng the distinction of souls bound and released, to those same avidyas the distinction of souls is due.--But here you reason in a manifest circle: the avidyas are established on the basis of the distinction of souls, and the distinction of souls is established when the avidyas are established. Nor does the argument of the seed and sprout apply to the present question. For in the case of seeds and plants each several seed gives rise to a different plant; while in the case under discussion you adopt the impossible procedure of establis.h.i.+ng the several avidyas on the basis of the very souls which are a.s.sumed to be due to those avidyas. And if you attempt to give to the argument a somewhat different turn, by maintaining that it is the avidyas abiding in the earlier souls which fict.i.tiously give rise to the later souls, we point out that this implies the souls being short-lived only, and moreover that each soul would have to take upon itself the consequences of deeds not its own and escape the consequences of its own deeds. The same reasoning disposes of the hypothesis that it is Brahman which effects the fict.i.tious existence of the subsequent souls by means of the avidyas abiding within the earlier souls. And if there is a.s.sumed a beginningless flow of avidyas, it follows that there is also a beginningless flow of the condition of the souls dependent on those avidyas, and that steady uniformity of the state of the souls which is supposed to hold good up to the moment of Release could thus not be established. Concerning your a.s.sertion that, as Nescience is something unreal and hence altogether unproved, it is not disestablished by such defects as mutual dependence which touch real things only; we remark that in that case Nescience would cling even to released souls and the highest Brahman itself.--But impure Nescience cannot cling to what has for its essence pure cognition!--Is Nescience then to be dealt with by rational arguments? If so, it will follow that, on account of the arguments set forth (mutual dependence, and so on), it likewise does not cling to the individual souls. We further put the following question-- When the Nescience abiding in the individual soul pa.s.ses away, owing to the rise of the knowledge of truth, does then the soul also perish or does it not perish? In the former case Release is nothing else but destruction of the essential nature of the soul; in the latter case the soul does not attain Release even on the destruction of Nescience, since it continues to exist as soul different from Brahman.--You have further maintained that the distinction of souls as pure and impure, &c., admits of being accounted for in the same way as the dimness or clearness, and so on, of the different images of a face as seen reflected in mirrors, crystals, sword-blades and the like. But here the following point requires consideration. On what occasion do the smallness, dimness and other imperfections due to the limiting adjuncts (i.e. the mirrors, &c.) pa.s.s away?--When the mirrors and other limiting adjuncts themselves pa.s.s away!--Does then, we ask, the reflected image which is the substrate of those imperfections persist or not? If you say that it persists, then by a.n.a.logy the individual soul also must be a.s.sumed to persist, and from this it follows that it does not attain Release. And if the reflected image is held to perish together with its imperfections, by a.n.a.logy the soul also will perish and then Release will be nothing but annihilation.-- Consider the following point also. The destruction of a non-advantageous (apurushartha) defect is of advantage to him who is conscious of that disadvantage. Is it then, we ask, in the given case Brahman--which corresponds to the thing reflected--that is conscious of the imperfections due to the limiting adjuncts? or is it the soul which corresponds to the reflected image? or is it something else? On the two former alternatives it appears that the comparison (between Brahman and the soul on the one hand, and the thing reflected and the reflection on the other--on which comparison your whole theory is founded) does not hold good; for neither the face nor the reflection of the face is conscious of the imperfections due to the adjuncts; for neither of the two is a being capable of consciousness. And, moreover, Brahman's being conscious of imperfections would imply its being the abode of Nescience.

And the third alternative, again, is impossible, since there is no other knowing subject _but_ Brahman and the soul.--It would, moreover, be necessary to define who is the imaginatively shaping agent (kalpaka) with regard to the soul as formed from Nescience. It cannot be Nescience itself, because Nescience is not an intelligent principle. Nor can it be the soul, because this would imply the defect of what has to be proved being presupposed for the purposes of the proof; and because the existence of the soul is that which _is formed_ by Nescience, just as sh.e.l.l-silver is. And if, finally, you should say that Brahman is the fict.i.tiously forming agent, we have again arrived at a Brahman that is the abode of Nescience.--If Brahman is not allowed to be the abode of Nescience, we further must ask whether Brahman sees (is conscious of) the individual souls or not. If not, it is not possible that Brahman should give rise to this manifold creation which, as Scripture declares, is preceded by 'seeing' on his part, and to the differentiation of names and forms. If, on the other hand, Brahman which is of an absolutely h.o.m.ogeneous nature sees the souls, it cannot do so without Nescience; and thus we are again led to the view of Nescience abiding in Brahman.

For similar reasons the theory of the distinction of Maya and Nescience must also be abandoned. For even if Brahman possesses Maya, i.e.

illusive power, it cannot, without Nescience, be conscious of souls. And without being conscious of others the lord of Maya is unable to delude them by his Maya; and Maya herself cannot bring about the consciousness of others on the part of its Lord, for it is a mere means to delude others, after they have (by other means) become objects of consciousness.-- Perhaps you will say that the Maya of Brahman causes him to be conscious of souls, and at the same time is the cause of those souls' delusion.

But if Maya causes Brahman--which is nothing but self-illuminated intelligence, absolutely h.o.m.ogeneous and free from all foreign elements-- to become conscious of other beings, then Maya is nothing but another name for Nescience.--Let it then be said that Nescience is the cause of the cognition of what is contrary to truth; such being the case, Maya which presents all false things different from Brahman as false, and thus is not the cause of wrong cognition on the part of Brahman, is _not_ avidya.--But this is inadmissible; for, when the oneness of the moon is known, that which causes the idea of the moon being double can be nothing else but avidya. Moreover, if Brahman recognises all beings apart from himself as false, he does not delude them; for surely none but a madman would aim at deluding beings known by him to be unreal!-- Let us then define avidya as the cause of a disadvantageous cognition of unreal things. Maya then, as not being the cause of such a disadvantageous cognition on Brahman's part, cannot be of the nature of avidya!--But this also is inadmissible; for although the idea of the moon being double is not the cause of any pain, and hence not disadvantageous to man, it is all the same caused by avidya; and if, on the other hand, Maya which aims at dispelling that idea (in so far as it presents the image and idea of one moon) did not present what is of disadvantage, it would not be something to be destroyed, and hence would be permanently connected with Brahman's nature.--Well, if it were so, what harm would there be?--The harm would be that such a view implies the theory of duality, and hence would be in conflict with the texts inculcating non-duality such as 'For where there is duality as it were, &c.; but when for him the Self only has become all, whereby then should he see, and whom should he see?'--But those texts set forth the Real; Maya on the other hand is non-real, and hence the view of its permanency is not in real conflict with the texts!--Brahman, we reply, has for its essential nature unlimited bliss, and hence cannot be conscious of, or affected with, unreal Maya, without avidya. Of what use, we further ask, should an eternal non-real Maya be to Brahman?--Brahman by means of it deludes the individual souls!--But of what use should such delusion be to Brahman?--It affords to Brahman a kind of sport or play!--But of what use is play to a being whose nature is unlimited bliss?--Do we not then see in ordinary life also that persons in the enjoyment of full happiness and prosperity indulge all the same in play?--The cases are not parallel, we reply. For none but persons not in their right mind would take pleasure in an unreal play, carried on by means of implements unreal and known by them to be unreal, and in the consciousness, itself, unreal of such a play!--The arguments set forth previously also prove the impossibility of the fict.i.tious existence of an individual soul considered as the abode of avidya, apart from Brahman considered as the abode of Maya.

We thus arrive at the conclusion that those who hold the non-duality of Brahman must also admit that it is Brahman alone which is affected with beginningless avidya, and owing to this avidya is conscious of plurality within itself. Nor must it be urged against him who holds this view of avidya belonging to Brahman that he is unable to account for the distinction of bondage and release, for as there is only the one Brahman affected with Nescience and to be released by the cessation of that Nescience, the distinction of souls bound and released, &c., has no true existence: the empirical distinction of souls bound and released, of teachers and pupils, &c. is a merely fict.i.tious one, and all such fiction can be explained by means of the avidya of one intelligent being.

The case is a.n.a.logous to that of a person dreaming: the teachers and pupils and all the other persons and things he may see in his dream are fict.i.tiously shaped out of the avidya of the one dreaming subject. For the same reason there is no valid foundation for the a.s.sumption of many avidyas. For those also who hold that avidya belongs to the individual souls do not maintain that the distinction of bondage and release, of one's own self and other persons, is real; and if it is unreal it can be accounted for by the avidya of one subject. This admits of being stated in various technical ways.--The distinctions of bondage and of one's own self and other persons are fict.i.tiously shaped by one's own avidya; for they are unreal like the distinctions seen by a dreaming person.--Other bodies also have a Self through me only; for they are bodies like this my body.--Other bodies also are fict.i.tiously shaped by my avidya; for they are bodies or effects, or non-intelligent or fict.i.tious creations, as this my body is.--The whole cla.s.s of intelligent subjects is nothing but _me_; for they are of intelligent nature; what is _not me_ is seen to be of non-intelligent nature; as e.g. jars.--It thus follows that the distinctions of one's own self and other persons, of souls bound and released, of pupils and teachers, and so on, are fict.i.tiously created by the avidya of one intelligent subject.

The fact is that the upholder of Duality himself is not able to account for the distinction of souls bound and released. For as there is an infinity of past aeons, it follows that, even if one soul only should attain release in each aeon, all souls would by this time have attained release; the actual existence of non-released souls cannot thus be rationally accounted for.--But the souls are 'infinite'; this accounts for there being souls not yet released!--What, pray, do you understand by this 'infinity' of souls? Does it mean that they cannot be counted?

This we cannot allow, for although a being of limited knowledge may not be able to count them, owing to their large number, the all-knowing Lord surely can count them; if he could not do so it would follow that he is not all-knowing.--But the souls are really numberless, and the Lord's not knowing a definite number which does not exist does not prove that he is not all-knowing!--Not so, we reply. Things which are definitely separate (bhinna) from each other cannot be without number. Souls have a number, because they are separate; just as mustard seeds, beans, earthen vessels, pieces of cloth, and so on. And from their being separate it moreover follows that souls, like earthen vessels, and so on, are non- intelligent, not of the nature of Self, and perishable; and it further follows therefrom that Brahman is not infinite. For by infinity we understand the absence of all limitation. Now on the theory which holds that there is a plurality of separate existences, Brahman which is considered to differ in character from other existences cannot be said to be free from substantial limitation; for substantial limitation means nothing else than the existence of other substances. And what is substantially limited cannot be said to be free from temporal and spatial limitation; for observation shows that it is just those things which differ in nature from other things and thus are substantially limited--such as earthen vessels, and so on--which are also limited in point of s.p.a.ce and time. Hence all intelligent existences, including Brahman, being substantially limited, are also limited in point of s.p.a.ce and time. But this conclusion leads to a conflict with those scriptural texts which declare Brahman to be free from all limitation whatsoever ('The True, knowledge, infinite is Brahman,' and similar texts), and moreover would imply that the souls as well as Brahman are liable to origination, decay, and so on; for limitation in time means nothing else but a being's pa.s.sing through the stages of origination, decay, and so on.

The dvaita-view thus being found untenable on all sides, we adhere to our doctrine that this entire world, from Brahma down to a blade of gra.s.s, springs from the avidya attached to Brahman which in itself is absolutely unlimited; and that the distinctions of consciousness of pleasure and pain, and all similar distinctions, explain themselves from the fact of all of them being of the nature of avidya, just as the distinctions of which a dreaming person is conscious. The one Brahman, whose nature is eternal self-illuminedness, free from all heterogeneous elements, owing to the influence of avidya illusorily manifests itself (vivarttate) in the form of this world; and as thus in reality there exists nothing whatever different from Brahman, we hold that the world is 'non-different' from Brahman.

To this the Dvaitavadin, i.e. the Vaises.h.i.+ka, replies as follows. The doctrine that Brahman, which in itself is pure, non-differenced self- illuminedness, has its own true nature hidden by avidya and hence sees plurality within itself, is in conflict with all the valid means of right knowledge; for as Brahman is without parts, obscuration, i.e.

cessation, of the light of Brahman, would mean complete destruction of Brahman; so that the hypothesis of obscuration is altogether excluded.

This and other arguments have been already set forth; as also that the hypothesis of obscuration contradicts other views held by the Advaitin.

Nor is there any proof for the a.s.sertion that effects apart from their causes are mere error, like sh.e.l.l-silver, the separate existence of the effect being refuted by Reasoning; for as a matter of fact there is no valid reasoning of the kind. The a.s.sertion that the cause only is real because it persists, while the non-continuous effects--such as jars and waterpots--are unreal, has also been refuted before, on the ground that the fact of a thing not existing at one place and one time does not sublate its real existence at another time and place. Nor is there any soundness in the argumentation that the effect is false because, owing to its being perceived and its being perishable, it cannot be defined either as real or unreal. For a thing's being perceived and its being perishable does not prove the thing's falseness, but only its non- permanency. To prove a thing's falseness it is required to show that it is sublated (i.e. that its non-existence is proved by valid means) with reference to that very place and time in connexion with which it is perceived; but that a thing is sublated with reference to a place and time _other_ than those in connexion with which it is perceived, proves only that the thing does not exist in connexion with that place and time, but not that it is false. This view also may be put in technical form, viz. effects such as jars and the like are real because they are not sublated with regard to their definite place and time; just as the Self is.--Nor is there any truth in the a.s.sertion that the effect cannot originate from the cause either modified or unmodified; for the effect may originate from the cause if connected with certain favouring conditions of place, time, &c. Nor can you show any proof for the a.s.sertion that the cause, whether modified or non-modified, cannot enter into connexion with such favouring conditions; as a matter of fact the cause may very well, without being modified, enter into such connexion.-- But from this it follows that the cause must have been previously connected with those conditions, since previously also it was equally unmodified!--Not so, we reply. The connexion with favouring conditions of time, place, &c., into which the cause enters, depends on some other cause, and not therefore on the fact of its not being modified. No fault then can be found with the view of the cause, when having entered into a special state depending on its connexion with time, place, &c., producing the effect. Nor can it be denied in any way that the cause possesses originative agency with regard to the effect; for such agency is actually observed, and cannot be proved to be irrational.--Further there is no proof for the a.s.sertion that originative agency cannot belong either to mere gold or to a (first) effect of gold such as coined gold, or to gold in so far as forming the substrate for coins and the like; for as a matter of fact mere gold (gold in general), if connected with the helpful factors mentioned above, may very well possess originative capacity. To say that we do not perceive any effect different from gold is futile; for as a matter of fact we perceive the svastika-ornament which is different from mere gold, and the existence of different terms and ideas moreover proves the existence of different things. Nor have we here to do with a mere error a.n.a.logous to that of sh.e.l.l-silver. For a real effected thing, such as a golden ornament, is perceived during the whole period intervening between its origination and destruction, and such perception is not sublated with regard to that time and place. Nor is there any valid line of reasoning to sublate that perception. That at the same time when the previously non-perceived svastika-ornament is perceived the gold also is recognised, is due to the fact of the gold persisting as the substrate of the ornament, and hence such recognition of the causal substance does not disprove the reality of the effect.--And the attempts to prove the unreality of the world by means of scriptural texts we have already disposed of in a previous part of this work.

We further object to the a.s.sertion that it is one Self which bestows on all bodies the property of being connected with the Self; as from this it would follow that one person is conscious of all the pains and pleasures caused by all bodies. For, as seen in the case of Saubhari and others, it is owing to the oneness of the Self that one person is conscious of the pains and pleasures due to several bodies. Nor again must you allege that the non-consciousness (on the part of one Self of all pleasures and pains whatever), is due to the plurality of the Egos, which are the subjects of cognition, and not to the plurality of Selfs; for the Self is none other than the subject of cognition and the Ego.

The organ of egoity (ahamkara), on the other hand, which is the same as the internal organ (antahkarana), cannot be the knowing subject, for it is of a non-intelligent nature, and is a mere instrument like the body and the sense-organs. This also has been proved before.--Nor is there any proof for your a.s.sertion that all bodies must be held to spring from the avidya of one subject, because they are bodies, non-intelligent, effects, fict.i.tious. For that all bodies are the fict.i.tious creations of avidya is not true; since that which is not sublated by valid means of proof must be held to be real.--Nor again can you uphold the a.s.sertion that all intelligent subjects are non-different, i.e. one, because we observe that whatever is other than a subject of cognition is non- intelligent; for this also is disproved by the fact of the plurality of intelligent subjects as proved by the individual distribution, among them, of pleasures and pains.--You have further maintained 'Through me only all bodies are animated by a Self; they are the fict.i.tious creations of _my_ avidya; _I_ alone const.i.tute the whole aggregate of intelligent subjects,' and, on the basis of these averments, have attempted to prove the oneness of the Ego. But all this is nothing but the random talk of a person who has not mastered even the principles of his own theory; for according to your theory the Self is pure intelligence to which the whole distinction of 'I,' 'Thou,' &c., is altogether foreign. Moreover, if it be held that everything different from pure, non-differenced intelligence is false, it follows that all effort spent on learning the Veda with a view to Release is fruitless, for the Veda also is the effect of avidya, and the effort spent on it therefore is a.n.a.logous to the effort of taking hold of the silver wrongly imagined in the sh.e.l.l. Or, to put it from a different point of view, all effort devoted to Release is purposeless, since it is the effect of knowledge depending on teachers of merely fict.i.tious existence.

Knowledge produced by texts such as 'Thou art that' does not put an end to bondage, because it is produced by texts which are the fict.i.tious product of avidya; or because it is itself of the nature of avidya; or because it has for its abode knowing subjects, who are mere creatures of avidya; or because it is the product of a process of study which depends on teachers who are the mere creatures of avidya; it is thus no better than knowledge resting on texts teaching how bondage is to be put an end to, which one might have heard in a dream. Or, to put the matter again from a different point of view, Brahman const.i.tuted by pure non- differenced intelligence is false, since it is to be attained by knowledge, which is the effect of avidya; or since it is to be attained by knowledge abiding in knowing subjects who are mere figments of avidya; or because it is attained through knowledge which is the mere figment of avidya. For whatever is attained through knowledge of that kind is false; as e.g. the things seen in dreams or a town of the Gandharvas (Fata Morgana).

Nor does Brahman, const.i.tuted by pure non-differenced intelligence, s.h.i.+ne forth by itself, so as not to need--for its cognition--other means of knowledge. And that that self-luminous knowledge which you declare to be borne witness to by itself, really consists in the knowledge of particular objects of knowledge--such knowledge abiding in particular cognising subjects--this also has been proved previously. And the different arguments which were set forth as proving Brahman's non- differenced nature, are sufficiently refuted by what we have said just now as to all such arguments themselves being the products of avidya.

Nor again is there any sense in the theory that the principle of non- differenced intelligence 'witnesses' avidya, and implicates itself in the error of the world. For 'witnessing' and error are observed to abide only in definite conscious subjects, not in consciousness in general.

Nor can that principle of pure intelligence be proved to possess illumining power or light depending on itself only. For by light (enlightenment) we can understand nothing but definite well-established knowledge (siddhi) on the part of some knowing subject with regard to some particular object. It is on this basis only that you yourself prove the self-illuminedness of your universal principle; to an absolutely non- differenced intelligence not implying the distinction of subject and object such 'svayamprakasata' could not possibly belong. With regard again to what you so loudly proclaim at your meetings, viz. that real effects are seen to spring even from unreal causes, we point out that although you allow to such effects, being non-sublatcd as it were, a kind of existence called 'empirical' (or 'conventional'--vyavaharika), you yourself acknowledge that fundamentally they are nothing but products of avidya; you thus undermine your own position. We have, on the other hand, already disposed of this your view above, when proving that in all cases effects are originated by real causes only. Nor may you plead that what perception tells us in such cases is contradicted by Scripture; for as, according to you, Scripture itself is an effect, and hence of the essence of avidya, it is in no better case than the instances quoted. You have further declared that, although Brahman is to be attained only through unreal knowledge, yet it is real since when once attained it is not sublated by any subsequent cognition. But this reasoning also is not valid; for when it has once been ascertained that some principle is attained through knowledge resting on a vicious basis, the fact that we are not aware of a subsequent sublation of that principle is irrelevant. That the principle 'the reality of things is a universal Void' is false, we conclude therefrom that the reasoning leading to that principle is ascertained to be ill-founded, although we are not aware of any subsequent truth sublating that principle. Moreover, for texts such as 'There is here no plurality whatsoever', 'Knowledge, bliss is Brahman,' the absence of subsequent sublation is claimed on the ground that they negative the whole aggregate of things different from mere intelligence, and hence are later in order than all other texts (which had established that aggregate of things). But somebody may rise and say 'the Reality is a Void', and thus negative the existence of the principle of mere Intelligence also; and the latter principle is thus sublated by the a.s.sertion as to the Void, which is later in order than the texts which it negatives. On the other hand the a.s.sertion as to the Void being the universal principle is not liable to subsequent sublation; for it is impossible for any negation to go beyond it. And as to resting on a vicious basis, there is in that respect no difference between Perception and the other means of knowledge, and the view of general unreality, founded on the Vedanta. The proper conclusion therefore is that all cognitions whatsoever abide in real subjects of cognition and are themselves real, consisting in mental certainty with regard to special objects. Some of these cognitions rest on defects which themselves are real; others spring from a combination of causes, real and free from all defect. Unless we admit all this we shall not be able to account in a satisfactory way for the distinction of things true and things false, and for all empirical thought. For empirical thought, whether true or of the nature of error, presupposes inward light (illumination) in the form of certainty with regard to a particular object, and belonging to a real knowing subject; mere non-differenced Being, on the other hand (not particularised in the form of a knowing subject), cannot be the cause of states of consciousness, whether referring to real or Unreal things, and cannot therefore form the basis of empirical thought.

Against our opponent's argument that pure Being must be held the real substrate of all erroneous superimposition (adhyasa), for the reason that no error can exist without a substrate, we remark that an error may take place even when its substrate is unreal, in the same way as an error may exist even when the defect (giving rise to the error), the abode of the defect, the subject of cognition and the cognition itself are unreal. The argument thus loses its force. Possibly he will now argue that as an error is never seen to exist where the substrate is unreal, the reality of pure Being (as furnis.h.i.+ng the required basis for error) must necessarily be admitted. But, we point out, it also is a fact that errors are never observed where the defect, the abode of the defect, the knowing subject and the act of knowledge are unreal; and if we pay regard to observation, we must therefore admit the reality of all these factors as well. There is really no difference between the two cases, unless our opponent chooses to be obstinate.

You further a.s.serted that, on the theory of many really different Selfs, it would follow from the infinity of the past aeons that all souls must have been released before this, none being left in the state of bondage; and that hence the actually observed distinction of souls bound and released remains unexplained. But this argumentation is refuted by the fact of the souls also being infinite. You indeed maintained that, if the souls are really separate, they must necessarily have a definite number like beans, mustard-seeds, earthen vessels, and so on; but these instances are beside the point, as earthen vessels, and so on, are also infinite in number.--But do we not actually see that all these things have definite numbers, 'Here are ten jars; a thousand beans,' &c.?--True, but those numbers do not belong to the essential nature of jars, and so on, but only to jars in so far as connected with time, place, and other limiting adjuncts. And that souls also have definite numbers in this sense, we readily admit. And from this it does not follow that all souls should be released; for essentially the souls are infinite (in number).-- Nor are you ent.i.tled to maintain that the real separation of individual souls would imply that, as earthen vessels and the like, they are non- intelligent, not of the nature of Self, and perishable. For the circ.u.mstance of individuals of one species being distinct from each other, does in no way imply that they possess the characteristics of things belonging to another species: the individual separation of jars does not imply their having the characteristics of pieces of cloth.--You further maintain that from the hypothesis of a real plurality of souls it follows that Brahman is substantially limited, and in consequence of this limited with regard to time and s.p.a.ce also, and that hence its infinity is disproved. But this also is a mistaken conclusion. Things substantially limited may be limited more or less with regard to time and place: there is no invariable rule on this point, and the measure of their connexion with s.p.a.ce and time has hence to be determined in dependence on other means of knowledge. Now Brahman's connexion with _all_ s.p.a.ce and _all_ time results from such other means of proof, and hence there is no contradiction (between this non-limitation with regard to s.p.a.ce and time, and its limitation in point of substance--which is due to the existence of other souls).--But mere substantial limitation, as meaning the absence of non-limitation of any kind, by itself proves that Brahman is not infinite!--Well, then you yourself are in no better case; for you admit that Brahman is something different from avidya. From this admission it follows that Brahman also is something 'different', and thus all the disadvantages connected with the view of difference cling to your theory as well. If on the other hand it should not be allowed that Brahman differs in nature from avidya, then Brahman's nature itself is const.i.tuted by avidya, and the text defining Brahman as 'the True, knowledge, infinite' is contrary to sense.--If the reality of 'difference' is not admitted, then there is no longer any distinction between the proofs and the mutual objections set forth by the advocates of different theories, and we are landed in general confusion. The proof of infinity, we further remark, rests altogether on the absence of limitation of s.p.a.ce and time, not on absence of substantial limitation; absence of such limitation is something very much akin to the 'horn of a hare' and is perceived nowhere. On the view of difference, on the other hand, the whole world, as const.i.tuting Brahman's body, is its mode, and Brahman is thus limited neither through itself nor through other things.-- We thus arrive at the conclusion that, as effects are real in so far as different from their cause, the effect of Brahman, i.e. the entire world, is different from Brahman.

Against this view the Sutra now declares itself as follows.--The non- difference of the world from Brahman, the highest cause, follows from 'what begins with the word arambhana'--which proves such non-difference; 'what begins with the word arambhana' means those clauses at the head of which that word is met with, viz. 'vakarambhanam vikaro namadheyam mrittikety eva satyam'; 'Being only this was in the beginning, one only, without a second'; 'it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth; it sent forth fire'; 'having entered with this living Self; 'In the True, my son, all these creatures have their root, in the True they dwell, in the True they rest'; 'In that all that exists has its Self; it is the True, it is the Self; and thou art it, O Svetaketu' (Ch. Up. VI, 1-8)--it is these clauses and others of similar purport which are met with in other chapters, that the Sutra refers to. For these texts prove the non- difference from Brahman of the world consisting of non-sentient and sentient beings. This is as follows. The teacher, bearing in his mind the idea of Brahman const.i.tuting the sole cause of the entire world and of the non-difference of the effect from the cause, asks the pupil, 'Have you ever asked for that instruction by which the non-heard is heard, the non-perceived is perceived, the not known is known'; wherein there is implied the promise that, through the knowledge of Brahman the general cause, its effect, i.e. the whole Universe, will be known? The pupil, not knowing that Brahman is the sole cause of the Universe, raises a doubt as to the possibility of one thing being known through another,'How then, Sir, is that instruction?' and the teacher thereupon, in order to convey the notion of Brahman being the sole universal cause, quotes an instance showing that the non-difference of the effect from the cause is proved by ordinary experience, 'As by one clod of clay there is known everything that is made of clay'; the meaning being 'as jars, pots, and the like, which are fas.h.i.+oned out of one piece of clay, are known through the cognition of that clay, since their substance is not different from it.'In order to meet the objection that according to Kanada's doctrine the effect const.i.tutes a substance different from the cause, the teacher next proceeds to prove the non-difference of the effect from the cause by reference to ordinary experience, 'vakarambhanam vikaro namadheyam mrittikety eva satyam'. Arambhanam must here be explained as that which is taken or touched (a-rabh = a-labh; and 'alambhah sparsahimsayoh'); compare Panini III, 3, 113, as to the form and meaning of the word. 'Vaka,' 'on account of speech,' we take to mean 'on account of activity preceded by speech'; for activities such as the fetching of water in a pitcher are preceded by speech,'Fetch water in the pitcher,' and so on. For the bringing about of such activity, the material clay (which had been mentioned just before) touches (enters into contact with) an effect (vikara), i.e. a particular make or configuration, distinguished by having a broad bottom and resembling the shape of a belly, and a special name (namadheya), viz. _pitcher_, and so on, which is applied to that effect; or, to put it differently, to the end that certain activities may be accomplished, the substance clay receives a new configuration and a new name. [FOOTNOTE 455:1] Hence jars and other things of clay are clay (mrittika), i.e. are of the substance of clay, only; this _only_ is true (satyam), i.e. known through authoritative means of proof; _only_ (eva), because the effects are not known as different substances. One and the same substance therefore, such as clay or gold, gives occasion for different ideas and words only as it a.s.sumes different configurations; just as we observe that one and the same Devadatta becomes the object of different ideas and terms, and gives rise to different effects, according to the different stages of life--youth, old age, &c.--which he has reached.--The fact of our saying 'the jar has perished' while yet the clay persists, was referred to by the Purvapaks.h.i.+n as proving that the effect is something different from the cause; but this view is disproved by the view held by us that origination, destruction, and so on, are merely different states of one and the same causal substance. According as one and the same substance is in this or that state, there belong to it different terms and different activities, and these different states may rightly be viewed as depending on the activity of an agent. The objections again which are connected with the theory of 'manifestation' are refuted by our not acknowledging such a thing at all as 'manifestation.' Nor does the admission of origination render the doctrine of the reality of the effect irrational; for it is only the Real that originates.--But it is a contradiction to maintain that that which previously exists is originated!--This, we reply, is the objection of a person who knows nothing about the true nature of origination and destruction. A substance enters into different states in succession; what pa.s.ses away is the substance in its previous states, what originates is the substance in its subsequent states. As thus the substance in all its states has being, there is nothing irrational in the satkarya theory.-- But the admission of the origination of a non-existing state lands us in the asatkarya theory!--If he, we retort, who holds the asatkarya theory is of opinion that the origination of the effect does not itself originate, he is similarly landed in the satkarya theory; and if he holds that the origination itself originates, he is led into a _regressus in infinitum_. According to us, on the other hand, who hold that states are incapable of being apprehended and of acting apart from that of which they are states, origination, destruction, and so on, belong only to a substance which is in a certain state; and on this theory no difficulty remains. And in the same way as the state of being a jar results from the clay abandoning the condition of being either two halves of a jar or a lump of clay, plurality results from a substance giving up the state of oneness, and oneness from the giving up of plurality; hence this point also gives rise to no difficulty.

We now consider the whole Chandogya-text in connexion. 'Sad eva somyedam agra asid ekam evadvitiyam.' This means--That which is Being, i.e. this world which now, owing to the distinction of names and forms, bears a manifold shape, was in the beginning one only, owing to the absence of the distinction of names and forms. And as, owing to the 'Sat' being endowed with all powers, a further ruling principle is out of the question, the world was also 'without a second.' This proves the non- difference of the world from Brahman. In the same way the next clause also,' It thought, may I be many, may I grow forth,' which describes the creation of the world as proceeding from a resolve of the Self to differentiate itself into a world consisting of manifold beings movable and immovable, viz. Fire, and so on, enables us to determine that the effect, i. e. the world, is non-different from the highest cause, i.e.

the highest Brahman.

And as now a further doubt may arise as to how the highest Brahman with all its perfections can be designated as one with the world, and how the world can be designated as one, without a second, not dependent on another guiding principle; and how this thought, i.e. the resolution, on the part of the Supreme cause, of differentiating itself into a manifold world, and the creation corresponding to that resolution are possible; the text continues,'That deity thought--Let me now enter those three beings with this living Self (jiva atman) and distinguish names and forms'--which means, 'Let me make the aggregate of non-sentient things (for this is meant by the "three beings") to possess various names and forms, by entering into them by means of the giva, which is of the nature of my Self.'The possession of names and forms must thus be understood to be effected by the jiva entering into matter as its Self.

There is another scriptural text also which makes it clear that the highest Brahman enters, so as to be their Self, into the world together with the jivas. 'Having sent forth that he entered into it. Having entered into it he became sat and tyat (i.e. sentient and non-sentient beings).'And that the entire aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings, gross or subtle, in their effected or their causal state, const.i.tutes the body of the highest Brahman, and that on the other hand the highest Brahman const.i.tutes their Self--this is proved by the antaryamin-brahmana and similar texts. This disposes of the doubt raised above. Since Brahman abides, as their Self, in all non-sentient matter together with the jivas, Brahman is denoted by the term 'world' in so far only as it (i.e. Brahman) has non-sentient and sentient beings for its body, and hence utterances such as 'This which is Being only was in the beginning one only' are un.o.bjectionable in every way. All change and all imperfection belongs only to the beings const.i.tuting Brahman's body, and Brahman itself is thus proved to be free from all imperfection, a treasure as it were of all imaginable holy qualites. This point will be further elucidated under II, 1, 22.--The Chandogya-text then further teaches that all sentient and non-sentient beings have their Self in Brahman 'in that all this has its Self; and further inculcates this truth in 'Thou art that.'

Texts met with in other sections also teach this same non-difference of the general cause and its effect: 'All this indeed is Brahman' (Ch. Up.

III, 14, 1); 'When the Self has been seen, heard, perceived, and known, then all this is known' (Bri. Up. IV, 5, 6); 'That Self is all this'

(Bri. Up. II, 4, 6); 'Brahman indeed is all this' (Mai. Up. IV, 6); 'The Self only is all this' (Ch. Up. VII, 25, 2). Other texts, too, negative difference: 'Everything abandons him who looks for anything elsewhere than in the Self (Bri. Up. II, 4, 6); 'There is not any plurality here'

(Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19); 'From death to death goes he who sees here any plurality' (Bri. Up. IV, 4, 19). And in the same spirit the pa.s.sage 'For where there is duality as it were, one sees the other; but when for him the Self has become all, whereby then should he sec and whom?'(Bri. Up.

11,4, 13)--in setting forth that the view of duality belongs to him who does not know and the view of non-duality to him who knows--intimates that non-difference only is real.

It is in this way that we prove, by means of the texts beginning with arambhana, that the world is non-different from the universal cause, i.e.

the highest Brahman. Brahman only, having the aggregate of sentient and non-sentient beings for its body and hence for its modes (prakara), is denoted by all words whatsoever. The body of this Brahman is sometimes const.i.tuted by sentient and non-sentient beings in their subtle state, when--just owing to that subtle state--they are incapable of being (conceived and) designated as apart from Brahman whose body they form: Brahman is then in its so-called causal condition. At other times the body of Brahman is const.i.tuted by all sentient and non-sentient beings in their gross, manifest state, owing to which they admit of being thought and spoken of as having distinct names and forms: Brahman then is in its 'effected' state. The effect, i.e. the world, is thus seen to be non-different from the cause, i.e. the highest Brahman. And that in the effected as well as the causal state of Brahman's body as const.i.tuted by sentient and non-sentient beings, and of Brahman embodied therein, perfections and imperfections are distributed according to the difference of essential nature between Brahman and its body, as proved by hundreds of scriptural texts, we have shown above.

Those on the other hand who establish the non-difference of cause and effect, on the basis of the theory of the effect's non-reality, are unable to prove what they wish to prove; for the True and the False cannot possibly be one. If these two were one, it would follow either that Brahman is false or that the world is real.--Those again who (like Bhaskara) hold the effect also to be real--the difference of the soul and Brahman being due to limiting conditions, while their non-difference is essential; and the difference as well as the non-difference of Brahman and matter being essential--enter into conflict with all those texts which declare that the soul and Brahman are distinct in so far as the soul is under the power of karman while Brahman is free from all evil, &c., and all those texts which teach that non-sentient matter undergoes changes while Brahman does not. For as, according to them, nothing exists but Brahman and the limiting adjuncts, Brahman--as being indivisible--must be undivided while entering into connexion with the upadhis, and hence itself undergoes a change into inferior forms. And if they say that it is only the power (sakti), not Brahman itself, which undergoes a change; this also is of no avail since Brahman and its power are non-different.

Others again (Yadavaprakasa) hold that the general cause, i.e. Brahman, is pure Being in which all distinctions and changes such as being an enjoying subject, and so on, have vanished, while however it is endowed with all possible potentialities. During a pralaya this causal substance abides self-luminous, with all the distinctions of consciousness of pleasure and pain gone to rest, comparable to the soul of a man held by dreamless sleep, different however in nature from mere non-sentient matter. During the period of a creation, on the other hand, just as the substance called clay a.s.sumes the forms of jars, platters, and so on, or as the water of the sea turns itself into foam, waves, bubbles, and so on, the universal causal substance abides in the form of a triad of const.i.tuent parts, viz. enjoying subjects, objects of enjoyment, and a ruler. The attributes of being a ruler, or an object of enjoyment, or an enjoying subject, and the perfections and imperfections depending on those attributes, are therefore distributed in the same way as the attributes of being a jar or pitcher or platter; and the different effects of these attributes are distributed among different parts of the substance, clay. The objects of enjoyment, subjects of enjoyment, and the ruler are one, on the other hand, in so far as 'that which is'

const.i.tutes their substance; just as jars, platters and pitchers are one in so far as their substance is const.i.tuted by clay. It is thus one substance only, viz. 'that which is,' that appears in different conditions, and it is in this sense that the world is non-different from Brahman.--But this theory is really in conflict with all Scripture, Smriti, Itihasa, Purana and Reasoning. For Scripture, Smriti, Itihasa and Purana alike teach that there is one supreme cause, viz. Brahman--a being that is the Lord of all Lords, all-knowing, all-powerful, instantaneously realising all its purposes, free of all blemish, not limited either by place or time, enjoying supreme unsurpa.s.sable bliss.

Nor can it be held that above the Lord there is 'pure Being' of which the Lord is a part only. For 'This which is "being" only was in the beginning one only, without a second; it thought, may I be many, may I grow forth' (Ch. Up. VI, 2, 3); 'Verily, in the beginning this was Brahman, one only. Being one it was not strong enough. It created the most excellent Kshattra, viz. those Kshattras among the Devas--Indra, Varuna, Soma, Rudra, Parjanya, Yama, Mrityu, isana' (Bri. Up. I, 4, 11); 'In the beginning all this was Self, one only; there was nothing whatsoever else blinking. He thought, shall I send forth worlds' (Ait.

ar. II, 4, 1, 1, 2); 'There was in truth Narayana only, not Brahma, not isana, nor heaven and earth, nor the nakshatras, nor the waters, nor Agni, nor Soma, nor Surya. Being alone he felt no delight. Of him merged in meditation' &c. (Mahana. Up. I, 1)--these and other texts prove that the highest cause is the Lord of all Lords, Narayana. For as the terms 'Being,' 'Brahman,' 'Self,' which are met with in sections treating of the same topic, are in one of those parallel sections particularised by the term 'Narayana,' it follows that they all mean Narayana. That the Lord only is the universal cause is shown by the following text also, 'He the highest great lord of lords, the highest deity of deities--he is the cause, the lord of the lords of the organs, and there is of him neither parent nor lord' (Svet. Up. VI, 7, 9). Similarly the Manu Smriti, 'Then the divine Self-existent (Brahma)--desirous to produce from his own body beings of many kind--first with a thought created the waters and placed his seed in them' (Ma. I, 6-8). Itihasas and Puranas also declare the Supreme Person only to be the universal cause, 'Narayana, of whom the world is the body, of infinite nature, eternal, when desirous to create sent forth from a