Carrier_ A Guided Tour Of An Aircraft Carrier Part 1

Carrier_ A Guided Tour of an Aircraft Carrier.

by Tom Clancy.

Acknowledgements

As we finish up the sixth book in this series, it is once again time to give credit where it is due. I'll start with my longtime friend, partner, and researcher, John D. Gresham. Once again, John met the people, took the pictures, spent nights aboard s.h.i.+p, and did all the things that make sure readers feel like they are there. We also have again benefited from the wisdom, experience, and efforts of series editor Professor Martin H. Green-berg, Larry Segriff, and all the staff at Tekno Books. Laura DeNinno is here again with her wonderful drawings, which have added so much to this book. As well, Tony Koltz and many others all need to be recognized for their outstanding editorial support that was so critical and timely.

Carrier required the support of many senior sea service personnel in a number of sensitive positions. In this regard, we have again been blessed with all the support that we needed and more. At the top were Admiral Jay Johnson and our old friend General Chuck Krulak. Both of these officers gave us their valuable time and support, and we cannot repay their trust and friends.h.i.+p. Their boss, Secretary of the Navy John Dalton, gave us critical support as well. Elsewhere around the Was.h.i.+ngton Beltway, we had the help of other influential leaders. Folks like Rear Admirals Dennis McGuinn and Carlos Johnson, and Captain Chuck Nash made it possible to get the information that we needed. This year, our home-away-from-home was the s.h.i.+ps of the required the support of many senior sea service personnel in a number of sensitive positions. In this regard, we have again been blessed with all the support that we needed and more. At the top were Admiral Jay Johnson and our old friend General Chuck Krulak. Both of these officers gave us their valuable time and support, and we cannot repay their trust and friends.h.i.+p. Their boss, Secretary of the Navy John Dalton, gave us critical support as well. Elsewhere around the Was.h.i.+ngton Beltway, we had the help of other influential leaders. Folks like Rear Admirals Dennis McGuinn and Carlos Johnson, and Captain Chuck Nash made it possible to get the information that we needed. This year, our home-away-from-home was the s.h.i.+ps of the George Was.h.i.+ngton George Was.h.i.+ngton battle group, and they took us to some really exciting places. Led by Rear Admiral Mike Mullen, this unit is key to helping keep us safe in a dangerous world. Running the battle group, and they took us to some really exciting places. Led by Rear Admiral Mike Mullen, this unit is key to helping keep us safe in a dangerous world. Running the GW GW was an extraordinary crew led by Captains "Yank" Rutheford and Mark Groothausen, as well as Commander Chuck Smith. These men took us under their wings, and kept us warm and fed. Thanks also to Captains Jim Deppe of USS was an extraordinary crew led by Captains "Yank" Rutheford and Mark Groothausen, as well as Commander Chuck Smith. These men took us under their wings, and kept us warm and fed. Thanks also to Captains Jim Deppe of USS Normandy Normandy and Jim Phillips of USS and Jim Phillips of USS Vella Gulf Vella Gulf for sharing insights and time and letting us break bread with them. For the thousands of other unnamed men and women of the for sharing insights and time and letting us break bread with them. For the thousands of other unnamed men and women of the GW GW group who took the time to show us the vital things that they do, we say a hearty "Thanks!" group who took the time to show us the vital things that they do, we say a hearty "Thanks!"

Another group that is always vital to our efforts consists of the members of the various military public and media offices (PAOs) that handled our numerous requests for visits, interviews, and information. Tops on our list were Rear Admirals Kendall Pease and Tom Jurkowsky in CHINFO at the Pentagon. Also at CHINFO were our project officers, Lieutenants Merritt Allen and Wendy Snyder, who did so much to keep things going. Over in the office of the Chief of Naval Operations was Captain Jim Kudla, who coordinated our interview requests. Down with the Atlantic Fleet in Norfolk, Virginia, Commander Joe Gradisher, Lieutenant Commander Roxy Merritt, and Mike Maus ably a.s.sisted us. Then there were the folks of the GW GW's PAO shop, led by the outstanding Lieutenant Joe Navritril. Along with Joe, an excellent young crew of media-relations specialists took us on some memorable adventures. Finally, we want to thank the special folks at the Navy Still Photo Branch, who have serviced our needs for so many years. They include Lieutenant Chris Madden and an incomparable staff of photographic experts. We thank them for their efforts as friends and professionals.

Again, thanks are due to our various industrial partners, without whom all the information on the various s.h.i.+ps, aircraft, weapons, and systems would never have come to light. Down at Newport News s.h.i.+pbuilding, we were allowed a look that few outsiders have ever had. Thanks are owed to Jerri Fuller d.i.c.kseski, Bill Hatfield, Mike Peters, Mike Shawcross, the folks from the U.S. Navy SUs.h.i.+PS office, and literally thousands of others. At the aircraft manufacturers, there were Barbara Anderson and Lon Nordeen of Boeing, Joe Stout, Karen Hagar, and Jeff Rhodes of Lockheed Martin, and finally, our old friend Bill Tuttle of Boeing Sikorsky. We also made and renewed many friends.h.i.+ps at the various missile, armament, and system manufacturers, including: Tony Geisha.n.u.ser and Vicki Fendalson at Raytheon Strike Systems, Larry Ernst at General Atomics, Craig Van Bieber at Lockheed, and the eternal Ed Rodemsky of Trimble Navigation. We also received an incredible amount of help from Dave "Hey Joe" Parsons and the fine folks at Whitney, Bradley, & Brown, Inc.

We owe thanks for all of our friends in New York, especially Robert Gottlieb, Debra Goldstein, and Matt Bialer at William Morris, as well as Robert Youdelman and Tom Mallon, who took care of the legal details. Over at Berkley Books, our highest thanks go to our series editor, Tom Colgan, as well as David Shanks, Kim Waltemyer, and the staff of Berkley Books. To old friends like Matt Caffrey, Jim Stevenson, A. D. Baker, Norman Polmar, and Bob Dorr, thanks again for your contributions and wisdom. Thanks also to the late Jeff Eth.e.l.l and Russ Eggnor, who gave so much of themselves to us and the world. And to all the folks who took us for rides, tours, shoots, and exercises, thanks again for teaching the ignorant how things really really work. As for our friends, families, and loved ones, we again thank you. work. As for our friends, families, and loved ones, we again thank you.

Foreword.

"Where are the carriers?" This has been the likely first question asked by every President of the United States since World War II when faced with a developing international crisis that involves U.S. interests. It was probably also asked by Admiral Isoroku Yamamoto (the Commander in Chief of the j.a.panese Combined Fleet) after the j.a.panese attack on Pearl Harbor initiating World War II. This same question was always a top concern of the Soviet leaders.h.i.+p throughout the Cold War. It drove an inordinate amount of their military expenditures, as well as many of their operational planning decisions.

More recently, in March of 1996, two U.S. aircraft carrier battle groups (CVBGs) were dispatched to the Taiwan Straits after the People's Republic of China launched a program of ballistic missile exercises close to Taiwan. The presence of the two aircraft carrier groups so close to the mainland of China defused the crisis, and prevented a Chinese escalation or miscalculation of our resolve.

The following year saw the latest in a series of crises with Iraq over Saddam Hussein's refusal to meet United Nations inspection criteria over his weapons of ma.s.s destruction. This was responded to by sending two more CVBGs to the Persian Gulf, this time to prepare for possible strikes on Iraqi targets had that been necessary.

Clearly, the flexibility, mobility, and independence of these versatile and forward-deployed a.s.sets will keep them center stage as our nation leads the world in the transition to a free-market system of democracies.

The rapid development and growth of airpower as the primary enabling capability for military operations represents one of the true military revolutions of the 20th century. At the close of this century, with manned s.p.a.ce exploration and earth-orbiting satellites commonplace, it is hard to conceive that just ninety-five years ago, the Wright brothers made their first flight at Kitty Hawk, North Carolina. That historic first effort traveled less distance than the wingspan of a modern jumbo jet. However, things began to rapidly progress with the coming of the First World War. With the start of the Great War visionaries around the world realized the potential significance of aviation capabilities on military operations. By 1914, then-Secretary of the Navy Josephus Daniels had announced "that the point has been reached where aircraft must form a large part of our naval forces for offensive and defensive operations." It was an insightful thought.

The ensuing twenty-five years before our entry into World War II saw the United States developing the a.s.sets and vision to take airpower to sea in a way unmatched by any other nation. As a maritime nation dependent on the sea lines of communications for its economic and national security interests, the United States would need the edge provided by Naval aviation to win the greatest over-water military campaigns ever conducted. The history of the Second World War in the Pacific doc.u.ments the great debt of grat.i.tude our nation owes to the early pioneers of naval aviation. These were legendary men like Glenn Curtis, Eugene Ely, Theodore Ellyson, John Towers, John Rogers, Was.h.i.+ngton Chambers, Henry Mustin, and many more too numerous to mention.

However, it was at Pearl Harbor on December 7th, 1941, with the war cry of "Tora ... Tora ... Tora!" "Tora ... Tora ... Tora!" and our own lax state of readiness, that j.a.pan brought home to the world the impact of carrier aviation. and our own lax state of readiness, that j.a.pan brought home to the world the impact of carrier aviation.1 The fact that none of our three Pacific-based aircraft carriers were in port that fateful morning may have been the single most significant factor in our eventual victory during the Great Pacific War. At the time of our entry into World War II, the U.S. Navy had just seven big-deck aircraft carriers in commission: The fact that none of our three Pacific-based aircraft carriers were in port that fateful morning may have been the single most significant factor in our eventual victory during the Great Pacific War. At the time of our entry into World War II, the U.S. Navy had just seven big-deck aircraft carriers in commission: Saratoga, Lexington, Ranger, Yorktown, Enterprise, Wasp, and Hornet. Saratoga, Lexington, Ranger, Yorktown, Enterprise, Wasp, and Hornet. These "seven sisters" would take the war to our enemies from Casablanca and Malta to Midway and Guadalca.n.a.l. These "seven sisters" would take the war to our enemies from Casablanca and Malta to Midway and Guadalca.n.a.l.

Clearly, Admiral Yamamoto knew that j.a.pan had awakened a "sleeping giant," and he believed a prolonged war would go in favor of the United States. He knew the potential productivity of American industry and its people, something that he had witnessed personally while on naval attache duty in Was.h.i.+ngton. Thus it was that j.a.pan, needing a quick decisive victory over the U.S. Navy in the Pacific, set in motion the great sea battle off Midway Island in mid-1942.2 Yamamoto mustered an overwhelming naval armada, designed to take Midway and hand the U.S. Navy and their carrier groups a crus.h.i.+ng defeat. However, when the Battle of Midway was over, the tide had turned in the Pacific, though not in the favor of j.a.pan. Thanks to the raw courage and aggressive tactics of the U.S. carrier pilots as well as superb intelligence, four j.a.panese carriers and a cruiser were sunk. In the process, j.a.pan's ability to project naval air power throughout the vast Pacific was crippled forever. Yamamoto mustered an overwhelming naval armada, designed to take Midway and hand the U.S. Navy and their carrier groups a crus.h.i.+ng defeat. However, when the Battle of Midway was over, the tide had turned in the Pacific, though not in the favor of j.a.pan. Thanks to the raw courage and aggressive tactics of the U.S. carrier pilots as well as superb intelligence, four j.a.panese carriers and a cruiser were sunk. In the process, j.a.pan's ability to project naval air power throughout the vast Pacific was crippled forever.

The U.S. carrier groups and their courageous aviators had, on paper, no right to win. But win they did. The cost was not insignificant; fifteen of fifteen aircraft and twenty-nine of thirty aircrew in Torpedo Squadron 8 alone were lost. Along with scores of American aircraft and their crews, the USN lost the Yorktown Yorktown and a destroyer. and a destroyer.3 However, finding a way to win in the face of adversity is a naval aviation tradition. However, finding a way to win in the face of adversity is a naval aviation tradition.

Today, U.S. carrier aviation is inextricably tied to the concept of United States forward presence and power projection; the "From the Sea" doctrine. Since the end of the East/West conflict, the United States military has withdrawn from the majority of its overseas bases. Consequently, America's ability to exercise a forward military presence and provide military forces depends on a combination of naval power and power projection from the continental United States. This means that in the complex post-Cold War world, where the majority of the world's major population centers are within two hundred miles of the open ocean, naval forces are increasingly relevant, and able to influence all manner of events that shape regional stability. The fact that this can be done with little or no land-based support and with no host nation support is a tremendous advantage for our national interests.

The independence, sustainability, and staying power of naval units often makes them the forces of choice for our National Command Authorities. This includes protecting the sea-lanes for a global free-market economy, reinforcing and supporting American emba.s.sies, and executing non-combatant evacuations of American citizens overseas. These and many other missions are ideally suited to our forward-deployed naval forces. This has been continuously demonstrated in places like the Taiwan Straits, the Persian Gulf, Somalia, Albania, the Central African Republic, Liberia, Zaire, and Sierra Leone. America is an island nation, dependent upon the seas for our economic prosperity and security. There was good reason why our founding fathers determined the need for the nation to maintain naval forces and raise an army. We should occasionally remind ourselves of this reality, since it is the geopolitics, not the geography of the world, that has changed over time.

Unfortunately, aircraft carriers and naval forces in general have often been seen as both provocative and vulnerable. Many critics who do not understand the science of modern naval operations have claimed that advances in s.p.a.ce systems and missile technology make the carrier/naval forces excessively vulnerable to air and missile attacks. Certainly technology has increased the threat from these systems, but far less so than that faced by fixed land bases and ground forces from terrorism and ballistic missile attacks.

For starters, there is the challenge to any would-be enemy who would try to find a CVBG in the open ocean. Naval units are highly mobile and the world's oceans are a big, dynamic place. Trying to coordinate sophisti-catedlong-range targeting solutions onto a target that can move thirty nautical miles in any direction in just one hour, or up to seven hundred nautical miles in a day, is a tough business. Clearly, a CVBG is not an easy target. The inherent mobility, together with sophisticated CVBG electronic-warfare-deception packages (radar "blip" enhancers, target decoys, etc.), combined with the air defenses provided by our Aegis-equipped escorts (Ticonderoga- (Ticonderoga-cla.s.s [CG-47] cruisers and Arleigh Burke-cla.s.s Arleigh Burke-cla.s.s destroyers [DDG-51]) as well as the CVN's own organic aircraft, make the vulnerability quite manageable. destroyers [DDG-51]) as well as the CVN's own organic aircraft, make the vulnerability quite manageable.

The threat of theater ballistic and cruise missiles is also a matter of concern for the CVBG, and work is rapidly progressing to increase our defenses against these cla.s.ses of weapons. The Aegis combat system is being improved and extended to be able to provide theater-wide defense from the sea, for both land and sea forces. Survivability from these threats will always be greater from a mobile bastion at sea than a fixed base on land. Arriving along with this new capability are new aircraft, s.h.i.+ps, and even new carrier designs, which will help keep the CVBG credible long after the last manned-aircraft designs are retired. However, one does not have such naval forces for purely defensive purposes.

The real strength of CVBGs is offensive, making them a threat to the very despots and enemies that might themselves wish ill to the carrier group. Able to generate hundreds of air and missile attack sorties day and night, the modern CVBG is a powerful tool that requires no permission of ally or foe to do its job. Today, when the challenge is to get the most return for our limited defense dollars, it is significant to note that since the end of World War II, we have not lost any any carriers to enemy action or geopolitical changes. carriers to enemy action or geopolitical changes.

This is hardly true in the case of our overseas land bases. In such countries as Iran, Libya, Vietnam, and the Philippines to name just a few, we not only lost the airfields that the U.S. paid for, but also the costly infrastructure devoted to support, maintenance, and quality-of-life issues. There also is the fact that we pay a high monetary and often unacceptable political price for even restricted access to foreign military land and air bases. As recently as 1997, the U.S. was not allowed to place the desired number of USAF aircraft in Saudi Arabia, where the U.S. presence was already established. From this viewpoint, the aircraft carrier, which has a forty-five-year life cycle and remains free from such entanglements, is a relative bargain for our scarce defense dollars.

As a new crop of world economic and potential military superpowers emerge in the coming years, the value of aircraft carriers to U.S. foreign policy goals will dramatically increase. One of the unchallenged realities of modern warfare is that you cannot be victorious in any conflict on the ground or at sea without air/s.p.a.ce superiority. In an era of sophisticated precision weapons, including cruise and ballistic missiles, this is the medium that enables our land and sea forces to operate with acceptable risk. Air superiority is even more essential for forward-deployed forces that are shaping the battles.p.a.ce, trying to create stability and prevent conflict from occurring through their own forward presence. In more and more cases, this flexible combat power will have to be provided by forward-deployed carrier and amphibious groups. This is a reality since the world's surface is 70% covered by water, and our free-market economy depends on open access to the sea lines of communication.

Naval forces are more than just s.h.i.+ps, planes, and weapons. What I hope this book conveys is the quality and dedication of the people it takes to provide the nation the kind of flexibility and fighting punch packaged in our modem CVBGs. The carriers, Aegis cruisers, and destroyers, together with their aircraft and fast-attack submarines, would be nothing without the people who make them work. Operating a high-usage airport in day and night operations, while moving at thirty knots on the open seas, is one thing. However, to provide all the organic support to do this for extended periods of time at a great distance from a home base is another thing all together.

A modern Nimitz- Nimitz-cla.s.s (CVN-68) carrier is the equivalent of a small American city packaged into just four-and-a-half acres. This city not only operates an airport on its roof, but also can move over seven hundred nautical miles in any given day. It also provides full medical support, machine shops, jet engine test cells, food service operations, computer support, electrical generation, and almost everything else that you can imagine.

Now picture the carrier as a business, a company that has a net worth of six to seven billion dollars and employs over six thousand people. The average age of the six thousand employees is less than twenty-one years. On top of this, the Chairman of the Board (Admiral and Staff), the President and Chief Operating Officer (Captain and Air Wing Commander), all the Vice Presidents (Department Heads), and every other employee rotates out of the company every two to three years. Common sense would dictate that you could never make a profit with any any business under those conditions. Yet the U.S. Navy operates successfully under these very conditions, and the profit is freedom, and protection of our national interests. business under those conditions. Yet the U.S. Navy operates successfully under these very conditions, and the profit is freedom, and protection of our national interests.

This dedication of young Americans, the symphony of their teamwork, and the indomitable spirit of the American sailor make this all possible. We owe them our respect and grat.i.tude, and must never take the service or sacrifices they and their families make for granted. It was my privilege to be a s.h.i.+pmate with these great Americans for over thirty-seven years. For this I salute the American Sailors, Marines, Soldiers, Airmen, and Coast Guards-men of every generation who have protected our freedom at home and around the world.

-Leon A. "Bud" Edney Admiral, USN (Retired) Former Commander, U.S. Atlantic Command & NATO Supreme Allied Commander, Atlantic

Introduction.

Presence, influence, and options. In these three words are the basic rationale for why politicians want carrier battle groups, and have been willing to spend over a trillion U.S. taxpayer dollars building a dozen for American use. That was hardly the original reason, though. Back in the years after the Great War, naval powers were trying to find loopholes in the first series of arms-control treaties (which had to do with naval forces). With the numbers and size of battles.h.i.+ps and other vessels limited by the agreements, various nations began to consider what s.h.i.+ps carrying aircraft might be able to contribute to navies. At first, the duties of these first carrier-borne aircraft were limited to spotting the fall of naval sh.e.l.ls and providing a primitive fighter cover for the fleet. Within a few years, though, aircraft technologies began to undergo a revolutionary series of improvements. Metal aircraft structures, improved power plants and fuels, as well as the first of what we would call avionics began to find their way onto airplanes. By the outbreak of World War II, some naval a.n.a.lysts and leaders even suspected that carriers and their embarked aircraft might be capable of sinking the same battles.h.i.+ps and other surface s.h.i.+ps that they had originally been designed to cover.

The Second World War will be remembered by naval historians as a conflict dominated by two new cla.s.ses of s.h.i.+ps: fast carriers and submarines. The diesel-electric submarines were a highly efficient force able to deny navies and nations the use of the sea-lanes for commerce and warfare. Unfortunately, as the German Kriegsmarine and Grand Admiral Karl Donitz found, you do not win wars through simple denial of a battles.p.a.ce like the Atlantic Ocean. Victory through seapower requires the ability to take the offensive on terms and at times of your choosing. This means being able to dominate vast volumes of air, ocean, and even near-earth s.p.a.ce. Without a balanced force to project its power over the entire range of possibilities and situations, one-dimensional forces like the U-boat-dominated Kriegsmarine Kriegsmarine wound up being crushed in the crucible of war. wound up being crushed in the crucible of war.

By contrast, the carriers and their escorts of World War II were able to project offensive power over the entire globe. From the North Cape to the islands of the Central Pacific, carrier-based aircraft dominated the greatest naval war in history. Along the way, they helped nullify the threat from Germany's U-boats and other enemy submarines, as well as sweeping the seas of enemy s.h.i.+ps and aircraft. While the eventual j.a.panese surrender may have been signed aboard the battles.h.i.+p Missouri Missouri in Tokyo Bay, it occurred in the shadow of a sky blackened by hundreds of carrier aircraft flying overhead in review. Called "Halsey's Folly," the flyover was the final proof of the real force that had ended the second global war of this century. Despite the claims of Air Force leaders who p.r.o.nounced navies worthless in an era of nuclear-armed bombers, when the next shooting conflict erupted in Korea, it was carrier aircraft that covered the withdrawal to the Pusan Perimeter and the amphibious landings at Inchon. They then dropped into a role that would become common in the next half-century, acting as mobile air bases to project combat power ash.o.r.e. in Tokyo Bay, it occurred in the shadow of a sky blackened by hundreds of carrier aircraft flying overhead in review. Called "Halsey's Folly," the flyover was the final proof of the real force that had ended the second global war of this century. Despite the claims of Air Force leaders who p.r.o.nounced navies worthless in an era of nuclear-armed bombers, when the next shooting conflict erupted in Korea, it was carrier aircraft that covered the withdrawal to the Pusan Perimeter and the amphibious landings at Inchon. They then dropped into a role that would become common in the next half-century, acting as mobile air bases to project combat power ash.o.r.e.

Despite the best efforts of the former Soviet Union to develop a credible "blue-water" fleet during the Cold War, the U.S. Navy never lost control of any ocean that it cared about. One of the big reasons for this was the regular presence of carrier battle groups, which took any sort of "home-court advantage" away from a potential enemy. Armed with aircraft that were the match of anything flying from a land base, and flown by the best-trained aviators in the world, the American carriers and their escorts were the "eight-hundred-pound guerrillas" of the Cold War naval world. This is a position that they still hold to this day. However, their contributions have taken on a deadly new relevance in the post-Cold War world.

One of the tragic truths about America's winning of the Cold War was that we did it with anyone who would help us. This meant that the U.S. frequently backed any local dictator with a well-placed air or naval base and a willingness to say that Communism was bad. The need to contain the ambitions of the Soviet Union and their allies took a front seat to common sense and human rights. The result was a series of alliances with despots ranging from Ferdinand Marcos to Manuel Noriega. However, there was a war to win and we did win it. The price, however, is what we are paying today. Around the world, Americans are being asked to please pack up their aircraft, s.h.i.+ps, and bases and please take them home. We should not be offended; we did it to ourselves. The continuing legacy of squalor in places like Olongapo City in the Philippines and other "outside the gate" towns was more than the emerging democracies of the post-Cold War era could stand. When you add in our continued interference in the internal politics of the countries that hosted our bases, it is a wonder that we have any friends left in the world as the 20th century ends.

Our poor foreign policy record aside, the United States and our allies still have a number of responsibilities in the post-Cold War world. This means simply that to wield military force in a crisis, we now have just a few options. One is to ask nicely if a friendly host nation might allow us to base personnel, aircraft, and equipment on their soil so that we can threaten their neighbors with military force. As might be imagined, this can be a tough thing to do in these muddled times. George Bush managed to do it in the Persian Gulf in 1991, but Bill Clinton failed in the same task in 1997 and 1998. Even with a dictator like Saddam Hussein, most regional neighbors would rather tolerate the bully than risk the death and destruction that occurred in Kuwait in 1990 and 1991. This leaves just two other credible options; to base military power at homeland bases or aboard sovereign flagged s.h.i.+ps at sea. The first of these options means that fleets of transport s.h.i.+ps and aircraft must be maintained just to move them to the place where a crisis is breaking out. It also takes time to move combat aircraft and ground units to the places where trouble may be brewing. This is why having units forward-based aboard s.h.i.+ps is so incredibly important to us these days.

Time in a crisis is more precious than gold. As much as any other factor, the time delay in responding to a developing conflict determines whether it results in war, peace, or a distasteful standoff. While we may never know for sure, there is a good chance that Saddam Hussein stopped at the Saudi border in 1990 because of the rapid flood of U.S. and coalition forces into the Kingdom. However, it would be a tough act to duplicate today. One of the benefits of our military buildup in the late years of the Cold War was the ability to do both of these things well. Along with lots of continental-based forces with excellent transport capabilities, we usually had a number of carrier and amphibious groups forward-based to respond to crises. However, these rich circ.u.mstances are now just happy memories.

Today the U.S. Navy considers itself lucky to have retained an even dozen carrier battle groups, along with their matched amphibious ready groups. By being able to keep just two or three of these forward-deployed at any time, the United States has managed to maintain a toehold in places where it has few allies and no bases. The recent confrontation with Iraq over United Nations weapons inspectors, had it led to war, would have been prosecuted almost entirely from a pair of carrier groups based in the Persian Gulf. With the 1990/91 allied coalition splintered over each country's regional interests, almost n.o.body would allow U.S. warplanes and ground forces onto their soil. This is a 180 change from 1990/91, when the majority of Allied airpower was land-based.

This brings us back to the three words at the beginning of this introduction: presence, influence, and options. Naval forces generally provide presence. Carrier groups, though, dominate an area for hundreds of miles/ kilometers in every direction, including near-earth s.p.a.ce. While a frigate or destroyer impresses everyone who sees it, a carrier group can change the balance of military and political power of an entire region. A weak country backed by an American carrier group is going to be much tougher to overthrow or invade for a local or regional rogue state or warlord. That is the definition of international presence these days. Finally, there is the matter of options.

In the deepest heart of every politician, there is a love of options. Having choices in a tough situation is every politician's greatest desire, and carrier groups give them that. It is one of the oddities of national politics that until they become President or Prime Minister, politicians frequently and publicly view large military units like carrier groups as a waste of taxpayer money. However, let the politicians. .h.i.t the top of a nation's political food chain, and they sing another tune entirely. It is almost a matter of national folklore that every Chief Executive will, at some time in their Presidency, ask those four famous words: "Where are the carriers?" It certainly has been the case since Franklin Roosevelt haunted the halls of the White House. Today, in fact, the use of forward-deployed forces afloat may be the only option open to a national leader.

Understanding aircraft carriers and their a.s.sociated aircraft and battle group escorts is not an easy task. Focusing only on the flattop is like tunnel vision, since the carrier's own weapons are purely defensive and quite short-ranged. To fully understand what effects a carrier group moving into your neighborhood is going to have, it is necessary to look beyond the carrier's bulk and dig deeper. You must look into the embarked air wing with its wide variety of aircraft and weapons, as well as the escorts. These range from Aegis-equipped missile cruisers and destroyers, to deadly nuclear-powered attack submarines. Armed with surface-to-air missiles and Tomahawk cruise missiles, they not only protect the carrier from attack, but have their own mighty offensive punch as well. To see it all takes a wider, deeper look than you are likely to find on the nightly news or in your daily newspaper. To do that requires that you spend time with people. Lots of people. These include the Navy's leaders, who make the policy decisions and have the responsibility of keeping our Navy the best in the world. You also need to spend some time with the folks who build the s.h.i.+ps, aircraft, and weapons that make the force credible and dangerous. Finally, you have to know the thousands of people who run the battle groups and sail them to the places where they are needed across the globe.

I hope as you read this book that you get some sense of the people, because it is they that are the real strength of the carrier groups, and our nation. While you and I stay home safe and warm in the company of our families and loved ones, they go out for months at a time to put teeth into our national policies and backbone into our words. It is they who make the sacrifices and perhaps pay the ultimate price. I hope you see that in these pages, and you think of them as you get to know the "heavy metal" of the U.S. Navy up close. If you do, I think that you will gain a real perspective on their difficult, but vital, profession.

-Tom Clancy July 1998

Naval Aviation 101 "Where are the carriers?"

Every American President since Franklin Delano Roosevelt

Aircraft carriers stretch perceptions. First of all, they're big-bigger big-bigger than most skysc.r.a.pers-skysc.r.a.pers that can move across the sea at a better than fair clip. And yet, despite their great size, when you watch flight operations on the flight deck (usually as busy as a medium-sized munic.i.p.al airport), you can't help but wonder how so much gets done in such a tiny s.p.a.ce. They not only stretch perceptions, they stretch the limits of the nation's finances and industrial capacity; and they stretch credibility. It's hard to find a weapon that raises more controversy. than most skysc.r.a.pers-skysc.r.a.pers that can move across the sea at a better than fair clip. And yet, despite their great size, when you watch flight operations on the flight deck (usually as busy as a medium-sized munic.i.p.al airport), you can't help but wonder how so much gets done in such a tiny s.p.a.ce. They not only stretch perceptions, they stretch the limits of the nation's finances and industrial capacity; and they stretch credibility. It's hard to find a weapon that raises more controversy.

Controversy has troubled naval aviation from the early days of the century, when primitive airplanes originally went to sea. At first, airpower was seen as a useless diversion of scarce funds from more pressing naval requirements like the construction of big-gun battles.h.i.+ps. Later, after naval aviation became a serious compet.i.tor for sea power's throne, bitter infighting arose between gunnery and airpower advocates. Today, as the acknowledged "big stick" of America's Navy, the aircraft carrier is under attack from those who claim to have better ways to project military power into forward areas. Air Force generals plug B-2A stealth bombers with precision weapons (so-called "virtual presence"). Submariners and surface naval officers hawk their platforms carrying precision strike missiles. A good case can be made for all of these. Still, in a post-Cold War world that becomes more dangerous and uncertain by the week, aircraft carriers have a proven track record of effectiveness in crisis situations. Neither bombers nor "a.r.s.enal s.h.i.+ps" can make that claim.

Question: What makes aircraft carriers so effective? What makes aircraft carriers so effective?

The USS George Was.h.i.+ngton George Was.h.i.+ngton (CVN- 73) operating her embarked carrier air wing One (CVW-1). Battle groups based around aircraft carriers are the backbone of American seapower. (CVN- 73) operating her embarked carrier air wing One (CVW-1). Battle groups based around aircraft carriers are the backbone of American seapower.

OFFICIAL U.S. NAVY PHOTO.

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Answer: Carriers and their accompanying battle groups can move freely over the oceans of the world (their free movement is legally protected by the principles of "Freedom of Navigation"), and can do as they please as long as they stay outside of other nations' territorial waters. Carriers and their accompanying battle groups can move freely over the oceans of the world (their free movement is legally protected by the principles of "Freedom of Navigation"), and can do as they please as long as they stay outside of other nations' territorial waters.

A nation's wars.h.i.+ps are legally sovereign territories wherever they might be floating; and other nations have no legal influence over their actions or personnel. Thus, an aircraft carrier can park the equivalent of an Air Force fighter wing offsh.o.r.e to conduct sustained flight and/or combat operations. In other words, if a crisis breaks out in some littoral (coastal) region, and a carrier battle group (CVBG) is in the area, then the nation controlling it can influence the outcome of the crisis.4 Add to this CVBG an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) loaded with a Marine Expeditionary Unit-Special Operations Capable (MEU (SOC)), and you have even more influence. Add to this CVBG an Amphibious Ready Group (ARG) loaded with a Marine Expeditionary Unit-Special Operations Capable (MEU (SOC)), and you have even more influence.5 This, in a nut-sh.e.l.l, is the real value of aircraft carriers. This, in a nut-sh.e.l.l, is the real value of aircraft carriers.

Such influence does not come without cost. Each CVBG represents a national investment approaching US $20 billion. And with over ten thousand embarked personnel that need to be fed, paid, and cared for, each group costs in the neighborhood of a billion dollars to operate and maintain annually. That's a lot of school lunches. That's a lot of schools! schools! Add to this current United States plans to maintain twelve CVBGs. And then add the ma.s.sive costs of the government infrastructure that backs these up (supply s.h.i.+ps, ports, naval air stations, training organizations, etc.), as well as the vast commercial interests (s.h.i.+pbuilders, aircraft and weapons manufacturers, etc.) necessary to keep the battle groups modern and credible. And then consider that not all twelve battle groups are available at one time. Because the s.h.i.+ps need periodic yard service and the crews and air crews need to be trained and qualified, only two or three CVBGs are normally forward-deployed. (There is usually a group in the Mediterranean Sea, another in the Western Pacific Ocean, and another supporting operations in the Persian Gulf region.) Add to this current United States plans to maintain twelve CVBGs. And then add the ma.s.sive costs of the government infrastructure that backs these up (supply s.h.i.+ps, ports, naval air stations, training organizations, etc.), as well as the vast commercial interests (s.h.i.+pbuilders, aircraft and weapons manufacturers, etc.) necessary to keep the battle groups modern and credible. And then consider that not all twelve battle groups are available at one time. Because the s.h.i.+ps need periodic yard service and the crews and air crews need to be trained and qualified, only two or three CVBGs are normally forward-deployed. (There is usually a group in the Mediterranean Sea, another in the Western Pacific Ocean, and another supporting operations in the Persian Gulf region.) Is this handful of mobile airfields worth the cost? The answer depends on the responses to several other questions. Such as: How much influence does our country want to have in the world? What kind? How much do we want to affect the actions and behavior of other countries? And so on.

Sure, it's not hard to equate the role of CVBGs with "gunboat diplomacy" policies of the 19th century. But doing that trivializes the true value of the carriers to America and her allies. Among the lessons the last few years have taught us is one that's inescapable: The United States has global responsibilities. These go far beyond simply maintaining freedom of maritime lines of communications and supporting our allies in times of crisis. Whether we like it or not, most of the world's nations look to America as a leader. And these same nations (whether they want to say so officially or not) see us as the world's policeman. When trouble breaks out somewhere, who're you going to call? China? Russia? j.a.pan? Not in this decade.

Sure, it's not always in the best interest of the United States to give a positive answer to every request for support and aid. But when the answer is positive, there is the problem of how to deliver the needed response. Once upon a time, our network of overseas bases allowed us to project a forward presence. No longer. Over the last half century, a poorly conceived and ill-executed American foreign policy has allowed us to be evicted from something over 75% of these bases. Add to this the limited resources available following the recent military drawdowns, and the National Command Authorities are left with very few options. Most of these are resident in the CVBGs and ARGs that make up the forward-deployed forces of the United States Navy.

At any given time, there are usually two or three CVBGs out there on six-month cruises, doing their day-in, day-out job of looking out for the interests of America and our allies, with adventure and danger only a satellite transmission away. Thanks to the support of service forces (fuel tankers, supply s.h.i.+ps, etc.), a well-handled CVBG's only limitations are the durability of machinery and the morale of the people aboard. Given the will of a strong nation to back it, CVBGs can be parked off any coast in the world, and sit out there like a bird of prey.

That is the true meaning of "presence."

Rationale: Why Aircraft Carriers?

So why does America really really need aircraft carriers? We've seen the theoretical, "policy" answer to that question. But what's the practical, real-world answer? What value does a ninety-year-old military concept have in an age of satellite surveillance and ballistic missiles? How does a relative handful of aircraft based aboard Naval vessels actually effect events on a regional scale? Finally, what does this capability give to a regional CinC or other on-scene commander? All of these questions must be explored if the real value of carriers and CVBGs is to be fully understood. need aircraft carriers? We've seen the theoretical, "policy" answer to that question. But what's the practical, real-world answer? What value does a ninety-year-old military concept have in an age of satellite surveillance and ballistic missiles? How does a relative handful of aircraft based aboard Naval vessels actually effect events on a regional scale? Finally, what does this capability give to a regional CinC or other on-scene commander? All of these questions must be explored if the real value of carriers and CVBGs is to be fully understood.

Aircraft Carriers: An Open Architecture In less than a hundred years, we've pa.s.sed from the first heavier-than-air test flights to deep-s.p.a.ce probes. During that same time, after over five centuries of preeminence, we have seen the demise of gunnery as the measure of Naval power. The decline of naval guns and the rise of airpower were not instantly obvious. In fact, in the early 1900's, to suggest it would have invited a straitjacket. The first flying machines were toys for rich adventurers and stuntmen, their payload and range were extremely limited, and their worth in military operations was insignificant. The technology of early manned flight was derived from kites, bicycles, and automobiles. Structures were flimsy and heavy, and the engines bulky and inefficient.

Though the First World War did much to improve aircraft technologies, and made many military leaders believers in the value of airpower, the world powers had just made a staggering investment in big-gun dreadnought-type battles.h.i.+ps that Naval leaders had no appet.i.te to replace. Thus, Naval airpower wound up being limited by arms treaties or shuffled to the bottom of the funding priorities. Even so, though few saw this then, the future of Naval airpower was already a given. There are two reasons for this:

First-Aircraft soon proved they could carry weapons loads farther than guns could shoot, and with greater flexibility.

Second-An aircraft carrier can more easily accommodate upgrades and improvements than an armored s.h.i.+p with fixed-bore guns.

In order to retrofit a larger gun to deliver a larger sh.e.l.l, you have to replace the turrets and barbettes. And to do that, you have to completely rebuild a battles.h.i.+p or cruiser. By comparison, for an aircraft carrier to operate a new kind of aircraft, bomb, or missile, you only need to make sure that the new system fits inside the hangars and elevators. You also need to make sure that it's not too heavy for the flight deck, and (if it's an aircraft) that it can take off and land on the deck. Simply put, as long as an aircraft or weapons fits aboard a carrier, it can probably be employed successfully. In modern systems terminology, the carrier is an "open architecture" weapons system, with well-understood interfaces and parameters. Much like a computer with built-in capabilities for expansion cards and networking, aircraft carriers have a vast capability to accept new weapons and systems. Thus, some battles.h.i.+ps built at the beginning of the First World War were sc.r.a.pped after less than five years service, while modern supercarriers have planned lives measured in decades.

Sure, gun-armed wars.h.i.+ps can still hurt aircraft carriers. And in fact, during World War II, several flattops found themselves on the losing end of duels with surface s.h.i.+ps. Today, missile-armed s.h.i.+ps and submarines pose an even greater hazard to flattops, as they do to all vessels. However, all things being equal, the range of their aircraft is going to give carriers a critical edge in any combat. Carrier aircraft can hold an enemy s.h.i.+p or target at a safe distance, and then either neutralize or destroy it. The word for this advantage is "standoff." By "standing off" from an enemy and attacking him from over the horizon, you greatly reduce his ability to counterattack the carrier force, making defense much easier. In fact, just finding a CVBG is harder than you might think, as the Soviet Union discovered to its great chagrin on more than one occasion during the Cold War. If-as now seems likely-the next generation of American flattops incorporates stealth technology, then you can plan on aircraft carriers serving well into the next century.

Some Propositions about Sea-Based Airpower The "real-world" effects of "sea-based" naval aviation (that is, aircraft based aboard s.h.i.+ps at sea) and the principles by which battle group commanders ply their intricate and difficult trade are many, varied, and complex; and learning these takes years. What follows is no subst.i.tute for those years. Still, knowledge of some of the basic propositions about sea-based airpower that guide the plans and actions of our Naval leaders can't help but be useful: * Control of the Total Littoral Battles.p.a.ce Is Impossible without Air Control of the Total Littoral Battles.p.a.ce Is Impossible without Airpower-While it cannot realistically win a battle, campaign, or war by itself, no victory is possible without airpower. Broadly defined as the effective military use of the skies-airpower is vital to controlling the "battles.p.a.ce" of the littoral regions. One only need look back at British operations in the Falklands in 1982 to see how much can go wrong when a fleet operates within range of enemy land-based aircraft without proper air cover. As a result, their victory in that war was "a very near thing."* Sea-Based Airpower Involves a Variety of Systems-Naval Sea-Based Airpower Involves a Variety of Systems-Naval forces bring a variety of systems and sensors to the littoral battles.p.a.ce. To name a few: fighter jets and transport helicopters; submarine-hunting helicopters and aircraft; surface-to-air (SAM) missiles defending against aircraft and ballistic missiles; and cruise missiles. This functional diversity means that a CVBG commander can bring any number of systems and employment options to bear, greatly compounding the defensive problem of an adversary. Properly utilized and supported, sea-based airpower can provide enabling force and muscle for any number and type of military operations. forces bring a variety of systems and sensors to the littoral battles.p.a.ce. To name a few: fighter jets and transport helicopters; submarine-hunting helicopters and aircraft; surface-to-air (SAM) missiles defending against aircraft and ballistic missiles; and cruise missiles. This functional diversity means that a CVBG commander can bring any number of systems and employment options to bear, greatly compounding the defensive problem of an adversary. Properly utilized and supported, sea-based airpower can provide enabling force and muscle for any number and type of military operations. Examples of this functional diversity include: deterring the use of ballistic and cruise missiles in a regional conflict, supporting amphibious and airborne operations, providing cover for a non-combatant personnel evacuation, or firing land-attack missiles and controlling unmanned aerial vehicles from submarines. Examples of this functional diversity include: deterring the use of ballistic and cruise missiles in a regional conflict, supporting amphibious and airborne operations, providing cover for a non-combatant personnel evacuation, or firing land-attack missiles and controlling unmanned aerial vehicles from submarines.An F-14D Tomcat taxies through catapult steam on the deck of the USS Carl Vinson Carl Vinson (CVN- 70). The four-and-a-half-acre flight deck is one of the busiest and most dangerous workplaces in the world. It also is the place where carriers prove their worth in the real world. (CVN- 70). The four-and-a-half-acre flight deck is one of the busiest and most dangerous workplaces in the world. It also is the place where carriers prove their worth in the real world.OFFICIAL U.S. NAVY PHOTO[image]* Sea-Based Airpower Is Inherently Flexible and Mobile- Sea-Based Airpower Is Inherently Flexible and Mobile-Because they are based aboard s.h.i.+ps, sea-based aviation a.s.sets are highly mobile. Modem CVBGs can easily move five hundred nautical miles in a day, which means that they can redeploy almost anywhere in the world in just a few weeks. And with a little warning, a forward-deployed force can be in a crisis zone in days, sometimes even in hours. Because they are not directly tied to a land-based command structure, the personnel and units embarked aboard the s.h.i.+ps are equipped and trained to work on their own. Finally, because sea-based air units pack a lot of power into very small packages, they have great agility in an uncertain, fast-moving crisis or combat situation.* Sea-Based Airpower Is Inherently Offensive- Sea-Based Airpower Is Inherently Offensive-While airpower has powerful defensive capabilities, it is best used in offensive operations, thus allowing its full power to be focused and timed into blows of maximum power and efficiency. The ability to rapidly s.h.i.+ft position, for example, allows sea-based units to change their axis of attack, and makes the defensive problem of the enemy much more difficult. By simply moving into an area, sea-based aviation units fill the skies with their presence, affecting both the military situation and the mind-set of a potential enemy. Should combat operations be initiated, sea-based air units are prepared to launch sustained strikes against enemy targets for as long as required. Even if the enemy forces choose to strike back at the naval force, the mere act of the attacking fleet units degrades the hostile air and naval units involved.* Sea-Based Airpower Provides Instant Regional Situational Awareness Sea-Based Airpower Provides Instant Regional Situational Awareness -A battle group entering an area provides a wide variety of intelligence-collection capabilities for a regional CinC. Along with the air and s.h.i.+pborne sensors organic to a naval force, the unit commanders have a number of regional and national-level intelligence-collection capabilities that can rapidly fuse the data into a coherent situational a.n.a.lysis. This makes the job of deciding upon future action and committing follow-on forces much less uncertain. As a further benefit, the staying power of the naval force means that minute-to-minute changes in the military and political situation in a crisis/combat zone can be watched, and trends and developments can be tracked over time, allowing a deeper and wider understanding of the regional situation. -A battle group entering an area provides a wide variety of intelligence-collection capabilities for a regional CinC. Along with the air and s.h.i.+pborne sensors organic to a naval force, the unit commanders have a number of regional and national-level intelligence-collection capabilities that can rapidly fuse the data into a coherent situational a.n.a.lysis. This makes the job of deciding upon future action and committing follow-on forces much less uncertain. As a further benefit, the staying power of the naval force means that minute-to-minute changes in the military and political situation in a crisis/combat zone can be watched, and trends and developments can be tracked over time, allowing a deeper and wider understanding of the regional situation.* Sea-Based Airpower Is Protected from the Effects of International Politics-Unlike land-based air and ground units, which can't operate without the approval of a regional ally or host country, naval forces (and air units in particular) are not affected by such issues. They are also less vulnerable to attack by enemy forces or acts of terrorism. s.h.i.+elded by the international laws covering freedom of navigation, sea-based units are free to act independently. Since each s.h.i.+p and aircraft is the sovereign territory of the owning country, any attack or intrusion becomes a potential act of war and a violation of international law. Since few nations have the will to violate these accords, this makes naval aviation a force that does not have to ask permission to act.* Sea-Based Airpower Provides Long-Term Presence and Power Sea-Based Airpower Provides Long-Term Presence and Power-Maritime nations have long made allowance for resupply and support of their forces at sea. As long as proper sea lines of communications can be maintained, and replacement s.h.i.+ps and aircraft can be rotated, s.h.i.+ps and sea-based air units can be sustained almost indefinitely on station, and mission durations of months or even years can be supported. This is a key attribute of great maritime nations, and the addition of sea-based air units to their force mix greatly enhances the power and presence they can generate. Recent examples of this kind of forward naval presence are the naval embargoes of Iraq and the Balkans, and the lead-up to the 1991 Gulf War.* Sea-Based Airpower Can Conduct Multiple Missions at the Same Sea-Based Airpower Can Conduct Multiple Missions at the Same Time-Since naval forces are designed with robust command-and-control capabilities, and sea-based aircraft are multi-mission-capable by necessity, sea-based air units are capable of many types of missions, and can conduct them simultaneously. Thus, attack aircraft can conduct suppressive missions on enemy air defenses, while other units are engaging in precision cruise-missile strikes, armed helicopters are securing the battles.p.a.ce around the naval force, and SAM-equipped s.h.i.+ps are conducting defensive operations against enemy ballistic- and cruise-missile strikes. Such flexi-bility gives naval leaders a critical edge when fast-breaking, rapidly changing crisis and combat situations are in play. Time-Since naval forces are designed with robust command-and-control capabilities, and sea-based aircraft are multi-mission-capable by necessity, sea-based air units are capable of many types of missions, and can conduct them simultaneously. Thus, attack aircraft can conduct suppressive missions on enemy air defenses, while other units are engaging in precision cruise-missile strikes, armed helicopters are securing the battles.p.a.ce around the naval force, and SAM-equipped s.h.i.+ps are conducting defensive operations against enemy ballistic- and cruise-missile strikes. Such flexi-bility gives naval leaders a critical edge when fast-breaking, rapidly changing crisis and combat situations are in play.* Sea-Based Airpower Can Generate a Wide Variety of Effects Sea-Based Airpower Can Generate a Wide Variety of Effects-A naval force generates reactions that range from coercion to terror. Sea-based air units add to this power, by adding a wide variety of weapon and mission effects, ranging from the use of surveillance aircraft and the delivery of special operations forces to more traditional results like the aerial delivery of munitions onto targets. Yet even here, variety is the watch-word. Because naval air units are based at sea, there are no restrictions upon the munitions they can carry and employ. This means that an enemy can expect to face everything from precision-guided penetration bombs to cl.u.s.ter munitions-or even a nuclear strike. Such threats can often deliver the most useful of all weapons effects, deterrence from acting with hostile force against a neighboring nation.* Sea-Based Airpower Keeps Threats Far Away Sea-Based Airpower Keeps Threats Far Away-America's Navy has historically displayed its greatest value by keeping the threat of enemy military action on the other side of the world's oceans. In fact, no hostile military force of any size has intruded upon our territory since the War of 1812. Today, our sea services continue this mission, and sea-based airpower provides our naval forces with much of the muscle that makes it possible. By keeping the enemy threats against our homeland at arm's length, sea-based airpower keeps our nation strong, and our people safe in an otherwise uncertain world.

The launch of a BGM-109 Tomahawk cruise missile from the guided-missile destroyer Laboon Laboon (DDG-58) during Operation Desert Strike in 1996. (DDG-58) during Operation Desert Strike in 1996.

OFFICIAL U.S. NAVY PHOTO.

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Milestones: The Development of a Modern Weapon It goes without saying that inst.i.tutions as large, diverse, and powerful as naval aviation do not just happen overnight. They evolve over time, and are the product of the forces and personalities that impact upon them. In fact, naval aviation grew to maturity surprisingly quickly, and most of the critical events and trends that shaped it happened in the roughly five decades stretching from 1908 through the mid-1950's. During that time, the basic forms and functions that define carriers and their aircraft today were conceived and developed. Let's take a look at a few of the most critical of these events and trends. We'll start with the first act in the birth of the world's most powerful conventional weapons system.

Eugene Ely's Stunt Our journey begins in 1908, just five years after the Wright brothers' first flight, when Glenn Curtiss, an early aerial pioneer, laid out a bombing range in the shape of a battles.h.i.+p, and simulated attacking it. Though the U.S. Navy took notice of Curtiss's test run, it took no action. Several years later, after word reached America of a German attempt to fly an airplane from the deck of a s.h.i.+p, the U.S. Navy decided to try a similar experiment. They built a wooden platform over the main deck of the light cruiser Birmingham Birmingham (CL-2) and engaged Eugene Ely, a stunt pilot working for Curtiss, to fly off it. At 3 P.M. on the afternoon of November 14th, 1910, while (CL-2) and engaged Eugene Ely, a stunt pilot working for Curtiss, to fly off it. At 3 P.M. on the afternoon of November 14th, 1910, while Birmingham Birmingham was anch.o.r.ed in Hampton Roads, Virginia, Ely gunned his engine, rolled down the wooden platform, and flew off. He landed near Norfolk several miles away. A few months later, Ely reversed the process and landed on another platform built on the stern of the armored cruiser was anch.o.r.ed in Hampton Roads, Virginia, Ely gunned his engine, rolled down the wooden platform, and flew off. He landed near Norfolk several miles away. A few months later, Ely reversed the process and landed on another platform built on the stern of the armored cruiser Pennsylvania Pennsylvania (ACR-4), which was then anch.o.r.ed in San Francis...o...b..y. Soon afterward, Congress began to appropriate money, the first naval aviators began to be trained, and planes began to go to sea with the fleet. It was a humble beginning, but Eugene Ely's barnstorming stunt had started something very much bigger than that. (ACR-4), which was then anch.o.r.ed in San Francis...o...b..y. Soon afterward, Congress began to appropriate money, the first naval aviators began to be trained, and planes began to go to sea with the fleet. It was a humble beginning, but Eugene Ely's barnstorming stunt had started something very much bigger than that.

The First Flattop: The Conversion of the USS Langley Langley (CV-1) (CV-1) Stunts were one thing, but making naval aviation a credible military force was something else entirely. During World War I, U.S. naval aviation was primarily seaplanes used for gunnery spotting and antisubmarine patrols. However, the British achieved some fascinating results using normal (wheeled) pursuit aircraft (fighters) launched from towed barges, and later from specially built aircraft carriers converted from the hulls of other s.h.i.+ps. These aircraft attacked German Zeppelin hangars and other targets.6 The benefits of taking high-performance aircraft to sea were so obvious to the British that the Royal Navy rapidly set to converting further s.h.i.+ps into aircraft carriers. This move did not go unnoticed by other Naval powers after World War I. By 1919, the j.a.panese were also constructing a purpose-built carrier, the The benefits of taking high-performance aircraft to sea were so obvious to the British that the Royal Navy rapidly set to converting further s.h.i.+ps into aircraft carriers. This move did not go unnoticed by other Naval powers after World War I. By 1919, the j.a.panese were also constructing a purpose-built carrier, the Hosho. Hosho. Meanwhile the British continued their program of converting hulls into aircraft carriers, and began work on their own from-the-keel-up carrier, the Hermes. Meanwhile the British continued their program of converting hulls into aircraft carriers, and began work on their own from-the-keel-up carrier, the Hermes.

Eugene Ely flies off of the USS Pennsylvania Pennsylvania at 3 P.M. on November 14th, 1910. This was the moment of birth for naval aviation. at 3 P.M. on November 14th, 1910. This was the moment of birth for naval aviation.

OFFICIAL U.S. NAVY PHOTO.

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These programs spurred the General Board of the U.S. Navy to start its own aircraft carrier program. In 1919, the board allocated funds to convert a surplus collier, the USS Jupiter, into the Navy's first aircraft carrier, the USS Langley Langley (CV-1)-nicknamed the "Covered Wagon" by her crew. For the next two decades, the little (CV-1)-nicknamed the "Covered Wagon" by her crew. For the next two decades, the little Langley Langley provided the first generation of U.S. carrier aviators